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THE PROGENY OF SANTA FE V GREEN: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF A
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM UNDER
RULE 10b-5 AND A CASE FOR A
FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
CATHY S. KRENDLt
Because of the procedural advantages available in federal court,
many litigants have chosen to bring suits in thatforum under rule 10b-5
for breach of thefiduciary duty of officers and directors of a corporation
rather than sue in state court. In Santa Fe Industries v. Green the
United States Supreme Court attempted to check this trend The Court
in Sante Fe held that claims alleging simply a breach offiduciary duty
should be brought in state courts and that only those claims alleging
deception or manipulation in connection with a breach offiduciary duty
could be brought in federal court. In this Article, Professor Krendlfirst
analyzes the Santa Fe decision and then, based on the decisions of
lower courts since Santa Fe, sets out what is required to bring afiduci-
ary claim under rule 10b-5 in federal court. Professor Krendlfocusing
on the confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts, argues that the
territorial rule of Santa Fe is not a workable one and that Congress,
therefore, should enact express federal fiduciary standards. She con-
cludes that in that legislation, Congress should give the federal courts
subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims alleging a breach of the
fiduciary duty of directors to the corporation and its shareholders.
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The board of directors of a corporation authorizes a loan from corporate
funds to one of its members on terms unfavorable to the corporation; a parent
company loots its most profitable subsidiary through its control of the subsidi-
ary's board; a board fights a tender offer for the corporation's stock to preserve
its control of the corporation. These transactions illustrate typical conflict of
interest situations in which a corporate director has a personal interest in tak-
ing a position favorable to himself or the party responsible for his election in
conflict with his fiduciary duty to the corporation. Corporate statutes and the
common law traditionally have viewed these transactions with strict scrutiny
and usually have required a director who seeks to enforce a corporate obliga-
tion incurred through one of these transactions to prove that the transaction is
fair to the corporation. Litigants, however, often have preferred to challenge
these transactions in federal court through the federal securities laws because
procedural advantages are available in a federal forum,1 federal judges are
often more sophisticated and experienced in analyzing complex corporate
transactions, applicable precedent is more likely to be found in federal cases,
and the federal docket often affords faster consideration. This determination
by litigants to pursue traditional state claims in federal forums2 has raised a
I. There are several procedural advantages. First, the security for expenses statute, applica-
ble in state court actions, is inapplicable to actions under the securities laws in federal courts. See
McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). (This
statute typically requires that a plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action post a bond to cover the
expenses of the defendant director or corporation, including attorney's fees). Second, a demand
on shareholders is required in some states as a condition precedent to derivative actions but is
unnecessary in federal courts as shareholders cannot ratify a violation of the federal securities
laws. See Dopp v. American Elec. Laboratories, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Third,
nationwide service of process and flexible venue provisions are available under federal laws. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Finally, the plaintiffs may de-
mand a jury in a federal court if the corporation would have been entitled to a jury. See Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
2. The basic securities law vehicle for bringing these suits in federal courts is rule lOb-5,
which reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
1981]
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territorial question-should self-dealing transactions be the turf of state or
federal courts? Neither court system has been very enthusiastic about taking
adverse possession of these claims. The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green,3 attempted to draw a property line that would return the
self-dealing turf to state courts. Subsequent interpretations of Santa Fe, how-
ever, have revealed that this line is not a workable one. The purposes of this
Article are to analyze the essential elements of a fiduciary duty claim under
rule lOb-5 and to demonstrate the desirability of an express federal statute that
would give the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over self-dealing cases.
First, it is helpful to review briefly the Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green deci-
sion and particularly the reasons used to support the decision.
I. DISCUSSION OF SANTA .FE INDUSTrIIES, INC. v. GREEN
Through a series of purchases beginning in 1936, Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
(Santa Fe) acquired ninety-five percent of the stock of Kirby Lumber Corpo-
ration (Kirby). In 1974 Santa Fe effected a short-form merger with Kirby to
eliminate the owners of the remaining five percent of Kirby stock. The Dela-
ware short-form merger statute permitted a parent that owned at least ninety
percent of a subsidiary to merge with the subsidiary upon the approval of the
parent's board of directors and to cash out the minority shareholders, provided
that notice of the merger was given to the shareholders within ten days after
the effective date of the merger. Under the statute minority shareholders had
the right to petition the Delaware courts for appraisal, that is, to request that
the court appoint an appraiser to determine the fair value of their stock and, if
that price differed from the price offered by the corporation, to require the
corporation to pay the appraised value.
4
Santa Fe complied with the statutory short-form merger procedure in all
technical respects and also hired Morgan Stanley and Company to appraise
ate as a fraud or deceipt upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
3. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The subsequent history of the Santa Fe plaintiffs is interesting to the
reader, if frustrating for the plaintiffs. In Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 82 F.R.D. 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification when they sought to con-
tinue their action based on diversity jurisdiction for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law.
Plaintiffs were to represent a class consisting of all minority shareholders with 17 or more Kirby
shares at the time of the merger (each shareholder with more than 17 shares would satisfy the
$10,000 requirement). They asked either to be restored as minority shareholders of Kirby or to
receive an appraisal. At the time an appraisal proceeding brought by other minority shareholders
of Kirby was pending in the Delaware state courts. The New York court denied their motion for
class certification on two grounds: (1) since almost all the former stockholders had either accepted
the $150 offer of Santa Fe or sought appraisal, restoration of the minority to full shareholders of
Kirby would be in conflict with the relief many of the shareholders of the proposed class would
want; and (2) since the question of money damages was being fully litigated in Delaware, a class
action in federal court would result in duplicative litigation and run the risk of inconsistent deter-
minations. In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), upon challenge by minority
shareholders the Delaware Supreme court upheld a chancery court's acceptance of an appraiser s
determination of the fair market value of Kirby stock.
4. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 851-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af 'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
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the stock based on other independent appraisals of Kirby's fiscal assets and
financial information. Morgan Stanley valued the stock at $125 per share, and
Santa Fe offered the minority shareholders $150 per share. Rather than seek
an appraisal remedy in the Delaware courts, minority shareholders brought a
federal derivative and class action requesting rescission of the merger and fair
value for their shares, allegedly $772 per share, based on an appraisal of the
assets included in the information statement sent by Santa Fe to the minority
shareholders.
5
The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated rule 1Ob-5 be-
cause the merger took place without prior notice to minority shareholders and
because its purpose was to freeze out the minority shareholders at a wholly
inadequate price. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim 6 but was reversed by a divided Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.7 The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
held that the complaint did not state a cause of action.8
Using the method of analysis adopted in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,9 the
Supreme Court relied upon the express statutory language of section 10(b).10
First, the Court read section 10(b) to require that the alleged conduct, to be
actionable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, be "fairly viewed as 'manipula-
tive or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute.""I Second, the Court con-
cluded that the conduct in Santa Fe was neither deceptive nor manipulative
under the language of either section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.1 2 There was no de-
ception because the complaint alleged only that a fiduciary duty had been
breached and not that any misrepresentation or deception or nondisclosure
had occurred in connection with the alleged breach. Defining "manipulative"
in its most technical and limited sense, 13 the Court also concluded that no
manipulative conduct was alleged since a breach of fiduciary duty per se is not
manipulation. Consequently, there being neither deception nor manipulation,
no cause of action was stated under the language of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.
5. Id
6. Id at 856.
7. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
8. 430 U.S. at 477.
9. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Section 10(b) reads as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
11. 430 U.S. at 474.
12. Id
13. Id at 476. "'Manipulation' is 'virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets.'" Id (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199). "The term refers
generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
mislead investors by artifically affecting market activity." 430 U.S. at 476.
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The Court cited additional considerations that "weigh heavily against
permitting a cause of action under Rule lOb-5" 14 for breach of fiduciary duty
in the absence of deception of manipulation. First, the Court emphasized that
the fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act is to encourage full disclosure, not
fairness of transactions, which is "'at best a subsidiary purpose' ""- of the fed-
eral legislation. A breach of fiduciary duty absent material omissions or mis-
representations is in effect a fairness question, and so long as the transaction is
subject to full disclosure, the Court held that unfairness should not in and of
itself be subject to redress under the federal securities laws.
Second, the Court argued that because self-dealing is the kind of action
traditionally governed by state law, the federal courts should be reluctant to
find that Congress intended to create a federal cause of action.16 Third, the
Court, referring to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,17 said that to
permit fiduciary duty causes of action in federal courts would pose a "'danger
of vexatious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of
plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5.' "18 Finally, the Court expressed its concern that
giving federal redress would "quite possibly interfere with state corporate law"
because federal courts "could be expected to depart from state fiduciary stan-
dards at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within the federal
system."' 19 The Court cited Cort v. Ash20 to emphasize this point. "'Corpora-
tions are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly re-
quires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state
law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.' ",21
The Santa Fe Court found that the essence of the complaint was that the
shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary and that this allegation,
standing alone, relegated plaintiffs' complaint to state court. In so doing, the
Court defined state and federal turf as follows: claims that in essence allege
breach of fiduciary duty are the turf of state courts; claims alleging deception
(material omissions or misrepresentations) or manipulation in connection with
a breach of fiduciary duty are the shared turf of the federal and state courts.
The Court, acknowledging that this line of demarcation may not be correct,
14. 430 U.S. at 477.
15. Id at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975)),
16. 430 U.S. at 478.
17. 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975).
18. 430 U.S. at 479. This litigation would result because:
It is difficult to imagine how a court could distinguish, for purposes of Rule lOb-5 fraud,
between a majority stockholder's use of a short-form merger to eliminate the minority at
an unfair price and the use of some other device, such as long-form merger, tender offer,
or liquidation, to achieve the same result; or indeed how a court could distinguish the
alleged abuses in these going private transactions from other types of fiduciary self-deal-
ing involving transactions in securities. The result would be to bring within the Rule a
wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation.
Id at 478.
19. Id at 479.
20. 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
21. 430 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added by Santa Fe court).
[Vol. 59
lob-5 FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS
nonetheless insisted that only Congress can draw the line with boundaries
more generous to the federal courts. "There may well be a need for uniform
federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this
complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.'"22
Santa Fe has been interpreted by various district and appellate courts,
and the discussions in those decisions are quite revealing. Those interpreta-
tions will first be discussed to determine the elements that now appear neces-
sary to bring a fiduciary duty claim under rule lOb-5. Then a more careful
analysis will be made to ascertain whether the lower courts have kept within
the property lines drawn in Santa Fe.
II. THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS FOR A FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM UNDER
RULE lOb-5
A. General Overview
A breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is stated under rule lOb-5 if the
plaintiff alleges the following elements:
1. The jurisdictional means is satisfied; that is, the fraud involved
the use of interstate commerce or the mails or a facility of a national
securities exchange;
2. A security was bought or sold;
3. The plaintiff was the purchaser or seller of securities;
4. There was a material deception (a misrepresentation or omis-
sion) or manipulation;
5. The defendant acted with scienter-fault greater than negli-
gence;
6. In the case of misrepresentation, the plaintiff relied;
7. Under some circumstances, there must be privity between the
plaintiff and defendant;
8. The plaintiff sustained damages and brought the claim within the
statute of limitations.
Persons liable for a violation of rule lob-5 can include the issuer, any control-
ling person of the issuer,23 and any person who aids and abets24 the violation.
22. Id at 479-80 (quoting Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law.- Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974) (footnote omitted). The Court defended this position citing Cary,
supra, at 700 (1974).
Professor Cary argues vigorously for comprehensive federal fiduciary standards, but
urges a "frontal" attack by a new federal statute rather than an extension of Rule 10b-5.
He writes: "It seems anomalous to jig-saw every kind of corporate dispute into the fed-
eral courts through the securities acts as they are presently written."
430 U.S. at 480 n.17.
23. Section 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 provides that
Every person who. . . controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter
...shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such con-
trolled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the control-
19811
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B. Jurisdictional Means
The jurisdictional requirement of section 10(b) is met if, in connection
ling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). The controlling person's defense is that he acted in good faith. For
determination of good faith, see Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d
478 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 734 (1980) (inadequate precautionary mechanisms);
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (no affirmative
acts required on facts; controlling person was simply required to maintain a reasonable and
proper system of supervision and internal control); Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (dictum; failure to supervise adequately is bad faith). For good faith determina-
tion as applied to an outside director, see Mader v. Armel, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1023 (1972). For a more complete discussion of § 20, see generally Annot., "Controlling
Person" Liability Under § 20(a) of Securities Act of 1934, 38 A.L.R. FED. 725 (1978).
24. Liability for aiding and abetting is justified upon two theories. Persons may be liable
under rule lOb-5 based upon a tort theory or a criminal theory. The tort theory, which makes
persons liable in civil causes of actions for violations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, is based on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977), which states:
Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he. . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutesa breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ....
The theory that makes aiders and abettors liable for criminal violations is based on 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1976), which provides:
Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
To establish aiding and abetting liability, it is necessary to show:
(1) Existence of an independent wrong, that is, a securities law violation. See, e.g.,
Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
(2) Knowledge of the wrong's existence. Some courts require actual knowledge. See,
e.g., Ster v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (re-
quires actual or imputed knowledge of fraud and positive assistance to wrongdoersor breach of duty to disclose fraud to plaintiff); Breman v. Midwester United Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. nd. 1966) (motion to dismiss), 286 F. Supp. 702(1968) (on merits), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970). Other courts require only the existence of a generalawareness. See SEC v.Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) ("[G]eneral
awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper, and if...
[he] knowingly and substantially assisted the violation." Id at 1316. "Inaction
may be a form of assistance in certain cases, but only where it is shown that the
silence of the accused alder and abettor was consciously intended to aid the securi-
ties law violation." Id at 1317.) Still other courts suggest that a showing of reck-
lessness is sufficient. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1979) (if a fiduciary duty is owed to the defrauded
party, recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. Id at 44); but see Edwards &
Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979), ceri. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 734 (1980); Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 457 F.
Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For recent applications, see Hirsch v. du Pont, 553
F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) (aiding and abetting still viable claim in
injunctive action after Hochfelder); Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (negligence not enough, actual knowledge required);
(3) Substantial assistance of the violation. This requirement can be established by
demonstrating knowing partic#pation. See Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 1974). It is more clearly defined in Landy v. FDIC, which cites the Restate-
ment definition of substantial assistance. "'If the encouragement or assistance is a
[Vol. 59
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with the purchase or sale of securities, there is a use of the mails or of a means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of a facility of a national securi-
ties exchange.25 The securities need not be traded on a national securities
exchange, nor must the issuer have one million dollars in assets and five hun-
dred holders of one class of equity securities. It is not necessary that the mis-
statement or omission be transmitted by the use of interstate commerce; any
use of the jurisdictional means in connection with the transaction is suffi-




The term "security" is defined broadly in section 3a(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certif-
icate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument com-
monly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but
substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a
tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.'" 486 F.2d
139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 346 (1967)). Facts relevant in determining substantial assist-
ance in the Restatement view include: (1) the amount of assistance given by the
defendant; (2) his presence or absence at the time of the tort; (3) his relation to the
other person; and (4) his state of mind. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876,
Comment b (1977). The most difficult question is whether mere silence or inaction
is substantial assistance. For cases that suggest that it is, see Monsen v. Consoli-
dated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978)
(inaction may result in liability where there is a conscious intent to assist in the
perpetration of a wrongful act); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th
Cir. 1974) (mere silence is enough if it amounts to knowing assistance of, or partici-
pation in, a fraudulent scheme); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (when there is a special
relationship, silence amounts to a tacit agreement with the fraudulent party); In re
Gap Stores Sec. Litigation, 457 F. Supp. 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (director found not
to aid and abet). But see Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975)
(whether mere silence is sufficient depends upon facts).
For a discussion of all of these elements, see generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases.- Aiding andAbetting, Conspiracy, In Par Delicto, Indemn~fcation and Contribu-
tion, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972). See also SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974); Epprecht v. Delaware Valley Mach. Inc., 407 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Some
question remains whether aiding and abetting is an appropriate theory. The Supreme Court left
the question open in Ernst & Ernst v. Hocifelder, 425 U.S. at 191 n.7 and denied certiorari in SEC
v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977), which
raised the question with respect to lawyers and accountants.
25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
26. See, eg., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1976).
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shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of
not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any re-
newal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
2 8
The courts, in interpreting "investment contract," have broadened the
definition further by using a combination of a modified Howey test,2 9 which
classifies as an investment contract a device through which an investment of
money is made in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits to be
derived substantially from the managerial efforts of third parties, and the
Joiner test, which looks to the "character the instrument is given in commerce
by the terms of the offer, .the plan of distribution, and the economic induce-
ments held out to the prospect."' 30 In the typical conflict of interest case, the
sale of stock is usually involved;31 therefore, a security is clearly present.
D. A Purchaser or Seller of Securities-the Birnbaum Requirement
The Birnbaum requirement, a standing test first adopted by the court in
Birnbaum v.Newport Steel Corp.32 and reaffirmed in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,33 requires that the plaintiff himself be a purchaser or
seller of securities. A shareholder who is suing derivatively, as in a fiduciary
duty case, meets the Birnbaum requirement if the corporation is the purchaser
or seller of securities. 34 Although some exceptions to Birnbaum have not
survived Blue Chip,35 others have been relied on by some courts to give relief
28. Id § 78c(a)(10).
29. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
30. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943). For the most recent
applications of the Howey-Joiner test by the Supreme Court, see International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (a noncontributing compulsory pension plan is not a security) and
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (stock issued in consideration
for an apartment in a cooperative nonprofit housing project is not a security).
31. See, e.g., Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560
F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
32. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
33. 421 U.S. 723 (hereinafter cited as Blue Chip). The Court held that the offerees of a stock
offering made pursuant to an antitrust consent decree could not maintain a private cause of action
for many damages under rule lOb-5 because they neither purchased nor sold the offered shares
and because their "right" to obtain the shares was not a contractual right sufficient to qualify
under the exception to Birnbaum. Id at 754-55.
34. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971); Gold-
berger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
35. Exceptions that have been determined not to survive Blue Chip are the aborted seller,
would-be seller, and frustrated seller exceptions. The aborted seller exception was not recognized
in Superintendent of Ins. v. Freedman, 443 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), in which a corporation
that had transferred funds for securities when there was no intention to convey the securities was
deemed not to be a purchaser. The would-be seller exception (a shareholder who would have sold
but for defendant's omission) was eliminated by the express language of Blue Chip. See Blue
Chp, 421 U.S. at 737-38; Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But
see Hermn v. Stafford, 455 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (dictum), in which a shareholder who
refrained from selling stock in reliance on misleading statements in a proxy solicitation seeking
approval of merger had standing to sue. The frustrated seller exception (shareholder fraudulently
induced to retain his securities) also was expressly eliminated by Blue Chip. See Blue Chp, 421
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to shareholders who sue either on their own behalf or on behalf of the corpo-
ration. For example, a "forced" seller has been permitted to sue under rule
lOb-5 if the nature of his interest in the corporation has been fundamentally
changed, that is, there has been a change in his status with the issuer or in his
relative investment. "Forced" sellers have been found to include shareholders
of an acquired corporation in an ordinary merger or sale of assets,36 minority
shareholders cashed out by short-form mergers, 37 and shareholders forced out
in certain liquidations.38 The forced seller doctrine was used to support stand-
ing in a fiduciary duty claim in Canadian Javelin Ltd v. Brooks.39 Javelin was
suing its former directors, who also constituted a majority of the boards of
directors of "Bison" and "Jubilee," for violating rule lOb-5 in eliminating
Javelin's controlling interest in Bison and Jubilee through an exchange of
stock between Bison and Jubilee. Javelin argued that it met the Birnbaum
requirement as a "forced" seller because the exchange of securities between
Bison and Jubilee deprived it of its controlling interest in both companies and,
therefore, constituted a fundamental change in the nature of its investment
and expectations. 40 The court found that the degree of change was not suffi-
cient to make Javelin a "forced" seller because, although Javelin's propor-
tional ownership of Bison and Jubilee had been reduced, Javelin still retained
a 34.5% interest in Bison and a 23.9% interest in Jubilee. The court said: "To
argue, as Javelin does, that such a reduction in interest is tantamount to a sale,
is to carry the doctrine of 'forced seller' to an extreme."
4 1
The Birnbaum doctrine, including the "forced" seller exception, was dis-
cussed by the District Court for Delaware in a fiduciary duty claim in Valente
v. Pepsico.42 In the context of a tender offer, the court applied Birnbaum as
U.S. at 737-38; Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 981 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977).
36. See, e.g., Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969),
afppeal after remand, 461 F.2d 1123, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Wulc v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc.,
400 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
37. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
38. See Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1980) (minority shareholder deemed a
forced seller when the controlling shareholder fraudulently obtained possession of former's securi-
ties, liquidated the corporation, and denied the minority shareholder access to proceeds); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980) (forced seller doctrine deemed inapplicable
when a surviving corporation in a merger exchanged its predecessor's debt securities, which had
stock conversion rights, for debentures having only a cash conversion right because the fundamen-
tal nature of the security holder's interest was not substantially changed); Coffee v. Permian Corp.,
434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after remand, 474 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
920 (1973); Weisman v. Darneille, 78 F.R.D. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co.,
415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The forced seller exception is not met if there is a wind-down
rather than a liquidation. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528, 534 (3d Cir. 1974);
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Goodall v. Co-
lumbia Ventures, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
39. 462 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
40. Id at 195.
41. Id at 196. See Parness v. Lieblich, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,392 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (minority shareholder is not a forced seller when other court has
blocked proposed merger that would cause sale). The court noted in dictum that a reduction in
proportionate ownership does not constitute a forced sale.
42. 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1236 (D. Del. 1978).
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follows: (1) a shareholder whose tender was accepted by the offeror was a
seller within Birnbaum; (2) a shareholder who retained his shares at the time
of the tender offer but was required at the time of a subsequent short-form
merger either to surrender the shares in exchange for cash or to request ap-
praisal was a "forced seller;" (3) the nontendering warrant holders were
"forced sellers" because they were "left with either the right to purchase shares
in a nonexistent corporation or the right to receive cash; ' 43 and (4) the
nontendering debenture holders were not "forced" sellers because debentures
are debt securities with repayment and redemption terms that can be met by
any solvent obligor (as opposed to equity securities, which represent a share in
a particular enterprise) and because the nontendering debenture holders were
not required to accept a new form of consideration. 44
A plaintiff seeking an injunction need not meet the Birnbaum require-
ment in most jurisdictions45 unless the plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief 46
or the purpose of the injunction is to undo past activities.
4 7
Finally, a person may meet the Birnbaum requirement if he has contrac-
tual rights to purchase securities but does not exercise those rights. However, a
substantial question may exist as to whether the person in fact has contractual
rights. Present shareholders with conversion rights, if they are induced not to
convert, are deemed to have the required contractual rights.4 8 Persons
deemed not to have contractual rights for the purpose of this exception include
offerees of a stock offering made pursuant to an antitrust consent decree,49
shareholders who are denied a right of first refusal for an offering of an issuer's
treasury stock,50 individuals whose contract is made expressly subject to ap-
proval by the corporation's board and no such approval is given,5 ' and target
shareholders whose approval is necessary for a takeover to be effected by a
43. Id at 1237 n.10.
44. Id The change of the identity of the obligor was not a "fundamental change" in the
investment.
45. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969);
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Hundahl v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1166 (D.R.I. 1976); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Ill. 1975), modfled, 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Initio, Inc. v. Hesse, 474 F. Supp. 312 (D. Del. 1979) (questioned); Fuchs v.
Swanton Corp., 482 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (in looting case, minority shareholder permitted
to seek to enjoin a proposed merger of his company and its acquiring company even though not
permitted to sue for damages in an alleged bootstrap acquisition of a controlling block of his
company's shares).
46. See Lutgert v. Vanderbilt Bank, 508 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. See Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976).
48. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 446 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. Pa.
1977), rev'd, 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum); Camp v. Genesco, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SFc. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
49. Blue Chp, 421 U.S. at 751.
50. Tully v. Mott Supermarket, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1976).
51. Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a9'd in open
court, 471 F.2d 647 (2d 
Cir. 1973).
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merger.52
Courts, however, generally have not been eager to define Birnbaum in a
broad sense. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Reid v. Hughes,53 dismissed a
complaint because the plaintiff did not meet the Birnbaum requirement. The
plaintiff had alleged in a derivative action that the defendants had caused the
corporation, without consideration or for insufficient consideration, to issue
promissory notes, transfer cash, and pledge certificates of deposit to enable
another corporation to purchase the stock of a third corporation. The court
found that the corporation did not meet the Birnbaum requirement because (1)
under the circumstances neither the certificates of deposit nor the notes were
securities and (2) the first corporation's financing of another corporation's
purchase of a third corporation did not make the first corporation a purchaser
for purposes of Birnbaum.54 Likewise, in Superintendent ofInsurance v. Freed-
man,5S the Southern District of New York dismissed a fiduciary claim under
rule lOb-5 because the plaintiff-corporation's status as a purchaser was in
doubt. The defendants had transferred money from a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary to the parent company and covered the transfer by representing that the
subsidiary was purchasing stock of another company. The court found that
the purchase did not take place and was never intended to take place and
refused to stretch the Birnbaum requirement to apply to the facts of the case.
In summary, in absence of the "forced sale," "injunction," or "contractual
rights" exceptions, the fiduciary duty claim must be in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities actually made by the corporation; otherwise the
complaint will not withstand a motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiff, suing derivatively on behalf of the corporation, cannot meet the
standing requirement of Birnbaum.
. Scienter
Another element of a lOb-5 claim is "scienter." Scienter requires the
showing of something more than mere negligence. The Supreme Court de-
fined scienter in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder56 as "intent to deceive, manipu-
late or defraud" 57 and "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate
or defraud."'5 8 Although the Hochfelder Court expressly did not determine
whether its definition of scienter includes reckless behavior,59 the majority of
courts in subsequent decisions have found reckless conduct sufficient.60 Reck-
52. Rediker v. Geon Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
53. 578 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1978).
54. Id at 638-39.
55. 443 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd men, 594 F.2d 852 (1978).
56. 425 U.S. 185.
57. Id at 193.
58. Id at 194 n.12.
59. Id See Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 n.5 (1980).
60. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Spectrum Financial
Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor cert.filedsub non. Harris, Kerr,
Forster & Co. v. Spectrum Financial Cos., No. 79-1251, (U.S. Feb. 21, 1980); Mansbach v. Pres-
cott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Berdahl v. SEC, 572 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1978)
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less conduct most frequently has been defined as "a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or
is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it."'61 InAaron v. SEC,62
the Supreme Court recently held that Hochfelder scienter must be established
by the Securities and Exchange Commission in an injunctive action.
63
(implication); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978) (dictum); Nelson v. Serwold,
576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (aiding and abetting); Coleco Indus., Inc.
v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830; Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Bartels v. Algonquin Properties,
Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Vt. 1979); Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
464 F. Supp. 528 (D. Md. 1978); Continental Assurance Co. v. American Bankshares Corp., 439 F.
Supp. 804 (E.D. Wis. 1977); SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. IlI. 1977). A sound
application of facts to law in the fiduciary duty context-the court found sufficient recklessness to
meet the scienter requirement-was made in Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). See also Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d
Cir. 1980) (court found sufficient evidence to create jury question of scienter). The Delaware
district court, in Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. at 1249, presents a helpful general discus-
sion of the scienter requirement in a fiduciary duty case. Recklessness was found to meet the
scienter requirement even in an omission case and in a transaction not carried out face-to-face.
Id at 1250 n.40. The Delaware court cited Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978); Rolf
v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); and Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman,
567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977). The court used the Sundstrand definition of recklessness, see note 61
and accompanying text infra, and also cited Sundstrand's further elaboration of that definition.
"[Nlot only must the danger of misleading buyers be actually known or so obvious that any man
would be legally bound as knowing, but the omission must derive from something more egregious
than even 'white heart/empty head' good faith." Valente v. PepsiCo., Inc., 454 F. Supp. at 1250-
51. The court said that this standard was applied in Nelson v. Serwold and Cook v. Avien, Inc..
The court, in leaving to the trier of fact the question whether the defendants' behavior was reck-
less, cautioned that the determination of materiality would not demonstrate recklessness. Id at
1251 n.42. The court held that the scienter requirement was also met if the defendants had actual
knowledge of the omitted facts even though they had no knowledge that the information would
mislead investors, id at 1252 n.45, and then specifically found that the scienter requirement was
met in this case because the defendants had actual knowledge of the existence of the appraisal and
did not put this information in the tender offer materials. This knowledge of the officers and
directors was attributed to the company to find it liable. 1d at 1252-53. But see Utah State Univ.
of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 890 (1977) (willful or intentional misconduct, or the equivalent thereof, is essential to recov-
ery under § 10(b)); Greene v. Emersons, Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Outside directors'
failure to discover actions by officers that artificially inflated price of company's stock did not
constitute lOb-5 scienter even though the outside directors allegedly held no regularly scheduled
meetings, met infrequently, did not receive or insist on receiving an agenda prior to the meetings
or internal financial informatoin on a regular basis, and had no audit committee. The court did
not decide whether recklessness would satisfy the scienter requirement when no duty is owed to
the plaintiff because the facts alleged in the complaint were found insufficient to constitute reck-
lessness); Schuiman v. Weil, 466 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court noted in dictum that it was
not clear whether recklessness is sufficient if no duty is owed to the plaintiff); Competitive Assoc.,
Inc. v. Laventhol Krekstine Horwath & Horwath, 478 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dictum)
(recklessness may not be sufficient if no duty is owed to plaintiff).
61. Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976). This
definition was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977); by the First Circuit in Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir.
1978); by the Sixth Circuit in Mansbach v. Prescott, Bell & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir.
1979) (by implication); by the Third Circuit in Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641,
649 (3d Cir. 1980) and in McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
63. Id. at 1958.
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The definition of scienter in Hochfelder has required changes in other
elements of rule lOb-5: the plaintiff is deemed to be duly diligent even if he is
negligent because his diligence need be no higher than that of the defendant;
64
a lOb-5 claim must be pleaded with greater particularity because it is now
more akin to fraud;65 and the applicable statute of limitations may need to be
more related to an action that requires a higher degree of intent, such as
fraud.66
F Statute of Limitations
Because there is no express federal statute of limitations for lOb-5 actions,
state statutes of limitations are applied. The third, sixth, ninth, and tenth cir-
cuits have applied the state fraud statute of limitations, 67 while the fourth,
fifth, and eighth circuits have applied the statute of limitations applicable to
blue sky actions.68 The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the contro-
versy.69 The question of the tolling of the statute of limitations is governed by
federal law, which provides that the statute will not begin to run until the
plaintiff, exercising reasonable care and diligence, discovers the fraud.70 Dis-
covery may occur "from the time when a clue to the facts, if pursued dili-
gently, would lead to an uncovering of the general fraudulent scheme '7 1 or
when the plaintiff has "either actual knowledge or notice of facts which, in the
exercise of due diligence would have led to actual knowledge of the viola-
tion." 72 For example, knowledge of a suit raising similar claims has been im-
64. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976) (due diligence obligation de-
pends upon facts of each case).
65. See note 435 infra.
66. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
67. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979) (fraud
statute); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); Nickels v. Koehler Manage-
ment Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Robuck v. Dean
Witter & Co., No. 77-1841 (9th Cir., filed Aug. 31, 1979) (not for routine publication) (general
statute of limitations, not fraud statute, applied in fiduciary claim); Pollution Control & Eng'r
Corp. v. Lange, No. 76-1338 (10th Cir. April 22, 1976) (not for routine publication); Clegg v.
Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
68. Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Alodex Corp. Sec.
Litigation, 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976) (court applied blue sky statute because, like lOb-5, it did
not require a showing of scienter); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (blue sky statute); Dirksen v. Hynes & Howes Ins. Coun-
selors, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (Iowa changed its blue sky statute to require
scienter after Hochfelder); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1975), aft'd, 542
F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976).
69. In 1977 the Supreme Court declined to review the Fifth Circuit decision in Nortek, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977), that
applied the blue sky statute of limitations rather than the fraud statute. Likewise, the Court de-
nied certiorari in Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977), in which the Sixth Circuit applied the fraud statute.
70. Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974). See Smith v. Equity Nat'l Indus., Inc.,
609 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980) (mem.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2941 (1980).
71. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999,
1009 (D.D.C. 1978).
72. Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 79 F.R.D., 47, 51 (N.D. Ga. 1978). See Jones v.
Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979); Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 487
F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (plaintiff deemed to be on notice when advised by accountant that
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puted to the plaintiff for the purpose of determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run.
73
G. The Presence of Deception or Manipulation
The crux of any lOb-5 cause of action is a fraudulent act, and this require-
ment is best discussed specifically in the context of fiduciary duty cases. In
Santa Fe the Supreme Court held that a mere breach of fiduciary duty absent
"other" deception or manipulation was not the kind of fraudulent activity ac-
tionable under rule lOb-5.74 Courts since Santa Fe have struggled to deter-
mine whether that "other" undefined deception or manipulation is present to a
degree sufficient to fall within the parameters set in Santa Fe. In that struggle
questions peculiar to the fiduciary duty setting have emerged: (1) Who acts as
the corporate persona capable of being deceived, or, to whom must disclosure
be made? (2) Was the disclosure adequate? (3) Did the misrepresentation or
omission cause the harm? These questions first will be analyzed within the
broad overview of a paradigm fiduciary duty case brought under rule lob-5.
Then each question will be examined in depth in the context of other fiduciary
duty cases.
75
III. ELEMENTS OF lOb-5 AS ADAPTED TO A FIDUCIARY DuTy CLAIM
A. A Broad Overview in a Paradigm Fiduciary Duty Case
In Wright v. Heizer Corp. 76 the Seventh Circuit held that rule lob-5 was
properly pleaded in a case that raised the typical questions in a fiduciary duty
claim under lOb-5.77 In Wright plaintiff minority shareholders brought a de-
rivative action alleging that the majority shareholder had defrauded the corpo-
ration in a series of five transactions. The allegedly defrauded corporation,
International Digisonics Corporation (IDC), was formed to develop and use
electronic monitoring equipment to police television commercials to ascertain
whether the commercials were shown in accordance with agreements between
advertising agencies and television stations. At the outset Jordan Ross, the
company's founder, and Beneficial Standard Corporation, the first investor in
IDC, owned approximately two-thirds of the IDC stock; the remaining one-
third of the stock was owned by friends and business associates of Ross. The
irregularities existed in brokerage account and that he should see counsel); Koke v. Stifel, Nico-
laus & Co., 480 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1979), a'd, 620 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1980) (confirmation
slips and account statements gave constructive knowledge of misrepresentation); Roberts v. Mag-
netic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934 (D. NJ. 1978), reversedon other grounds, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.
1979) (SEC letter stating that there appeared to be adequate disclosure does not toll statute).
73. Braunstein v. Laventhol & Horwath, 433 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D.N.Y.), a1 'd in open court,
573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977).
74. See text accompanying notes 3-22 supra.
75. Of course, also included in the list of required elements for a fiduciary duty claim under
rule lOb-5 are the elements of materiality, reliance, and causation. These elements are discussed
in Part I of this article.
76. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
77. Id at 249.
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defendant, Heizer Corporation (Heizer), a venture capitalist that specialized in
investing in high-risk companies, first became acquainted with IDC in the fall
of 1969 when IDC was seeking a one million dollar capital contribution as a
preliminary step to going public. At that time Heizer, in a transaction receiv-
ing unanimous approval of the IDC board of directors and shareholders,
purchased, in consideration for one million dollars, 100,000 shares of a new
class A common stock for ten dollars per share and warrants to purchase
155,000 shares of common stock at $8.50 per share. The exercise price of the
warrants was hotly contested. Ross insisted on ten dollars per share and
Heizer offered five dollars per share. In 1970, when the public offering had not
yet taken place and IDC needed additional capital, Heizer agreed to loan two
million dollars to IDC on the same basis as the earlier transaction. 78 This
transaction also received the unanimous approval of the IDC board and share-
holders. Heizer received 200,000 shares of new preferred stock for ten dollars
per share and warrants to purchase 400,000 shares of common stock at an
exercise price of six dollars per share. The subscription agreement further pro-
vided that if certain conditions were not met, the warrants could be exercised
for four dollars per share. About a year later IDC needed more money and,
with unanimous approval of the IDC board and sharheolders, Heizer invested
$1.7 million in consideration for a twenty-year note and warrants to purchase
an additional 472,222 shares of common stock at $3.60 a share. This third
agreement, which obligated the corporation to issue additional common stock,
triggered the antidilution clauses negotiated in the first two agreements and
entitled Heizer to purchase 1,304,000 shares of IDC stock for $3.60 per share,
which amounted to sixty-one percent of the company's equity. IDC's articles
of incorporation were then amended to give the Heizer preferred stock 4.4
votes per share and the right to appoint two of Heizer's officers to the IDC
board. In the next six months IDC once again needed capital and after the
underwriter it retained could not find other private investors interested in buy-
ing IDC stock, Heizer agreed to lend IDC $600,000 in consideration for a
demand note, which, if not paid, would be convertible into common stock at
one dollar per share. This fourth transaction triggered the antidilution clauses
in the previous three transactions, thereby giving Heizer the right to purchase
4,694,400 shares of IDC common stock for one dollar per share. If these rights
were fully exercised, Heizer would have eighty-five percent of the equity of
IDC. The board of directors that met to consider this transaction consisted of
four persons-two of the other three directors had resigned and one was ab-
sent from the country.79 Of these four directors, two were Heizer nominees.
The Heizer nominees, admitting their conflict-of-interest positions, permitted
the two independent directors to vote first, assuring them that there would be
no transaction if either of them disapproved. The two independent directors
voted for the proposal, and the transaction then was submitted for a share-
holder vote because it was necessary to amend the articles of incorporation to
78. Id at 241-43.
79. Id at 241-44.
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increase the number of authorized shares. Written consent of the sharehold-
ers, permitted by Delaware law, was secured by Ross through solicitations
from himself and his friends and business associates.80 Beneficial, a large
shareholder, refused to give its consent. In December 1971, when the public
financing fell through, IDC, unable to develop the technology necessary to
monitor the commercials as previously hoped, changed the company's focus
and, at the behest of Hezier, sought new management. About three months
later the IDC board, with the Beneficial director dissenting, amended the
agreement in the fourth transaction to provide that Heizer would lend IDC
another $250,000, which would be convertible into common stock at an exer-
cise price of one dollar per share if not paid in eighteen days. When the loan
was not paid in the specified period, Heizer gained the right to purchase
eighty-seven percent of the company's equity at one dollar per share. Follow-
ing a change of management in the next year, Heizer extended approximately
two million dollars in nonconvertible demand loans to IDC to keep it afloat. 8'
In October 1972 a derivative action was filed by Beneficial and another
shareholder against Heizer for violating rule lob-5. While the case was pend-
ing, a fifth loan was made by Heizer to IDC, apparently because there was no
other financing available except through recapitalization of the corporation, a
measure that was impossible because of the pending law suit. In that fifth
transaction Heizer demanded a pledge of all the stock of T & R, the only
profitable IDC subsidiary, in consideration for which Heizer agreed to post-
pone demand on previous loans and lend the corporation between $460,000
and $1,181,700 during the remainder of the year. This loan would be secured
by the pledge and payable in January of the next year. The new president of
the company, elected by Heizer directors, testified that one purpose of the
pledge was "to smoke [the plaintiffs] out of the woodwork" by threatening to
foreclose on IDC's most profitable asset, T & R.
8 2
The complaint, which ultimately was amended twice, alleged that Heizer
had violated rule lob-5 by failing to disclose its controlling position to the
IDC shareholders and by setting an unfair exercise price for IDC's stock in the
second, third, and fourth transactions. The complaint further alleged that
Heizer, even if not in control of IDC, had aided and abetted IDC's manage-
ment in its failure to disclose material facts about the fourth transaction and
was liable as a controlling person for the actions of its nominees on the board
who voted for the allegedly unfair and improperly disclosed fourth transac-
tion.8
3
The district court found for plaintiffs on the fourth and fifth transaction
only and (1) ordered that the notes from the fourth transaction be declared
nonconvertible; (2) cancelled any warrants issued in connection with the
fourth transaction; (3) declared void the triggering of the prior warrants; and
80. This represented 52.4% of the IDC common stock. Id at 244.
81. Id at 241-44.
82. Id at 245.
83. Id
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(4) cancelled the pledge of T & R stock.84 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
the defendants challenged the lower court's ruling on liability for the fourth
and fifth transactions and argued that the court had granted overly broad pro-
spective relief. The plaintiffs did not challenge the district court's ruling that
there was no deception in the first three transactions. The district court also
ruled, however, that the unfair price and Heizer's violation of its fiduciary
duty were sufficient to establish liability under lOb-5 without proof of decep-
tion or nondisclosure. The Seventh Circuit, stating that this reasoning was no
longer valid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, nevertheless
affirmed the district court's decision, but on different grounds. 85
In reviewing the fourth and fifth transactions, the Seventh Circuit first
asked whether shareholder approval was required for the transactions. 86 This
question was raised at the outset because, after Santa Fe, an essential require-
ment of a lOb-5 claim is that there be deception, and there can be no deception
unless there is a person who is deceived. If shareholder approval is required,
the shareholders are the actors who are susceptible to deception;8 7 and to
avoid deception of the shareholders there must be disclosure to them of all
material facts.
In the fourth Heizer-IDC transaction, a charter amendment was neces-
sary to increase the number of authorized shares, and under Delaware law the
amendment requires approval by a majority of the common shareholders vot-
ing as a class. At the time of the fourth transaction, Heizer had the right to
acquire, through the exericse of warrants, a majority of the common stock but
had not yet exercised this right. Consequently, the other IDC shareholders
still had the power to defeat the amendment to the articles and thereby block
the fourth transaction. Since shareholder approval was required to effect this
transaction, the court concluded that the shareholders, as the principal actors
in the transaction, were entitled to full disclosure of all the material facts con-
cerning the transaction.
88
Once it decided who was entitled to disclosure, the court had to determine
whether full disclosure had been made. The court found that: (1) the only
written disclosure in the written consent and notice to shareholders was that
the number of common shares would be increased from three to seven million
by shareholder action; (2) the only oral disclosure was a representation that
the amendment was necessary for financing and the amount of the financing;
and (3) when Ross obtained the consents he did not reveal the source of the
financing or give any other information that would indicate that the financing
involved anything more than a simple purchase of stock.89 Heizer argued that
the shareholders should have inferred from the proposed increase in the
84. Id
85. Id at 246.
86. Id at 247.
87. If shareholder approval is not required, the question of who is deceived is more complex.
See text accompanying notes 108-21 infra.




number of shares of common stock that their equity position would be eroded
and that this inference should have put them on notice to ask Ross more ques-
tions.90 The court refused to impose this duty of inquiry on the shareholders.
Using the TSCIndustries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 91 standard of materiality, the
court held that the following material facts were not disclosed to the share-
holders: (1) the terms of the transaction; (2) the method by which Heizer ar-
rived at the dollar per share exercise price; (3) the alternatives that would be
available to the corporation if the transaction could not be consummated; and
(4) that a majority vote of the shareholders (excluding Heizer) was necessary
for passage of the amendment.92 The court also suggested that the affirmative
statement located at the bottom of the consent form-that Heizer had 300,000
votes-may have given the shareholders the misleading impression that their
votes were not important. This impression would be incorrect because, even
though Heizer had a large number of voting shares, it did not have a majority
of the common stock, and since the Delaware statute required the affirmative
vote of a majority of each class,93 Heizer could not by its vote alone assure
passage of the amendment.
The third step in the court's analysis of whether this fiduciary duty claim
was proper under lob-5 was an examination of the reliance requirement (or
the causation question). The court cited Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States94 for the general proposition that "in the ordinary lOb-5 case involving
a failure to disclose, proof of materiality is sufficient to establish reliance. '' 95
The court, applying this materiality concept to a fiduciary duty case, suggested
that if the minority shareholders would have been powerless to prevent the
proposed self-dealing by the controlling shareholder, even if they had pos-
sessed knowledge of all the facts, the failure to disclose presumably would be
immaterial and reliance would not be shown.96 In this case, however, the
court reasoned that the shareholders would have had the power under state
law to veto the transaction entirely and thus, if all the information had been
disclosed, could have prevented the self-dealing simply by voting against the
transaction. The required reliance, therefore, was clearly present.
Next the court, with more rigor and much greater difficulty, reviewed the
fifth transaction, using the framework of the same three questions: (1) Who is
90. Id at 247.
91. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). See text accompanying notes 307-22 infra.
92. 560 F.2d at 247-48.
93. Id Once it found that the disclosure was inadequate, the next question addressed by the
court was whether Heizer, as majority shareholder, should be liable for the failure of IDC to
disclose. The court found that even though Heizer did not control the board at the time of the
fourth transaction, three factors made it liable for the inadequate disclosure: (I) Heizer had vot-
ing control of the company at the crucial time; (2) Heizer had placed two of its officers on the IDC
board; and (3) Heizer had assumed responsibility for the disclosure by undertaking to control and
supervise the communication to the shareholders and even had its counsel draft the closing docu-
ments for all four transactions, including the infamous shareholder consents used in the fourth
transaction. Id at 248.
94. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
95. 560 F.2d at 249.
96. Id at 250.
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capable of being deceived, or, to whom must disclosure be made? (2) Was the
disclosure to this group adequate? (3) Did the failure to disclose cause the
harm? Because the corporation was the real party plaintiff in the fifth transac-
tion, the court first grappled with the problem of who could act for the corpo-
ration and, therefore, could be subject to deception. The fifth transaction
involved a pledge of the assets of the corporation's subsidiary, a transaction
that under Delaware law does not require shareholder approval. It would ap-
pear, therefore, that the board of directors would have authority to act for the
corporation and that disclosure to the board would be sufficient. The problem
with this analysis was that a majority of the board of directors allegedly were
"interested" and, therefore, had full knowledge of all the material facts and
were not "deceived." If the directors' knowledge were attributed to the corpo-
ration, the corporation also would not be deceived for purposes of rule lOb-5.
Wrestling with this dilemma, the court reasoned that if the entire board had
been controlled by a self-dealing director or shareholder, the corporation
would be deceived absent disclosure to the shareholders because the knowl-
edge of a self-dealing director should not be attributed to the corporation.97 In
other words, disclosure to an interested director would not constitute disclo-
sure to the corporation. Disclosure to the corporation could only be made
through disclosure to the shareholders who, under those circumstances, would
be the only group available to act for the corporation. On the other hand, if
disinterested directors constituted a majority of the board, disclosure to those
directors would be sufficient because the directors would be qualified to act for
the corporation.
98
The key to this analysis is how many of the directors are interested, if any.
In this case there were only four directors participating at the time the fifth
transaction was approved. One of those directors, Jordan Ross, was presuma-
bly disinterested. Two of the directors were Heizer nominees and, therefore,
clearly were interested. The fourth director was Paul Roth, the President of
IDC, who was hired by the Heizer directors over the objection of Jordan Ross,
the only other disinterested director.9 9 The court, after some difficulty, con-
cluded that Roth was an interested director. In support of this conclusion the
court cited the testimony of Heizer and Roth, particularly the statement by
Roth that "I was pretty much convinced that Heizer, you know, would insist
on the pledging of the stock, and that I didn't have a hell of a lot of alternative
short of resigning if it came to a matter of the pledge agreement."' 10 In find-
ing that Roth was an interested director, the court also cited Heizer's acknowl-
edgement that it had assumed control of IDC when Jodan Ross refused to hire
Roth. The court finally concluded that three of the directors were interested
and that disclosure to Ross, the sole disinterested director, would not consti-
tute disclosure to the corporation, at least when Ross did not represent the
97. Id at 249.
98. Id
99. The other directors had resigned or were absent from the country at the time of the fifth
transaction.
100. 560 F.2d at 248.
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interest of the second largest shareholder and was completely excluded from
the negotiation of the transaction.10' Under these circumstances the share-
holders, and not the board of directors, would be the persons acting for the
corporation for purposes of applying the deception test. Accordingly, Heizer,
the majority shareholder, should have disclosed the material facts to the in-
dependent shareholders prior to the consummation of the transaction. There
was little reason for the court to. deal seriously with the question of whether
there was sufficient disclosure to the shareholders in this case since evidence
indicated they were told of the pledge only in general terms two months after
it had been made. There being no meaningful disclosure to the shareholders,
who in this case were considered "the corporation," there was also no disclo-
sure to the corporation. The corporation, therefore, was "deceived" within the
Santa Fe interpretation of rule lob-5.
Finally, the Wright court considered the third and most troublesome
question: was there lOb-5 reliance (or causation) with respect to the pledge
transaction? The minority shareholders could not have vetoed the fifth trans-
action by their vote since shareholder approval was not required. The court
found the requisite degree of reliance, however, because if there had been full
disclosure the shareholders could have brought a derivative action on behalf
of the corporation in state court to enjoin a breach of Heizer's fiduciary duty to
deal fairly with the corporation.' 0 2 The court reached this conclusion by an
elaborate process necessitating an inquiry into the fairness of the transaction.
First, the court reasoned that reliance would be presumed if the omission were
material and that materiality would be present if the minority shareholders
could have successfully brought a derivative action in state court to enjoin the
transaction as a breach of fiduciary duty. To defeat the injunction in state
court, the controlling shareholder would have had the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the transaction was fair. If the controlling shareholder could not sus-
tain this burden, the minority shareholders would have established a breach of
fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholder, and the derivative action would
have been successful. If the minority shareholders would have been able to
block the transaction in state court because it was unfair, the requisite materi-
ality and, in an omission case, reliance would be established in federal court
for an action under rule lOb-5.10 3
As the court noted, the existence of "the causal link" between the viola-
tion of lob-5 and the confirmation of the pledge depended upon the fairness of
the transaction.1°4 Since fairness was the key to its analysis of causation, the
court felt compelled to examine the fairness of this transaction as it would
presumably have been analyzed by a state court. After reviewing Heizer's jus-
101. Id at 249.
102. Id at 250.
103. Id at 250-51. Although the court did not articulate the alternative proposition, it seems
clear that if the controlling shareholder could have shown the transaction to be fair, the requisite
materiality would not be shown and the requisite reliance would not be presumed. Consequently,
a derivative action in federal court would also have been unsuccessful.
104. Id at 250.
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tifications for the pledge, the court found that Heizer could not meet the bur-
den of proving that the transaction was fair under Delaware law.105 The court
then concluded that the "freezeout" of the minority could be enjoined as a
breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law and, therefore, the requisite lOb-
5 reliance was established in the fifth transaction.
10 6
Finding that the fourth and fifth transactions violated rule lOb-5, the Sev-
enth Circuit fashioned the kind of relief it believed the Delaware state court
would have given. The court cancelled the conversion feature and price ad-
justment effected through the fourth transaction, removed the charter amend-
ment permitting an increase in the number of authorized shares, voided the
pledge in the fifth transaction, and required that the maturity dates of the
loans be adjusted to make them commensurate with IDC's ability to pay. Fur-
ther, the court enjoined Heizer from entering into any security transaction
with IDC absent approval by a majority of the shareholders, other than
Heizer, upon disclosure of all the facts bearing on the fairness of the transac-
tion, including Heizer's own evaluation of the company and its future pros-
pects; or failing such approval, the transaction is found to be fair and equitable
by the district court or another court having jurisdiction to make that finding.
Thus, not only did the federal court find a federal claim in the fifth transaction
to the extent that the claim would have been actionable in the state court, but
it also designed the kind of remedy it believed would be appropriate under
state law for both the fourth and fifth transactions. 10 7
The Wright case illustrates the factual context in which a typical fiduciary
duty claim arises and is resolved under rule lOb-5. The three questions dis-
cussed by the Wright court are somewhat peculiar to a fiduciary duty claim:
(1) Who is capable of being deceived, or to whom must full and fair disclosure
be made? (2) Is there adequate disclosure? (3) Did the inadequate disclosure
cause the harm (or was there reliance)? Each of these questions will now be
discussed in greater depth and detail.
B. Who is Deceived or To Whom Must Disclosure Be Made?
1. The General Rule When All Directors Are Interested
or All or a Majority are Disinterested
For there to be a violation of rule lob-5 after Santa Fe v. Green in a
fiduciary duty case, there first must be deceptive or manipulative conduct. To
determine whether deception exists, a court first must ascertain to whom dis-
closure must be made. If shareholder approval is required, as was the situa-
tion in Wright v. Heizer where an amendment to the articles of incorporation
was necessary to increase the number of authorized shares, the court must
examine the disclosure made to the shareholders to see if there were any omis-
105. Id at 251.
106. Id
107. See text accompanying notes 75-105 supra.
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sions or misrepresentations in the disclosure.' 0 8 If no shareholder action is
required the inquiry becomes more complicated, because then the relevant is-
sue is whether the corporation's board of directors is sufficiently disinterested
to act as the "corporate persona" capable of being deceived. If all or a major-
ity of the board members are disinterested, and if the transaction is one that
does not require shareholder approval, the board is deemed the corporate per-
sona, and the court therefore must examine the disclosure to the board to de-
termine if any omissions or misrepresentations were made.' 09 On the other
hand, if all of the directors are interested, the directors are not deemed to be
qualified to act as the corporate persona, and disclosure must be made to the
shareholders. 10 If a majority of the board is interested, it is unclear whether
disclosure must be made to the disinterested members who constitute a minor-
ity of the board or to the shareholders."'
This issue is a modem version of the age-old question of who can act for
the corporation in a self-dealing transaction. 12 The inanimate corporate en-
tity cannot be deceived. Therefore, the corporation must be represented by
natural persons who can be deceived. Obviously, if all of the directors are
interested, they have knowledge of the material facts and therefore cannot be
deceived by themselves. If this knowledge is attributed to the corporation, the
corporation is likewise not deceived. This is hardly fair to the corporation or
to its shareholders because the more self-dealing directors on the board, the
more attributed knowledge and the less likely the corporation can be found to
be deceived under rule lOb-5. Therefore, when all of the board are clearly
interested, the courts should and do find that only the shareholders can act as
the corporate persona. However, courts have justified this conclusion on a
number of different grounds. For example, the court in Goldberg v. Mer-
idor 113 used an attribution theory. In Goldberg a derivative action was
brought by a shareholder of a subsidiary, Universal Gas & Oil Co., Inc.
(UGO), a Panama corporation having its principal place of business in New
York City, against the controlling parent, Maritimecor, and several other per-
sons. The complaint alleged a violation of rule lOb-5 in a transaction between
the subsidiary and the parent in which the subsidiary, UGO, issued to the
parent 4,200,000 shares of its stock and also assumed all of the parent's liabili-
ties, including a $7,000,000 debt owed to the subsidiary, in consideration for
the transfer of all the parent's assets, except 2.8 million of the subsidiary's
shares held by the parent. Since all of the directors of the subsidiary appar-
ently were interested, the crucial question in the case was whether, after Sante
Fe, lOb-5 deception could lie when all the corporate decision makers knew of
108. 560 F.2d at 247-48.
109. Id at 249. See also Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1037-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
110. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
111. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 249. See also text accompanying notes 122-70 infra.
112. See, e.g., Frick v. Howard, 23 Wis. 2d 86, 126 N.W.2d 619 (1964).
113. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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the fraud. The court said that, "[the problem with the application of § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to derivative actions has lain in the degree to which the knowl-
edge of officers and directors must be attributed to the corporation, thereby
negating the element of deception."' 4 The court rejected automatic attribu-
tion even in those cases in which all of the directors know of the fraud.
We come then to the question whether it is possible within the mean-
ing of section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 for a corporation to be defrauded
by a majority of its directors. We note at the outset that in other
contexts, such as embezzlement and conflict of interest, a majority or
even the entire board of directors may be held to have defrauded
their corporation. When it is practical as well as just to do so, courts
have experienced no difficulty in rejecting such cliches as the direc-
tors constitute the corporation and a corporation, like any other per-
son, cannot defraud itself." 5
The court then concluded that a corporation can be deceived if a majority
or even if all of the directors have knowledge of the fraud. There is no re-
quirement for "one virtuous or ignorant lamb among the directors in order for
liability to arise under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 on a deception theory."
' 1 6
The Southern District of New York in Klamberg v. Roth 117 reached the
same conclusion in a slightly different context by using an agency law theory.
A class action was brought by an employee-beneficiary of a retirement trust on
the ground that the employer-settlor had failed to disclose its conflict of inter-
est to the beneficiaries in violation of rule lOb-5. The A. Sandler Company's
noncontributory pension plan gave the corporation the right to appoint and
remove members of the committee that administered the plan and gave to the
committee the right to make investment decisions, including investment in
Sandier stock. In the event of a merger any successor corporation was to be
given the right to terminate the plan or to continue it with all of the powers
and rights of Sandier. In 1969 Kayser-Roth acquired Sandler and replaced
the committee members. The new committee invested seventy percent of the
trust assets in Kayser-Roth stock. The plaintiffs brought this action, alleging
that Kayser-Roth violated both lOb-5 and state law fiduciary duties" 18 because
it did not disclose to the beneficiaries (1) that Kayser-Roth insiders had re-
placed former committee members; (2) that seventy percent of the trust's assets
had been invested in Kayser-Roth stock; and (3) other information that was in
their possession about Kayser-Roth stock.
In the court's view, the threshold question was determining the appropri-
ate persona who could be deceived on behalf of the retirement trust:
In lob-5 cases, whether conduct may 'fairly be viewed as decep-
tive' will generally depend upon the circumstances of the particular
114. Id at 215.
115. Id. (citing Ruckle v. Rota Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1964)).
116. Id at 216.
117. 473 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
118. The court had jurisdiction over the state law claims on the basis of diversity of citizenship
and pendent jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 490 infra.
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person or class allegedly deceived, their knowledge and perceptive
faculties. In other words, before the court can ask 'Was the conduct
deceptive?', it must first ascertain 'To whom?' Since a lOb-5 action
requires a causal connection between the defendant's violation and
the plaintiffs loss, the allegedly deceived observers will have to be
persons who were in a position to make a decision that led to that
loss. Such a decision will often be whether to purchase or sell securi-
ties, but may also include a proxy vote, a decision to seek an injunc-
tion, or even whether to retire from active employment." 19
The court recognized that if the above principle were applied to this case, the
committee members who had the power to purchase and sell stock on behalf
of the trust not only would be the "person" to be defrauded but also would be
the persons alleged to have committed the fraud. This analysis would require
the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants deceived themselves. Therefore, the
court was forced to use another approach; however, finding one that worked
was difficult. After rejecting the analogy of trust committee member to corpo-
rate director as one "not likely to bear lasting fruit,"120 the court returned with
conviction to principles of agency law:
In general, if the corporation's agents have not been deceived,
neither has the corporation. However, as in other situations gov-
erned by agency principles, knowledge of the corporation's officers
and agents is not imputed to it when there is a conflict between the
interests of the officers and agents and the interests of the corporate
principal. Therefore, a corporation may be defrauded in a stock
transaction even when all of its directors know all of the material
facts, if the conflict between the interests of one or more of the direc-
tors and the interests of the corporation prevents effective transmis-
sion of material information to the corporation, in violation of Rule
lOb-5(2). 1
21
However, while the Klamberg court articulated this principle, it did not
apply it to find deception because the conflicts were "built into the trust rela-
tionship by the terms of the Agreement."' 22 This agreement gave Kayser-
Roth as the successor corporation the right to appoint the committee members,
who in turn were given the right to invest in Kayser-Roth stock.
Whether the attribution model or the agency model is used, the conclu-
sion that the board of directors should not be the "corporate persona" when
all of its members are interested is correct, primarily because it is simply un-
fair to attribute the knowledge of self-dealing directors to the corporation
under those circumstances. When a majority, but not all, of the directors are
interested, however, the equities are not so clear.
119. 473 F. Supp. at 550 (footnotes omitted).
120. Id at 551.
121. Id at 554-55 (quoting Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)).
122. 473 F. Supp. at 556.
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2. The Corporate Persona When a Minority of the
Board is Disinterested
Can or should the disinterested members who constitute a minority of the
board of directors be the corporate persona for purposes of lOb-5 disclosure?
The Wright court held that disclosure to a sole disinterested director was not
sufficient when the director did not represent the interest of the second largest
shareholder and was completely left out of the negotiations regarding the dis-
puted transaction.12 In Maldonado v. Flynn, however, the four disinterested
directors of an eight-member board were deemed to be the corporate persona
because the four represented a majority of a quorum and thus could legally act
for the corporation under Delaware law.
124
When at least some of the board members are disinterested, the courts are
properly reluctant to require disclosure to the shareholders, even though a ma:
jority of the board members are interested. There are at least two justifications
for this position. First, taking the matter to the shareholders is expensive and
time-consuming. Second, state legislatures deliberately have chosen to leave
the running of the corporation to a kmall group of well-informed persons who
presumably can make better and quicker decisions than a widely scattered
group of shareholders.
Court decisions on a related question-whether a decision not to sue by a
disinterested board bars a derivative action-indicate a tendency to defer to
the judgment of disinterested directors even when they constitute a minority of
the board. In the landmark case ofBurks v. Lasker,125 shareholders of a regis-
tered investment company sued several members of the company's board of
directors and its registered investment adviser. The derivative complaint al-
leged that the defendants had violated their duties under the Investment Com-
pany Act, the Investment Advisers Act, and the common law in connection
with the 1969 purchase by the corporaton of $20 million in Penn Central
Transportation Company commercial paper. Five members of the eleven-
member board, who were neither affiliated with the investment adviser nor
defendants in the action, and who were acting as a quorum under the com-
pany's bylaws, concluded, on the basis of outside counsel's recommendation
and their own investigation, that continuation of the litigation was contrary to
the best interests of the company and its shareholders and moved the district
court to dismiss the action. The district court, applying the business judgment
rule, dismissed the action, but the Second Circuit reversed.1 26 The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit and stated that "corporations are creatures
of state law. ..127 The ICA and IAA, therefore, do not require that federal
law displace state laws governing the powers of directors unless the state laws
123. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
124. Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See text accompanying
notes 173-84 infra.
125. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
126. 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
127. 441 U.S. at 478 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
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permit action prohibited by the Acts, or unless 'their application would be
inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action. .... 1 "1128
The Court deferred to the business judgment of the directors not to pursue the
action even though (1) complaints were raised under two federal acts, (2) the
situation was inherently fraught with potential conflicts of interest, and
(3) Congress had taken affirmative steps to minimize the conflicts by imposing
strict standards for director independence. 129 The Court set forth a two-prong
test to determine whether a court should defer to the directors' business judg-
ment: (1) would state law permit disinterested directors to terminate a deriva-
tive suit and (2) would the state rule be inconsistent with the policy of the
federal securities laws.' 30 In formulating the test, the Court used strong lan-
guage to defend the value of the judgment of disinterested directors even in
situations fraught with conflicts of interests:
Yet, while these potential conflicts may justify some restraints upon
the unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual fund directors,
particularly in their transactions with the investment adviser, they
hardly justify a flat rule that directors may never terminate nonfrivo-
lous derivative actions involving co-directors.' 3 '
There may well be situations in which the independent directors
could reasonably believe that the best interests of the shareholders
call for a decision not to sue-as, for example, where the costs of
litigation to the corporation outweigh any potential recovery. . . In
such cases, it would certainly be consistent with the Act to allow the
independent directors to terminate a suit, even though not frivolous.
Indeed, it would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been
willing to rely largely upon "watchdogs" to protect shareholder inter-
ests and yet, where the "watchdogs" have done precisely that, require
that they be totally muzzled. 132
This deference to the decisions of disinterested directors not to sue has
relevance in the area of lOb-5 disclosure as well, because if disinterested direc-
tors, even though they represent a minority of the board, can decide not to sue,
surely they can act as the corporate persona for purposes of lOb-5 disclosure.
In Burks the Court justified deference to the five-member minority because
that number constituted a quorum under the company's bylaws whereas, as
previously noted, the court in Maldonado emphasized that the four minority
directors were a sufficient number because they could legally act for the corpo-
ration under the state statute.
The Burks trend has been followed with enthusiasm by the circuits. For
example, the Eighth Circuit in Abbey v. Control Data Corp. 133 affirmed the
district court's entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of
Burks. A class action was brought in Abbey to compel seven senior officers
128. Id. at 479 (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)).
129. Id at 481-82.
130. Id at 480.
131. Id at 481-82 (citation omitted).
132. Id at 485.
133. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980).
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and directors of Control Data to repay over one million dollars in civil and
criminal penalties levied on the corporation as a result of its guilty plea to
criminal charges stemming from illegal payments admittedly made by the cor-
poration to certain foreign entities.13 4 The complaint alleged that Control
Data and its officers and directors had violated the federal securities laws by
failing to give its shareholders notice of the illegal foreign payments in the
proxy and registration materials released during the payment period and had
violated various common law corporate duties through waste and mismanage-
ment. The board had created a "Special Litigation Committee," composed of
seven "outside" directors, none of whom had been named as a defendant in
the class action or had been involved in or had contemporaneous knowledge
of the foreign payments. After retaining independent counsel and pursuing an
investigation, the committee directed its legal counsel to move for summary
judgment on behalf of Control Data.'
3 5
The Eighth Circuit applied the two-prong test suggested by the Supreme
Court in Burks v. Lasker. First, the court found that under Delaware law a
committee of outside directors can terminate a derivative action. The court
quoted Justice Brandeis in United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Cop-
per Co. 136 for this "long-standing rule. . . found in the common law of many
states."1
37
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a
cause of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordina-
rily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of
the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the stockhold-
ers. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion inter vires the
corporation, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct
equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation
which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment.1
38
The court was not persuaded by the argument that the rule does not apply
when the directors are charged with criminal misconduct because the decision
not to pursue the claims is tantamount to a ratification of the criminal acts. In
134. The action also sought cancellation of several executive stock options approved by the
shareholders during the period in which the payments were made. Id at 726.
135. Id at 727.
The committee determined that legal action by CDC against the defendants was not in
the best interest of the corporation because: (1) the defendants had not been directly
involved in the payments, nor had they personally profited from them; (2) the defendants
had fully cooperated with the Justice Department and the committee; (3) legal action
against the defendants could significantly impair their ability to manage corporate af-
fairs; (4) the foreign payments were a customary business practice at the time they were
made and were intended to serve the business interests of CDC; and (5) disclosure of the
details of the payments might endanger certain CDC employees and would nullify the
Justice Department's agreement with CDC to treat the results of its criminal investiga-
tion as confidential ....
Id
136. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
137. 603 F.2d at 729.
138. Id (citing United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. at 263-64).
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support of its reasoning the court quoted Gall v. Exxon:139
The decision not to bring suit with regard to past conduct which may
have been illegal is not itself a violation of law and does not result in
the continuation of the alleged violation of law. Rather, it is a deci-
sion by the directors of the corporation that pursuit of a cause of
action based on acts already consummated is not in the best interest
of the corporation. Such a determination, like any other business
decision, must be made by the corporate directors in the exercise of
their sound business judgment. The conclusive effect of such a judg-
ment cannot be affected by the allegedly illegal nature of the intial
action which purportedly gives rise to the cause of action.
140
The court then applied the second prong of the test-does termination of
the litigation undermine the policies of the federal securities laws? Termina-
tion of this case was found not to undermine section 13 of the Exchange Act
because the section 13 claim was weak and the cause of action was of the kind
traditionally relegated to state law.14 1 Likewise, section 14(a) was not under-
mined by dismissal of the case because the section 14 claim was "at best mar-
ginally related to the federal policies underlying that section" 142 and because
any injury to the shareholders from the corporation's illegal foreign payments
stemmed directly from the corporate waste and mismanagement in authoriz-
ing the payments and not from allegedly misleading proxy solicitations deal-
ing with other corporate matters.
43
Abbey, however, is not especially helpful to our analysis of the type of
minority that can constitute a lob-5 corporate persona. The court did not con-
sider whether the number of directors must be sufficient to constitute a quo-
rum under the company's bylaws or whether they must represent the
minimum number of directors required for legal action under the corporate
statute. The court simply stated that before it would defer to their judgment,
the directors must: (1) be outside directors; (2) not be named as defendants or
not claimed to be involved in or have contemporaneous knowledge of the ifle-
gal act; (3) constitute a "Special Litigation Committee" created by the board;
and (4) act with independent legal counsel. 144
Perhaps providing more guidance is Lewis v. Anderson,145 in which the
Ninth Circuit relied on Burks to defer to the business judgment of a special
litigation committee of the corporation's directors. One year after Walt Dis-
ney Productions had adopted a stock option plan for key employees, the
board-appointed "stock option committee" granted new, and allegedly more
139. 418 F. Supp. 508, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
140. 603 F.2d at 730 (quoting Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. at 518).
141. Id at 731.
142. Id at 732.
143. Id
144. Id at 727.
145. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing on April 8, 1980 even
though the Delaware Chancery court held that courts are not obligated to defer to the business
judgment of directors in dismissing derivative actions. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251
(Del. Ch. 1980).
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favorable, options to defendant directors. The plaintiffs contended that the
issuance of the new options and management's behavior in seeking share-
holder approval of the new option plan violated federal securities laws. The
litigation committee, which determined that maintaining the action was not in
the corporation's best interest, consisted of two outside directors, appointed to
the board after the challenged transaction, and one other director who, al-
though a named defendant, did not benefit from the transaction. 146 The court
applied the Burks test and held that the committee's good faith determination
not to sue barred any further action by a shareholder on behalf of the corpora-
tion.147 First, the court, "sitting as a state court," examined decisions of inter-
mediate Califiornia appellate courts and courts in other jurisdictions and
concluded that California would extend the business judgment rule to dismiss
a derivative action if a duly delegated committee had determined that the ac-
tion was not in the corporation's best interest. That the committee was ap-
pointed by the interested directors, though troublesome, was not deemed to be
conclusive. Citing Auerbach v. Bennett,14 8 the court said:
To assign responsibility of the dimension here involved to individu-
als wholly separate and apart from the board of directors would, ex-
cept in the most extraordinary circumstances, itself be an act of
default and breach of the nondelegable fiduciary duty owed by the
members of the board to the corporation and to its shareholders, em-
ployees and creditors. For the courts to preside over such determina-
tions would similarly work an ouster of the board's fundamental
responsibility and authority for corporate management.'
49
The court justified its deference to directors with the argument that direc-
tors are better equipped to make the decision to sue than one minority share-
holder.
To allow one shareholder to incapacitate an entire board of directors
merely by leveling charges against them gives too much leverage to
dissident shareholders. There is no reason to believe that a minority
shareholder is more likely to act in the best interest of the corpora-
tion than are directors who are elected by a majority of the stock-
holders.'
50
In applying the second-prong of the Burks test the court found, with
much greater difficulty, that deference to the director's judgment in the case
was not inconsistent with rule 1Ob-5. The court gave two reasons for this con-
clusion: (1) "It [the business judgment rule] operates only to insulate the com-
mittee's good faith decision to dismiss an action, even if that decision is
negligent. In that sense the business judgment rule is closely analogous to
146. 615 F.2d at 780. Whether the committee exercised good faith is a determination for the
trier of fact. Id
147. Id at 783.
148. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).





Rule lb-5 itself, which affords no cause of action for neglience;"'' and (2)
"Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 were not intended to bring within
their ambit simple corporate mismanagement or every imaginable
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transac-
tion..... That description of Rule lOb-5 is an equally apt descrip-
tion of the business judgment rule. We find, in sum, that the two
rules can coexist harmoniously.
152
These two reasons appear to be neither sound nor persuasive, but it is hard to
see how the court could find better ones. It is difficult to apply the second-
prong of Burks to lob-5 because lob-5 is so broad. Any decision that takes the
case out of federal court, including deferring to the business judgment of the
directors who decide not to sue, limits rule lOb-5 and arguably undermines the
policies of the rule by failing to give relief for a deceptive or fraudulent cause
of action.
The Ninth Circuit in Lewis was helpful in pinpointing the nature of the
minority that can act as the corporate persona for purposes of lob-5. The
court emphasized the "disinterestedness" of the directors, not whether they
constituted a quorum or could legally act for the corporation.1 53 This is an
equally proper focus. Of course, the fact that the minority are sufficient in
number to act under the bylaws or corporate statue is the most persuasive case
for accepting minority directors as the corporate persona, provided they are
disinterested.
Deference is not accorded even to disinterested directors unless a trier of
fact determines that the directors acted in good faith. 154 It is not clear what
"good faith" adds to disinterested. A more precise standard might result if
good faith is presumed when the directors are proven to be disinterested. 155 A
151. Id at 783-84 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
152. Id at 784 (citing St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978)).
153. The committee retained independent legal counsel was also considered important by the
court. Id at 780.
154. In Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH)
96,086 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1977), the court's good faith inquiry was into the independence of
members of a committee that decided not to sue and into the appropriateness and sufficiency of
the committee's investigation procedures.
155. In Nussbacher v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the South-
ern District of New York seemed to imply that good faith may mean disinterestedness:
The fact that the board opposed the action does not, of course, establish their good faith
in so doing. Thus, plaintiff stands on firmer ground in asserting that the business judg-
ment rule should not apply where the directors themselves are charged with complicity
in the allegedly wrongful action, as they are in the case at bar. It is inconceivable that
directors who participated in and allegedly approved of the transaction under attack can
be said to have exercised unbiased business judgment in declining suit based on that very
transaction. In this regard it is well to note the concurrence of Judge Coffin in In re
Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 269 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857,
94 S. Ct. 161, 38 L.Ed.2d 107 (1973):
I find it hard to imagine that a director, however, unaffiliated, who had participated,
or under these circumstances knowingly acquiesced, in a major transaction, albeit
for a corporate purpose, would authorize a suit, effectively against himself, claiming
that the transaction violated the federal antitrust laws. Even independent watch-
dogs cannot be thought ready to sign a confession of that magnitude.
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court that directed its inquiry primarily to the disinterestedness of the directors
rather than to their good faith was the Second Circuit in Galefv. 41exander.
1 5 6
The court refused to defer to the business judgment of directors who were
named as defendants in a derivative action for alleged violations of Section 14
of the Exchange Act. Even if Ohio courts would defer to the business judg-
ment of these directors (and the court did not decide that they would), the
policy of Section 14(a) was found to be undermined by that state policy:
Obviously the goal of § 14(a) that communications from manage-
ment be accurate and complete as to all material facts is a vital one.
Its achievement would quite clearly be frustrated if a director who
was made a defendant in a derivative action for providing inade-
quate information in connection with a proxy solicitation were per-
mitted to cause the dismissal of that action simply on the basis of his
judgment that its pursuit was not in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. The very premises which give life to a derivative right of action
to enforce § 14(a) must save it from a premature death.
15 7
The Southern District of New York in Maldonado v. JHynn, 158 in defer-
ence to the business judgment of only two directors, dismissed a shareholders'
derivative action against the other directors for an alleged violation of Section
14. The court examined the independence (a synonym for disinterested in this
case) and the good faith of the directors:.
The cornerstone of the business judgment rule is the indepen-
dence and disinterestedness of the directors charged with responsibil-
ity for decisions. It requires a group of directors who are genuinely
independent of the disqualified board and disinterested in the action;
it requires them to exercise their business judgment in fact and to do
so in good faith. No court is required to take for granted that these
conditions have been met and the shareholder is free to challenge the
committee's bona fides.
15 9
The court found that the two directors were independent even though
appointed by the wrongdoers 160 because they: (1) were not defendants in the
action; (2) were designated long after the suit was filed; (3) had no involve-
ment in matters that were the subject of the action; and (4) had no substantial
id at 977.
156. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. Id at 63, 64.
158. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
159. Id at 282.
160. The court, in response to plaintiffs' argument that "the business judgment rule in effect
empowers the 'wrongdoers' by their very designation of the independent committee to obtain
exoneration," stated:
This cynical attitude would require a per se disqualification of any committee appointed
by a board exercising its statutory authority no matter how far the independent commit-
tee may be removed from the transactions that are at the core of the litigation. More-
over, this concept would sterilize the corporation, for "to disqualify the entire board
would be to render the corporation powerless to make an effective business judgment
with respect to prosecution of the derivative action."
Id at 282 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at
928 (1979)).
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previous involvement with either the corporation or its directors. The commit-
tee also was found to have acted in good faith.16 1 The business judgment rule,
said the court, would permit disinterested directors to decide not to pursue an
action even though it is legally sound if other considerations (for example,
ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations, fiscal)
would make dismissal in the best interest of the corporation.'
62
The Chancery Court of Delaware in Maldonado v. Flnn 163 held that the
directors' decision not to sue does not bar the derivative action under Dela-
ware law. The court reasoned that a derivative action has two phases-one
that is the equivalent of a suit to compel the corporation to sue, which belongs
to the complaining shareholders, and the other a suit by the corporation
against those liable to it, which belongs to the corporation. The court said:
Under settled Delaware law the directors do not have the right to
compel the dismissal of a derivative suit brought by a stockholder to
rectify an apparent breach of fiduciary duty by the directors to the
corporation and its stockholders after the directors have refused to
institute legal proceedings, because the stockholder then possesses an
independent right to redress the wrong.'
64
Under our system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the
merits of litigation. Aggrieved stockholders of Delaware corpora-
tions ought to be able to expect that an impartial tribunal, and not a
committee appointed by the alleged wrongdoers, will decide whether
a stockholder's derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty has
any merit. 165
This decision would have changed the result of Abbey v. Control Data,16
6
Lewis v. Adams,167 and Siegal v. Merrick,168 all of which based their decisions
upon a contrary interpretation of Delaware law.
The Chancery Court later reconsidered its ruling, dismissed the suit on
the grounds of res judicata, and stayed the dismissal pending the decision of
the Second Circuit. 169 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
161. As evidence of the committee's good faith the court noted that the committee had spent
three months reviewing the matter and preparing its report, retained its own counsel, reviewed the
pleadings and thousands of related documents, considered the depositions of parties and witnesses
taken in the actions, and conducted numerous interviews-including interviews with the defend-
ant directors, the corporation's president and former officers and employees, its auditors and tax
advisers. Id at 284.
162. Id at 285.
163. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
164. Id at 1262.
165. Id at 1263.
166. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 670 (1980).
167. No. 77-266C (N.D. Okla., filed Nov. 15, 1979).
168. 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Applying the reasoning of the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery in Maldonado v. Flynn, the District Court for Southern Texas in Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490
F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980), refused to dismiss a derivative action charging breach of fiduciary
duty and violations of §§ 14(a), 13(a) and 13(b)(2) (the latter of which embodies the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act), despite a recommendation to do so by an ostensibly independent commit-
tee of shareholders.
169. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). The history of this suit is complex.
During the pendency of the Delaware action, the shareholder fied suit in the U.S. District Court
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Court took a contrary position in Parkoff v. General Telephone & Electronics
Corp. ,170 holding that the decision whether to prosecute claims alleging waste
of corporate property in connection with questionable foreign payments lies
within the business judgment of the corporation's board of directors. Regard-
less of the way in which this controversy is finally resolved, it can be argued
with authority that even if a minority of disinterested directors cannot act to
bind the courts by requiring the dismissal of a derivative action, they can serve
in the much more innocuous role of the corporate persona for purposes of
disclosure under rule lOb-5.
In conclusion, the best view is that disclosure to a disinterested board,
regardless of size, should be deemed disclosure to the corporation. 17 1 These
directors, even if in the minority, are elected by the shareholders to act for the
corporation. They have greater kowledge and expertise and can therefore di-
gest the disclosure better than the shareholders-and certainly at less expense
to the corporation. They are also better able to evaluate the transaction than
even a learned judge who must review the transaction long after the events
and who may find it difficult to ignore the knowledge of hindsight. A few
directors can act with the speed and precision necessary in most corporate
transactions. Disclosure can be oral and new information can be easily and
quickly communicated to the directors. To require disclosure to the share-
holders not only delays the process but exposes the corporation to liability for
possible omissions or misrepresentations in the voluminous written material
that must be mailed to the shareholders and updated. Corporate statutes, for
all these reasons, wisely require a shareholder vote only on rare occasions.
3. Defining "Interested"
Whether a director is interested is a factual determination. Analysis of
the cases reveals some relevant facts that may indicate when a director is inter-
for Southern New York against the company and its officers and directors under §§ 7, 10(b), and
14(a) of the 1934 Act. The shareholder also asserted in the federal action, as pendent to his securi-
ties law violation claims, the common-law claims asserted in Delaware. The district court dis-
missed the securities law claims, and because there were no federal claims to which the common
law claims were pendent, also dismissed the common law claims. Maldonado v. Flynn 448 F.
Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of the § 10(b) claim but reversed the dismissal of a § 14(a) claim. Maldonado
v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). The case was remanded to the district court with specific
instructions to determine whether to exercise its discretionary pendent jurisdiction over the com-
mon-law claims. Prior to any determination by the district court whether to exercise pendent
jurisdiction, the shareholder filed an amended complaint alleging only a single cause of action for
violation of § 14(a).
Applying the Supreme Court's analysis in Burks v. Lasker, the U.S. District Court on Janu-
ary 24, 1980, held that Delaware's business judgment rule requires the dismissal of a shareholder's
derivative action once a duly delegated committee of disinterested directors determines that the
action is not in the corporation's best interests. Maldonado v. Flynn, [Current Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,260 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980).
170. 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. N.Y. 1980).
171. An example of the court's unwillingness to extend the disclosure obligation is Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Freedman, 443 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd menL, 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1978), in which the court found that there was no duty under rule lOb-5 to disclose to policy
holders and creditors. Disclosure had been made to the directors, who were controlled by the
defendant parent, and there were no minority shareholders.
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ested but, perhaps more important, circumstances that do not automatically
make a director interested. The court in Wright v. Heizer172 found that the
president of the company was controlled by the majority shareholder and was,
therefore, an interested director in a transaction between the majority share-
holder and the corporation because: (1) he was hired by the directors chosen
by the majority shareholder over the objection of the only other director and
(2) he testified that he felt he had no alternative to approving the transaction
short of resignation. 173 The Second Circuit discussed "interestedness" at
length in Maldonado v. Flynn 174 in which it upheld the district court's dismis-
sal of the lob-5 claim but reversed the dismissal of the claim under section 14
and rule 14a-9. The directors in that case allegedly had modified a stock op-
tion plan to accelerate the exercise date of the options and had loaned certain
officers corporate money to exercise the options, knowing that the corporation
was about to make a tender offer for its stock that would increase the "bargain
spread."' 75 The modifications allegedly were made to permit the officers to
exercise their options prior to the price rise so as to lower their bargain spread
and thereby reduce their tax liability. An early exercise of the options, al-
though in the best interest of the officers, had the concurrent effect of decreas-
ing the corresponding tax deduction for the corporation. Five directors of the
eight-member board were present at the special meeting when the modifica-
tions were made. The president, a beneficiary of the option plan, abstained
and the other four directors voted unanimously to approve the changes in the
option plan. One of those four directors was a partner in a large law firm that
received substantial fees from the corporation, and another had traded on the
inside information that the tender offer was pending.
176
The court dismissed the lob-5 claim because the corporation was not
deceived, disclosure having been made to a "disinterested" board, which
under Delaware law could act for the corporation. 177 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court stated:
Even if some directors have an interest in the transaction, absent
domination or control of a corporation or of its board by the officer-
beneficiaries, approval of the transaction by a disinterested majority
of the board possessing authority to act and fully informed of all
relevant facts will suffice to bar a Rule lob-5 claim that the corpora-
tion or its stockholders were deceived. [Citations omitted] The
172. 560 F.2d at 236.
173. Id at 248.
174. 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
175. The bargain spread is "the difference between the fair market price of the stock at the
time the option is exercised and the option price paid for the stock." Id at 792.
176. Id at 792-94. Even though shareholder approval was not necessary, the directors de-
cided at the meeting to refer the proposal to the shareholders, and the option agreement provided
that it would be cancelled if the shareholders did not approve. The proposal was never submitted
to the sharheolders, however. Id at 792.
177. Id at 795. Under Delaware law a majority of the eight-member board (five) constituted
a quorum, and a majority of a quorum (at least three) could approve the transaction. In this case,
five directors were present, and the transaction was approved by four of those directors (the presi-
dent abstaining).
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knowledge of the disinterested majority must in such event be attrib-
uted to the corporation and its stockholders, precluding deception.
178
The key to the court's conclusion was that the four directors who ap-
proved the trasaction were "disinterested." The court found that the four di-
rectors who approved this transaction were "disinterested" because none had
"a financial stake in the transaction."u 79 The process used to reach that con-
clusion was arduous. First, the court rejected the argument that the nonop-
tionee directors were "interested" because they aided and abetted the
optionees in violating rule lOb-5, noting that "[tihis bootstrapping theory
would convert every alleged act of mismanagement in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security into a lOb-5 claim, unless the act were ratified by
the shareholders after full disclosure."'i8 0 Nor, in the court's view, was the
lawyer-director shown to be interested. The mere fact that the attorney's con-
tinued employment, from which he received substantial legal fees, depended
upon the directors' favor did not make the attorney an interested director ab-
sent a specific claim that he voted in favor of this particular transaction in
exchange for the continued retention of his firm as counsel. The court said:
"Unless and until board membership on the part of a corporation's outside
counsel, or of anyone with a commercial relationship with the corporation, is
outlawed, we cannot assume that a counsel-director acts for reasons that are
against the corporation's interest, as distinguished from the private interests of
its officers."' 18' The court also mentioned that the shareholders had elected the
attorney a director knowing of his relationship to the corporation.
The court then determined whether Woolcott, who through a corporation
wholly owned by his mother had traded on the inside information of the im-
minent tender offer, was interested. The court acknowledged that Woolcott
may have voted in favor of the transaction to remain in the good graces of the
other directors with the hope that his vote would induce them to cover up his
private profiteering at the expense of the public shareholders. However, be-
cause his vote was not necessary to approve the transaction, the court was able
to evade the question of whether his desire to conceal separate wrongdoing
was sufficient to label him an interested director for purposes of this transac-
tion.
1 82
Finally, the court examined whether the four directors who approved the
transaction lost their disinterestedness because of the controlling influence of
the six officers, who were the beneficiaries of the transaction. The court said
domination by interested directors in some cases could make otherwise disin-
terested directors interested.
Domination or control of a corporation or of its board by those bene-
178. Id at 793.
179. Id
180. Id at 794 n.6.
181. Id at 794. The court might have strengthened its argument by a reference to the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires the attorney to act in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5, EC 5-18.
182. 597 F.2d at 794-95.
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fiting from the board's action may under some circumstances pre-
clude its directors from being disinterested. In such a case, since they
would be acting as mere pawns of the controlling wrongdoer, their
knowledge could hardly be imputed to the corporation or its stock-
holders. We have so held, for instance, where the "corporation is
influenced by its controlling shareholder to engage in a transaction
adverse to the corporation's interests . and there is a nondisclo-
sure or misleading disclosures."'
8 3
The court did not apply this doctrine to the facts of Maldonado, however,
because the plaintiffs did not claim that the officers who were the beneficiaries
of the transaction were controlling shareholders or that they controlled the
decision-making by the "disinterested" directors who voted in favor of the
transaction.184 The court then modified its definition of disinterested by ad-
ding a requirement of materiality and substituting personal interest for
financial stake-the director is disinterested if he "has no material personal
interest in the transaction or matter under consideration."'
85
"A material personal" interest in the outcome is a much broader and
more ambiguous definition of interested than "financial stake" in the transac-
tion.186 Since the presence of disinterested directors is the key to determining
to whom disclosure must be made, the test of interestedness should be clear
and precise so that corporate planners can decide whether there should be
disclosure to the shareholders. "Financial stake" is the more precise of the two
tests and would be even more precise if defined as "material financial stake" in
the outcome. An indirect financial stake should not be sufficient, as wisely
held by the Maldonado court. It is arguable that an attorney, in a transaction
in which controlling persons of the corporation are the interested directors,
does have an indirect financial stake in voting for the transaction to assure that
his firm will remain in favor with those directors, who will be directly respon-
sible for its continued employment. Likewise, a person like Woolcott could
have an indirect financial stake in a transaction in which his vote would bene-
fit other directors, whose future cooperation might minimize the chances that
he would be sued for damages resulting from his insider trading. However,
the addition of "indirect" makes the test of interestedness much less precise
and therefore of less value to corporate planners who should be able to struc-
ture transactions upon which the decision makers can rely. Furthermore, di-
rectors are elected by shareholders to use their expertise and knowledge to
make decisions for the corporation. That mandate should not be ignored by
the courts because of possibilities of "indirect" financial rewards, for then the
corporation loses (for what may be no good reason) any expert contribution
183. Id at 795 (quoting Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 217).
184. Id The complaint alleged that the directors "may have been controlled" but not that
they were in fact controlled.
185. Id
186. State legislators have not succeeded in defining "interested director" with any greater
precision. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney)
(963).
[ l. 59
lOb-5 FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS
the directors can make to the decision. Accordingly, only a director with a
direct financial stake in the transaction should be presumed interested.
There are some situations in which directors would be clearly disinter-
ested, regardless of the test used by the court. For example, directors are
deemed to be disinterested if there is no conflict of interest alleged between
any of the directors of the corporation. In Kaplan v. Bennett 187 the Southern
District of New York held that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under rule
lOb-5 since they had not alleged that the corporation was deceived.18 8 Plain-
tiffs brought a derivative action alleging that defendants had violated lOb-5
because they had caused the corporation to sell its interest in a foreign subsidi-
ary for "virtually nothing."' 8 9 The court found that the corporation had not
been deceived because the knowledge of the directors would be attributed to
the corporation absent an allegation of conflict of interest. The court, after
analyzing and citing several cases,19 0 acknowledged that "a corporation can be
held to have been deceived within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
when the board has a conflict of interest or is under the improper influence of
a controlling person or when some members of the board have been
deceived."'' However, the knowledge that defendants argued was possessed
by all members of the board was attributed to the corporation because there
was no allegation that "some members of the board misled others [or] a con-
flict of interest on the part of the board or a controlling influence exerted over
it by a dominant shareholder, parent corporation or board faction."' 92 Thus,
this case turned upon a failure to plead a conflict of interest.
Despite better pleading, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Tyco Lab-
oratories, Inc. v. Kimbal 93 also found that directors' knowledge was attrib-
uted to the corporation absent a "classic" conflict of interest.194 The plaintiffs
brought a derivative action alleging that two defendant directors failed to dis-
close to the other defendant directors, the corporation, and the stockholders or,
in the alternative, all the defendant directors failed to disclose to the corpora-
tion and the stockholders the known willingness of plaintiffs to purchase a
substantial amount of the corporation's preferred stock at a price materially
187. 465 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
188. Id at 566.
189. Id at 562. Other claims were made for failure to disclose kickbacks and bribes to offi-
cials of foreign governments, the details of which had been disclosed in a proxy statement after the
investigation of an audit committee. A special litigation committee had decided it would not be in
the corporation's best interest to sue. Id at 558.
190. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 462; Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 209;
Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. at 1032; Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F.
Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
191. Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. at 565.
192. Id at 565-66. The court in passing noted that "[allthough plaintiffs' claim would not
necessarily be precluded by the fact that the Audit and Special Litigation Committees found no
evidence of personal profit, plaintiffs have not even alleged pecuniary interest or other conflict on
the part of the board." Id at 566.
193. 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
194. Id at 297-98. Accord, Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) % 96,086 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1977).
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higher than that actually paid by a lower bidder. Plaintiffs alleged that de-
fendant directors concealed the higher bid because selling to the lower bidder
would allow the two directors to remain as incumbent management of the
corporation.19 5 The court found that the complaint stated a lOb-5 cause of
action against the two directors, Kimball and Loidl, on the theory that they
deceived the other directors.19 6 It also found, however, that the allegation that
all of the directors had deceived the corporation did not state a cause of action
because no conflict of interest was alleged.'
9 7
Whether the directors are interested then is crucial to ascertaining the
persons who must be informed to avoid deception under lob-5. If all of the
directors are interested, disclosure must be made to the shareholders even
though the decision normally would be made by the board. If all or a majority
of the directors are disinterested, disclosure should be to the board. If a mi-
nority of the board is disinterested, the law is unclear but the better view is
that disclosure should be made to the board.
C. Was There Adequate Disclosure?
After the court determines the person to whom disclosure should be
made, it must examine whether disclosure is adequate under the standards of
rule lob-5.
1. Disclosure Deemed Adequate if No Allegation of
Misrepresentation or Omission
If there is no allegation in the complaint of a material misreprsentation or
omission, a claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty clearly is
not actionable after Sante Fe. For example, the Southern District of New
York in In re Sunshine Mining Co. Securities Litigation 198 dismissed a claim by
the stockholders of Sunshine Mining Company that its directors, motivated
soley by selfish interests, violated section 14(e) by resisting the tender offer of
Great Western United Corporation. Throughout the period of its resistance to
the tender offer, management made no public statements except to announce
the various activities it was undertaking and never recommended that the
shareholders refrain from tendering their shares. The court, applying Santa
Fe to section 14(e), 199 held that the complaint was "no more than a charge
that Sunshine management acted unfairly and in breach of its fiduciary du-
ties" 2° ° and thus did not state a claim under section 14(e).
195. 444 F. Supp. at 295.
196. Id at 296.
197. Id at 298. The court distinguished Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 209, on the ground
that the directors here, unlike in Goldberg, had no pecuniary involvement with the transaction.
444 F. Supp. at 297.
198. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,217 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
199. Id at 96,635. The court rejected the argument that a breach of fiduciary duty came
within the broader langauge of § 14(e), which prohibits "fraudulent" as well as deceptive or ma-
nipulative conduct. Id at 96,636.
200. Id at 96,636.
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2. Disclosure Deemed Inadequate to Meet lOb-5 Standards
At one extreme of the disclosure continuum is the case in which virtually
no disclosure is made. This most often occurs when there is a duty to disclose
to the shareholders but disclosure has been made, if at all, to directors, some of
whom are interested. A recent illustration is Kidwell v. Meikle.20 1 In Kidwell,
the defendant corporation was Targhee, an Idaho nonprofit cooperative mem-
bership corporation formed to operate for its members a ski resort on lands
leased from the United States Forest Service. When a consulting firm hired by
Targhee recommended that additional housing be built to improve the opera-
tion of its resort, the executive vice president of Targhee suggested to the
fifteen-member board a housing plan that led to the formation of Sioux Cor-
poration (Sioux), a profit corporation. Certain Targhee shareholders were per-
mitted to become members of Sioux. Targhee borrowed money from the
Small Business Association to build the housing units and leased them to
Sioux for twenty-five years in consideration for which Sioux agreed to pay off
the mortgage. Targhee signed a management contract, which was alleged to
be highly unfavorable because it forced Targhee to remain in operation the
year round to manage and maintaift the units.
After the units were operational William Robinson approached the
Targhee board with the proposal to purchase Targhee's assets through a stock-
for-assets exchange between a newly-formed corporation, Big Valley, and
Targhee. Big Valley, in consideration for Targhee's assets and assumption of
its liabilities, including its contract with Sioux, would give to Targhee and its
members a minority stock interest in Big Valley. The fifteen-member Targhee
board voted two to one to approve the sale and called for an advisory mem-
bership vote, even though the vote was not required under Idaho law.20 2 The
directors voting for this first proposal included three directors who were share-
holders of Sioux and two persons who had guaranteed Targhee's liabilities to
the Valley Bank. The chairman of the board of directors, who was not a
shareholder of Sioux, opposed the sale. The notice sent to the shareholders
prior to the advisory vote contained a brief outline of the proposal and stated
that full disclosure of the details of the Robinson proposal would be made at
the meeting. The evidence was in conflict on whether the Targhee members
were informed at the meeting that: (1) certain Targhee directors owned shares
in Sioux; (2) the counsel for Targhee had been and may still have been the
counsel for Sioux; and (3) two of Targhee's directors had become personally
liable for the corporation's debts to the Valley Bank. Less than one-third of
the total voting stock of the corporation voted for the sale. (Sixty-five percent
of those present approved the sale but fewer than half of the members were
present.)
Some directors and various members of Targhee sued the other directors,
201. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
202. Id at 1280-81. Section 30-145(2) of the Idaho Code provided that if a corporation were
unable to meet its liabilities then matured, shareholder approval of the sale of all its assets was not
required. Id at 1280 n.l.
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the bank, and various other individuals for violations of 1 Ob-5 and state fiduci-
ary duties. The court ultimately dismissed all causes of action except a deriva-
tive cause of action by a member of the corporation under lob-5 against the
directors, the attorney, Sioux, Valley Bank, Big Valley, Robinson, and others.
In refusing to dismiss the lOb-5 claim, the court first found that disclosure
should have been made to the shareholders. "Even where shareholder ap-
proval is not required for a corporate act under state law, failure by directors
and others to disclose conflicts of interest or unfairness to shareholders regard-
ing the transaction constitutes a violation of the rule. '203 The court then ex-
amined the adequacy of the disclosure to the shareholders, which consisted of
a brief outline of the proposal and a statement that full details would be given
at the meeting. Since there was virtually no disclosure in the notice sent to the
shareholders, the court found that there were material omissions in the disclo-
sure, which gave rise to a cause of action under rule lOb-5.2°4 Whether there
had been full disclosure at the meeting was, in the court's opinion, irrelevant,
because an incomplete notice and poor attendance made any disclosure at the
meeting irrelevant. "The only disclosure . . . came in an ambiguous notice
followed by a disorderly meeting which fewer than half of Targhee's members
attended." 20
5
There was also virtually no attempt at disclosure in Wright v. Heizer
Corp. 206 In Wright, a derivative action, the only written disclosure made to
the shareholders, whose written consent to an amendment to the articles was
sought, was that the number of common shares would be increased from three
to seven million, and the only oral disclosure was a statement that the amend-
ment was necessary for financing and the amount of the financing. Testimony
indicated that the shareholders were not told the source of the financing or
given any other information that would suggest that the financing was more
than a simple purchase of stock.20 7 The court found that this disclosure did
not meet the standards of rule lob-5.
3. Disclosure Deemed Adequate Under lOb-5
When there is some disclosure by the defendants and an allegation in the
complaint that the disclosure was inadequate under rule lOb-5, the courts are
faced with less of a clear-cut resolution than in Kidwell and Wright. There are
some categories that are used by the courts in analyzing the adequacy of dis-
closure. If the alleged omission falls into one of these categories, it is usually
deemed to be immaterial and thus does not constitute inadequate disclosure:
(1) a characterization of the transaction; (2) readily available information; (3)
203. Id at 1291.
204. Id at 1293.
205. Id at 1292.
206. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 75-105 supra.
207. 560 F.2d at 247.
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an expert opinion; (4) prediction and speculation; and (5) alternative courses
of action.
a Characterizing the Transaction
By far the most common basis for finding that the disclosure is adequate
under lob-5 is that the underlying terms of the transaction have been disclosed
and the alleged omission is simply a failure to characterize the transaction in
pejorative terms. In Goldberger v. Baker,208 a derivative action, shareholders
of Health-Chem Corporation alleged that Health-Chem's officers and direc-
tors and corporate parents violated rules 14a-9 and lOb-5 by looting Health-
Chem through several fraudulent transactions. After examining the transac-
tions and the allegations made in the complaint, the court concluded that
plaintiffs' claims were nothing more than that Health-Chem had been badly
managed 20 9 and thus did not state a claim under rule lOb-5. Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that Health-Chem failed to disclose to its shareholders and
the public that $900,000 in loans to its corporate parents were in violation of a
representation in an earlier prospectus that it would not loan funds to any of
its parents. Plaintiffs also alleged that Health-Chem received less than fair
and adequate consideration for the loans.2 10 The court held that since the
complaint failed to allege that the terms of the loans were either not disclosed
or disclosed in a misleading manner, allegations that the company did not
disclose that the terms were unfair or that the loans were inconsistent with
company policy did not give rise to a cause of action under rule lOb-5. The
court refused to require that the transaction be described in pejorative terms.
To hold that such an allegation was sufficient would be tantamount
to asking defendants to 'characterize' the transactions with 'pejora-
tive' words, and the failure to use such descriptions is not a lOb-5
violation. Meridor, supra. If the Green case means anything, it is
that such an allegation is not a sufficient claim of deception. Simi-
larly, the mere fact that the loans were inconsistent with previously
stated policy and defendants did not disclose the inconsistency also
does not rise to the level of an actionable deception. So long as the
minority shareholders are not misled about the actual terms of the
transactions, this Court sees no reason why every transaction in
which a corporation wishes to engage should have to be measured
against all statements of company policy previously made, in order
to search for any possible inconsistencies. Plaintiffs do not allege
that they were deceived as to the terms or conditions of the loans,
and, based on their carefuly inexplicit pleading, one would have to
conclude that they were not. Accordingly, under Green and Meridor,
the complaint does not presently state a claim under Rule lOb-5.
211
Plaintiffs also had alleged that the defendants forced Health-Chem to
208. 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
209. Id at 665.
210. Id at 662.
211. Id at 665.
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enter into an agreement with Funding Systems Leasing Corporation under
which Health-Chem purchased equipment from Funding Systems and then
leased back the equipment at a loss of approximately $300,000. The complaint
alleged that defendants violated rule lob-5 because they failed to disclose that
the deal would result in Health-Chem's committing more funds to the
purchase than its net worth and would depress the market price of Health-
Chem common stock. In finding that this was not an adequate allegation of
deception under rule lOb-5, the court said: "Plaintiffs do not allege that any
terms of the transaction were withheld, only that certain conclusions and de-
rogatory predictions were not made. Defendants cannot be liable for a mere
failure to say that their deal was a bad one."
212
Similarly, in Biesenbach v. Guenther213 the Third Circuit not only upheld
the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim
but also denied them an opportunity to amend their complaint a second time.
The basic justification for finding defendant's disclosure adequate under rule
10b-5 was the court's unwillingness to hold that defendants had a duty to char-
acterize the transaction or to state their motives. Plaintiffs, minority'share-
holders of Heidelberg, Inc., brought derivative and class actions against the
individual members who constituted a majority of the Heidelberg board of
directors, challenging two loans defendants had made to the corporation. The
loans were repugnant to plaintiffs because the corporate directors had the op-
tion of receiving the interest and principal in stock of the corporation, thereby
increasing their control. The complaint further alleged that, in pursuit of their
goal of taking over the corporation and eliminating opposition, defendants
had reduced the number of the board of directors from nineteen to seven and
had issued a million new shares after representing to the shareholders that
they intended to issue only 500,000.
The court read the complaint to allege that the deception consisted of (1)
defendants' statements that the transactions were in the best interests of the
shareholders and (2) defendants' failure to disclose the true purpose behind
the various transactions. In the court's view, "appellants are stating that the
failure to disclose the breach of fiduciary duty is a misrepresentation sufficient
to constitute a violation of the Act." 214 Quoting an oft-cited passage from
Judge Higginbotham in Stedman v. Storer,215 the court found that failure to
disclose faithless motives or an unclean heart is not actionable under lob-5.
[I]t is bemusing, and ultimately pointless, to charge that directors
perpetrated a 'material omission' when they failed to (a) discover and
adjudged [sic] faithless motives for their actions and (b) announce
such a discovery in reporting the products of their managerial efforts
and judgment. The securities laws, while their central insistence is
upon disclosure, were never intended to attempt any such measures
of psychoanalysis or reported self-analysis. The unclean heart of a
212. Id
213. 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
214. Id at 402.
215. 308 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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director is not actionable, whether or not it is 'disclosed,' unless the
impurities are translated into actionable deeds or omissions both ob-
jective and external.
2 16
Another example is Lavin v. Data Systems Analysts, Inc. ,217 in which the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed a derivative action brought against
the corporate executives and directors (also alleged to be majority sharehold-
ers) because they violated rule lOb-5 by enacting an employee bonus plan in
which forty percent of the corporation's pretax profits would be distributed as
bonuses to key personnel selected by the board of directors. The plaintiffs
alleged that the corporation had failed to disclose in various corporate docu-
ments, including proxy statements and annual reports, that the plan "involved
self-dealing, conflict of interest, and utilization of corporate funds for strictly
personal benefit" and that the plan was "devoid of a legitimate or justifiable
corporate purpose.' 218 Noting that the shareholders had been informed of the
plan's purpose, the maximum percentage of pretax profits available for the
plan, that the board would select the recipients, and that officers and directors
216. 588 F.2d at 402 (quoting Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. at 887).
217. 443 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd inen, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978). See also
Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Maldonado v. Flynn,
597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). The proxy statement contained a table showing the number and
monetary value of the stock options granted to or exercised by the officers over a certain period
and discussed the loans made to cover the cost of purchasing the stock and the tax liability of the
officers. This was insufficient because:
the statement significantly failed to advise the stockholders that on July 2, 1974, mem-
bers of the board, possessed of inside information to the effect that an imminent tender
offer would sharply increase the market value of Zapata's shares, had amended the plan
by accelerating the option exercise date, thus enabling Zapata's six senior officers to en-
large their profit substantially and reducing by several hundred thousand dollars theben fit which Zapata would otherwise have derived from the exercise of the options
under the plan as it stood before amendment. In addition, the statement did not point
out that under the original terms of the stock option plan Zapata shares could bepurchased by the officers only for cash, so that amendment of the plan was necessary to
obtain authorization for the loans. The statement also neglected to mention that the
board had directed that the resolution be submitted for shareholders' approval, which
had neither been sought nor obtained.
What the 1975 proxy statement did represent was that
The purpose of the . . loan arrangements was to enable [the] officers to exercise their
options at a time when, because of the generally depressed state of the securities markets,
the differential between the market value of the Common Stock and the exercise price of
their options, and therefore the Federal income tax liability resulting from exercise,
would be minimized.
At best this statement was a half-truth and quite misleading. It was true that the loans
were made and the options exercised in order to minimize the optionees' resulting tax
liability. What was not true was the implication that prompt exercise of the options had
been encouraged merely to anticipate a turnaround in a generally depressed state of a
market that would reduce the attractiveness of the options.
Id at 797. In short, the court said that the "proxy statement, however, left the misleading impres-
sion that the authorization of the loans was a routine corporate action undertaken to serve the
interests of the Corporation, whereas in fact the authorization facilitated transactions costing it
more than $400,000 in tax savings." Id at 798.
218. 443 F. Supp. at 107. The complaint also alleged that the corporation had failed to dis-
close that the bonuses would be given primarily to officers and directors and that they, as majority
shareholders, could approve the plan without the votes of the other shareholders. The court did
not specifically discuss these allegations.
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were eligible for the bonuses, the court held that the failure to disclose im-
proper motives was not deceptive under lob-5.
On distinguishable facts in SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co. ,219 the Second
Circuit held that a failure to disclose improper motives was actionable decep-
tion under lob-5 but denied injunctive relief. Management sought share-
holder approval of a merger to effect a going private transaction in which
public shares that sold for nine dollars per share six years prior to the merger
were being repurchased for two dollars per share. The SEC claimed inter alia
that the proxy statement inadequately disclosed 220 that the president and prin-
cipal shareholder's true intention and underlying purpose in proposing the
merger was to discharge his personal debts from the corporation's treasury.
After the merger the president's salary was increased from $90,000 to $150,000
retroactively, and some of his properties were purchased by the corporation
for $2 million. The Second Circuit found that there was substantial evidence
for the district judge to find "'that the overriding purpose for the merger was
to enable Somekh [the president] to repay his personal indebtedness. Had his
finances been otherwise, the merger may never have occurred. There is not so
much as a hint of Somekh's huge debts in the proxy statement. The non-
disclosure is clearly established'. '221 It is unclear from this language whether
there was deception because of the failure to disclose the existence of the debts
or failure to disclose Somekh's motive in affecting the merger. Park/ane Ho-
siery may be distinguished from the cases described above because it is an
SEC enforcement action and, more significantly, because one of the underly-
ing facts-the existence of the debt-was not disclosed.
The Fifth Circuit in Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. Ameri-
can Fidelity Lfe Insurance Co. ,222 despite several statements that a failure to
characterize the transaction was not actionable under lOb-5, 223 nonetheless
held that deception was properly alleged in a complaint apparently based on a
failure to disclose motives. Specifically, the court upheld the claim because
defendants failed to disclose that a corporate repurchase plan would be carried
out in a manner that would artificially inflate the price of the company's stock
to benefit defendants and in fact misrepresented in a press release that the
purchases would be made in a manner that would not unduly affect the mar-
219. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
220. The proxy statement disclosed the following facts:
If the proposed merger is consummated, the shareholders of Newco will be entitled
to the benefit of all of the assets, earnings, earning capacity and cash flow of the Com-
pany. The merger will make possible a combination of the resources of the Company
with those of Mr. Somekh (who with his wife and trusts for the benefit of his children,
owns approximately 86% of the stock of Newco) for the conduct of real estate activities
of the type that Mr. Somekh has to date conducted individually (primarily development
of garden apartments). Such a combination is presently being contemplated.
Id at 1086 n.2.
221. Id at 1086.
222. 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979).
223. Id at 609-11.
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The cases discussed above, except Parkiane Hosiery Co. and Alabama
Farm Bureau, were based firmly on the premise that the underlying terms of
the transactions were disclosed and that the only omission was a failure to
characterize the transaction as unfair or as a breach of fiduciary duty or to
reveal the underlying motives of the defendants. Going even further, the
Southern District of New York, in Rodman v. Grant Foundation,225 expressed
some doubt as to the necessity of disclosing even the underlying facts of the
conflict. In Rodman, the court dismissed an action brought by the trustee of a
bankrupt corporation against various directors and shareholders for making
misleading statements in a proxy statement used by the corporation to
purchase its own stock. Noting that the proxy statements did disclose facts
from which the alleged conflicts of interest could be inferred-the stock hold-
ings of the individual defendants, the Foundation and the various trusts, and
the affiliation of the individual defendants with the foundation and trusts
226-
the court held "that the two proxy statements [,which] failed to disclose that
Staley's [chairman of the bankrupt corporation and trustee of the Foundation]
and Mayer's [president and chief executive officer of the corporation] true pur-
poses in the proposed purchases of stock were to prevent the Foundation and
trust from selling Grant shares to the public, (which would have diluted Sta-
ley's and Mayer's control of Grant) and to enable the foundation and the trust
to receive more for their shares than they would have received in an arm's
length sale"2 27 were not misleading.2 2 8 The court carefully analyzed previous
cases229 and concluded that although it is not yet settled whether there is a
duty to disclose the facts giving rise to a conflict of interest, it is clear that
"failure to disclose on top of such facts one's actual subjective purpose does
not violate the securities laws."
230
224. Id at 613. The court seemed to be influenced by the lack of discovery and that the case
had been decided by the lower court on summary judgment.
225. 460 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afrd, 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit,
although agreeing that there was no requirement to disclose a subjective purpose, did not decide
whether the underlying conflict need be disclosed. 608 F.2d at 71. However, the court found that
the conflict in this case was fully disclosed, at least to the directors. Id at 73.
226. 460 F. Supp. at 1037.
227. Id
228. Id at 1038.
229. Id at 1037-38. The court cited Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., 571 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d at 1083; Browning Debenture
Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977); and Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d at 209.
230. 460 F. Supp. at 1037-38. The court cited Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1978), Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kim-
ball, 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977), to support its position.
The court also found that disclosure of a conflict to the corporation's board of directors on
another occasion prior to the transaction in question was adequate disclosure. The disclosed facts
were that the directors were affiliated with the foundation and that the foundation was remainder-
man of trusts that held over 3,000,000 shares of Grant stock of which CBT was either trustee or
co-trustee. "The disclosure that the Foundation was remainderman of the trusts was sufficient to
put the directors on notice that the shares purchased were from a trust of which the Foundation
was remainderman." 460 F. Supp. at 1037.
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Courts have acknowledged quite frankly that distinguishing between an
underlying fact and a characterization of that fact or the motive behind the
transaction is often quite difficult. For example, in Hundahl v. United Beneft
Life Insurance Co. ,231 the court found that the omissions alleged in the com-
plaint were not actionable under rule lob-5 because they concerned disclo-
sures of motives, which would require management to label its decisions.
232
In Hundahl, class, derivative, and individual actions were brought against a
parent corporation that had allegedly depressed the price of a subsidiary it
sought to acquire through a tender offer. The allegations of deception in-
cluded claims that the parent failed to disclose: (1) the extent to which certain
changes in expense allocation concealed the subsidiary's profitability; (2) the
degree to which the parent's "very conservative" book value conversions un-
derstated the subsidiary's worth and earnings; (3) the reason that the Company
frequently changed the accountants' decisions with regard to the subsidiary's
accounting without first informing the subsidiary of the accountants' position;
(4) the explanation for the fact that the market price of the subsidiary's stock
was artificially low and not indicative of its true intrinsic value; and (5) that
the subsidiary's assets had appreciated to an amount substantially in excess of
their book value.233 With two exceptions, the court did not discuss each alle-
gation separately or with any specificity but rather concluded that none of
them were actionable because they were omissions of purpose or motive, not
of underlying fact. The court was concerned that this distinction between fact
and motive-the crucial distinction in determining the adequacy of disclosure
under l0b-5-is not easy to draw.
Rule lob-5 was designed to impose a duty to disclose and in-
form, not a duty to become enmeshed in labeling disclosed informa-
tion. . . . The line between informing and labeling, however, is
often not easy to draw. Courts have made clear that a party cannot
bootstrap its way into federal court by alleging violations of state law
and then claiming that the defendant failed to so label these viola-
tions ...
Viewed separately, none of the alleged acts amounts to an af-
firmative misstatement; rather, the bare facts disclosed are true, and
the claim is that there was not enough information given by Mutual
to make the facts disclosed meaningful and, hence, not deceptive.
But the omissions are not facts. They are instead nondisclosures of
purpose and motive; for example, not disclosing that the true worth
of the company stock was depressed by the accounting methods used.
In a narrow sense, then, the essence of the plaintiffs complaint is that
Mutual did not adequately explain, or label, the elemental facts that
it disclosed.23
4
With this in mind the court did analyze two of the allegations of decep-
231. 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See text accompanying notes 324-31 infra.
232. 465 F. Supp. at 1365.
233. Id at 1364-65.
234. Id at 1364 (citing Golub v. PPD, 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978) and Popkin v. Bishop, 464
F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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tion with specificity to determine whether they were omissions of fact or sim-
ply were failures to characterize the facts that were disclosed. The parent's
failure to disclose that its changes in expense allocation "concealed" the sub-
sidiary's profitability and adversely affected the price of the subsidiary's stock
was viewed by the court as a self-evident failure to characterize an action as a
breach of fiduciary duty and consequently not deception under lOb-5. 235 The
court had more difficulty in deciding whether fact or characterization of fact
best described plaintiffs allegation that the parent failed to accompany its
statement of a dividend restriction with a representation that management did
not regard the restriction as a serious bar to declaring dividends. Recognizing
that this was a close question, the court said: "it is arguable that the gist of the
claim is that management failed to request a lifting of the dividend restriction
and in that sense, it is more a matter of mismanagement than of nondisclo-
sure."236 The court left it to the trier of fact to draw the fact/characterization
line.
At least one court, in IKlamberg v. Roth,237 held that the existence of a
conflict can be inferred by the shareholder from other facts and therefore need
not expressly be disclosed because the conclusion would require a characteri-
zation. The court explained its position:
The principle underlying these cases appears to be that, once the
facts are disclosed, a failure to articulate adverse inferences from or
pejorative descriptions of those facts is not materially deceptive: a
reasonable person would not be deceived by their nondisclosure,
since he would be able to draw whatever inferences and append
whatever characterizations he believed appropriate. Of course, the
distinction between facts and characterizations may not be a nice
one. See, e.g., Hundahl v. United Benef)t Life Insurance Co. .supra .238
The Kiamberg court then concluded that plaintiffs, employee-benefi-
ciaries of a trust, should have known from available information that defend-
ant corporation, Kayser-Roth, successor to the original employer-settlor, could
replace the trustees who made the investment decisions with its own insiders.
Furthermore, given the information available, they should have realized that
the insiders could and very well might invest the trust assets in Kayser-Roth
stock. Plaintiffs had alleged that the trustees would have conflicting loyalties
to the trust and to Kayser-Roth and therefore might be unwilling to sell Kay-
ser-Roth stock when sale would be in the best interest of the trust but deleteri-
ous to Kayser-Roth. The court characterized the allegations as "attendant
conflicts of interests [that] are readily inferable [from these facts]."
'2 3 9
235. 465 F. Supp. at 1365.
236. Id
237. 473 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see text accompanying notes 116-211, supra; text ac-
companying notes 245-49 infra.
238. 473 F. Supp. at 552.
239. Id at 553.
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b. Readily Available Information
Failure to disclose information readily available from other sources gen-
erally is not deemed a violation of rule lOb-5. The problem of course is decid-
ing whether the information is readily available. Valente v. PepsiCo240
includes several examples of information that may or may not be reasonably
expected to be available and known to shareholders. In Valente, a lob-5 ac-
tion, the Delaware District Court considered various omissions allegedly made
in connection with a PepsiCo tender offer for a controlling share of Wilson
and the ensuing short-form merger of Wilson into PepsiCo. The court focused
on whether the omitted information was known or reasonably should have
been known to the shareholders. The tender offer materials disclosed the sub-
sequent merger and stated that the minority would be cashed out in the merger
for $17.50 a share, the price of the tender offer. The court found material as a
matter of law failure to disclose the availability of an appraisal remedy in the
subsequent merger. The court characterized the disclosed alternatives avail-
able to the shareholders as "$17.50 now or $17.50 later."'241 The alternative of
seeking an appraisal should have been disclosed because the merger giving
rise to an appraisal remedy was "probable," 242 and the appraisal remedy was
the only alternative whereby a shareholder could receive more than the $17.50
per share offered by PepsiCo. The court was unconvinced by the defendant's
argument that the shareholders should have been on notice of their statutory
appraisal rights.
The Court concludes that statutory appraisal rights are not so fre-
quently invoked nor so familiar that a reasonable shareholder could
be deemed to be conscious of their existence, at least in the circum-
stances of this case. Even among those who knew about appraisal
rights, the wording of the tender materials may have created the im-
pression that the rights would be unavailable in this case. 2 4 3
The court left the trier of fact to decide whether disclosure that PepsiCo
owned 88.2% of Wilson stock and intended to acquire 100% was sufficient to
reveal the extent of PepsiCo's control over Wilson. PepsiCo did not disclose
(1) the interlocking directorates between the two companies, (2) the fact that
PepsiCo's attorneys provided all legal advice to Wilson, and (3) PepsiCo's con-
trol over Wilson borrowing, capital expenditures, financial planning, and mar-
keting decisions.244 The court cautioned the trier of fact to keep in mind that
"[flacts which indicate control and conflict of interest may be material, since
such facts cause shareholders to scrutinize a proposal more carefully than
usual."245 It is improbable that a reasonable investor could not infer the ex-
tent of PepsiCo's control from the disclosure that PepsiCo owned 88.2% of
Wilson stock. The court's unwillingness to find this as a matter of law suggests
240. 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978).
241. Id at 1240.
242. Id at 1240 n.16.
243. Id at 1240 n.17.
244. Id at 1241.
245. Id
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its special sensitivity to conflict of interest disclosure. The trier of fact also was
left to decide whether a reasonable shareholder might have known the extent
of PepsiCo's control over Wilson from prior annual reports even though the
reports allegedly were received months or years before the tender offer, many
of the details of control were never disclosed in the annual reports, and the
disclosed facts were not always displayed prominently.
246
After examining the Company's previous proxy statements and annual
reports, the court refused to impute to the shareholders knowledge of premi-
ums paid to the company's employees-allegedly to improve morale by com-
pensating employees for loss of otherwise available tax benefits247---because
the disclosure of the provisions was neither adequate nor prominently dis-
played, and the documents were issued several months before the tender of-
fer.248 However, the court found as a matter of law no obligation to disclose
readily available financial information, such as earnings per share, when the
improvements in the company's earnings were highlighted in its annual and
quarterly reports and appeared on the financial pages of major newspapers.
"Common sense suggests that the minority shareholders would have known
about the improved EPS figures, or at least would have checked them before
making a decision whether or not to tender."
249
The court found immaterial as a matter of law the allegation that Wilson,
when it made a tender offer of $920 for each of its own debentures should have
disclosed its obligation to pay $1,054.50 per debenture should it redeem the
debentures at that time, because, inter alia, the schedule of redemption prices
was contained in the indenture agreement. 250 In addition, information con-
tained in other documents would be reasonably imputed to the shareholder
since the disclosure in those documents was adequate, prominent, and of a
recent date. The court also considered whether to impute to the shareholders
knowledge of the tax benefits to be received by the controlling shareholder as a
result of the timing of the tender offer and the merger, the answer was deemed
to depend upon whether the benefits were unusual in nature.25'
The court was reluctant to find that certain market information would be
readily available. For example, the court found that "[iun light of the uncer-
tainty as to the nature of the effect on the market price of Wilson, it might
have been misleading for defendants to make any statement about that effect
in the tender materials. '252 Nonetheless, it left for the trier of fact a decision
on the materiality of the failure to disclose that PepsiCo's announcement of
246. Id at 1242.
247. Id at 1244-45.
248. Id at 1245 n.26.
249. Id at 1243.
250. Id at 1242 n.22. Other relevant facts were: (1) since a debenture holder could not force
the corporation to redeem, redemption was not a practical alternative to acceptance of the tender
offer;, (2) there was no indication that Wilson had any intention of redeeming; and (3) the market
value of the debenture was determined by a variety of factors, including the prevailing interest
rate, and would be affected only slightly by redemption price. Id at 1242-43.
251. Id at 1245.
252. Id at 1246 n.28.
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the Wilson acquisition might place a ceiling on the market price of Wilson
stock.
The Valente case typifies judicial reluctance to find omissions immaterial
as a matter of law on the ground that knowledge of the omissions is readily
available from other sources and therefore imputable to the shareholders.
Courts are much more willing to dismiss a complaint when the information
can be deemed readily available and the significant omission is a failure to
characterize the disclosed facts. For example, the Second Circuit in Rodman v.
Grant Foundation,253 upholding a dismissal, discussed whether the defend-
ant's motives should have been reasonably inferred by the shareholders. The
trustees of the bankrupt corporation, Grant, had alleged that various directors,
and shareholders controlled by the directors, had violated proxy rules. When
the corporation purchased its own stock, the directors (Staley and Mayer)
failed to disclose in proxy materials that they designed the transaction to
maintain their control of Grant by preventing the foundation and the trust,
substantial holders of Grant stock, from selling Grant shares to the public.
The court said that this purpose clearly could be inferred from the corpora-
tion's purchase of an unusually large bloc of stock.254 The court also rejected
the argument that the proxy statement failed to disclose adequately that the
purchase price offered by Grant was twenty dollars higher per share than the
price its employees were required to pay for the same stock under Grant's
Employee Stock Purchase Plan. Because the proxy statements had disclosed
both the price to be paid by the employees and the formula for calculating the
price Grant was to pay for the shares it purchased from the foundation and
trust, shareholders were found to have enough information to compute the
difference in prices for themselves.2 55 The failure to disclose in the proxy
statement that Grant had a sufficient number of authorized but unissued
shares to meet its obligations under the Employee Stock Purchase Plan with-
out having to purchase its outstanding stock was likewise held not misleading
since the numbers of authorized and issued shares were disclosed in the com-
pany's annual statement.256 The Second Circuit also upheld without discus-
sion two findings of the District Court.2 57 First, since the financial statements
disclosed the amount of assets and liabilities, the number of shares issued, and
the number of treasury shares, the lower court did not find misleading the
failure to disclose that the price to be paid for the shares was in excess of their
book value, would decrease the company's net worth, and would have an ad-
verse effect on its profit and loss statement. The court reasoned that a share-
253. 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979); see text accompanying notes 227-28 infra.
254. 608 F.2d at 71. The court found little support in the record for the argument that the
desire to entrench management control was the sole reason for the stock purchase program. Id at
70.
255. Id at 72. See 460 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (district court decision); text
accompanying notes 224-29 supra.
256. 608 F.2d at 70. The court said that this contention misstated the facts. "Purchase of
Foundation stock was said to be 'desirable,' not necessary, and there is not the slightest intimation
that unissued shares were unavailable for use." Id
257. Id at 72.
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holder could compute book value from the information disclosed and could
infer (since treasury stock was carried on the books as an asset valued at cost)
that a purchase of stock at more than book value would leave net worth un-
changed and increase book value.2 58 Second, the lower court held not mis-
leading the failure to disclose that the prices to be paid under the stock
purchase agreement could exceed the market price on the date of closing. The
court said "[t]his risk could be inferred easily from the fact that the price was
to be the average of the daily closing market prices during a certain month," a
fact which was disclosed.259 Although a careful reader might uncover the so-
called omissions in the proxy statement, the court seems to have unrealistically
high expectations of the average shareholder, who, to infer these facts, would
have to piece together information revealed in several different parts of the
proxy statement. 260 No doubt the court was unsympathetic because what
plaintiffs claimed to be significant omissions were in fact failures to character-
ize the transaction in perjorative terms.
An example of a more reasonable expectation of the shareholder is found
in Klamberg v. Roth.261 Plaintiffs, employee beneficiaries of defendant Kay-
ser-Roth's trust, alleged that certain material information about the invest-
ment quality of Kayser-Roth's stock had not been disclosed: (1) its financial
condition depended upon developments in the volatile clothing industry; (2)
its continued growth depended upon acquisitions, many of which were made
in the late 1960's at unrealistic prices; (3) its most profitable division was under
pressure because of current fashion trends; and (4) it was subject to foreign
competition and had higher proportionate costs for raw material and labor
than its competitors.262 The court found that these alleged omissions consisted
of "factual" information readily available to the plaintiff because Kayser-Roth
stock was at all material times traded on the New York Stock Exchange and
therefore was subject to the SEC's and the Exchange's reporting requirements.
In addition, the court found that to the extent the omissions concerned nonfac-
tual information, the information "comprises pejorative characterizations and
adverse inferences, which, it appears, the plaintiff has drawn without the de-
fendant's help."
263
The court then characterized as "merely inferences about the legal effects
258. 460 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
259. Id
260. In 1979 the Ninth Circuit found that an information statement announcing a proposed
merger of a publicly held corporation into a company wholly-owned by one of is debtors ade-
quately revealed the conflict of the company's directors who were also trustees in bankruptcy for
the debtors. In rejecting plaintiffs claim that the information was buried in the information state-
ment and therefore did not give adequate notice of potential conflicts, the court found the disclo-
sures were in three different places well toward the front of the statement, preceded by a boldface
headline that would have alerted the reasonable reader and was in type of the same size and
prominence as that used throughout the information statement. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Trustee for
Westgate-California Corp., 609 F.2d 1274, 1282 (9th Cir. 1979).
261. 473 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 116-21, 236-38
supra.
262. Id at 552.
263. Id at 552-53.
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of the 1971 amendment, about which the beneficiaries knew or could readily
have learned," 264 the allegation that Kayser-Roth had improperly amended
the trust to justify discontinuance of Kayser-Roth contributions and that such
purported amendment should have, by the terms of the trust, effected its auto-
matic termination. The court also found that Kayser-Roth's replacement of
the trustees and the committee's subsequent investment in Kayser-Roth stock
need not have been disclosed to the beneficiaries because they knew or could
readily have learned by reading the agreement that these actions were ex-
pressly permitted by its terms.
265
Imputing this information to the beneficiaries is more easily justified in
Klaamberg than in Rodman because in Kiamberg inferences either were not
required or could have been made from facts generally available. The piec-
ing-together of facts disclosed in different places of a multiple page document
was not necessary in Kiamberg.
Requiring a shareholder to draw an inference makes more sense, how-
ever, if the shareholder is sophisticated and knowledgeable. For example,
Bridgen v. Scott 266 involved a speculative real estate partnership, formed
largely to provide "dramatic" tax savings for the participants with a possibility
for profit upon resale. The question was whether the investors should have
know that the promoter only sold forty-five percent of the interests and
retained fifty-five percent for himself and that the partnership property was
sold twice on the same day. The court, influenced also by the fact that the
plaintiffs sought recission after realizing the tax savings, found that the alleged
omissions were "details" that could either have been determined by the "high-
ly sophisticated and knowledgeable investors" 267 or could have been obtained
from the promoter because of the supposed "position" of the plaintiffs.
268
Had a public offering or less sophisticated investors been involved, a different
result likely would have followed.
c. Expert Opinions
Courts are much more tolerant of omissions relating to expert opinions
and often are unwilling to find that those omissions constitute inadequate dis-
closure for purposes of lOb-5. In He//ant v. Louisiana & Southern Life Insur-
ance Co. ,269 for example, the Eastern District of New York dismissed a class
action brought on behalf of minority shareholders who were to be cashed out
of the merged corporation while two insiders were to receive debentures in the
surviving corporation. The plaintiff had alleged that the opinion letter of
Alex. Brown & Sons (Alex. Brown), which accompanied the proxy statement
and contained Brown's evaluation of the fairness of the transaction and the
264. Id. at 553.
265. Id.
266. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
267. Id. at 1064.
268. Id. at 1065.
269. 459 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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value of the debentures given to the insiders, was a misrepresentation under
federal laws. The court said that the sweeping "characterization of a state-
ment as a 'misrepresentation' is not sufficient to state a claim under Rule lOb-
5" when there was no allegation that the financial data upon which Brown
based its opinion was false or undisclosed, or that the firm was unqualified to
make its assessment, had acted in a manner unacceptable in its field, or had
intentionally caused a false statement to be issued.270 The court granted leave
to amend, and the amended complaint was found to state a claim under sec-
tions 10(b) and 14(a) because the plaintiff's "broad and vague complaint has
been reduced to the simple theory that Alex. Brown knowingly issued a false
opinion."
27 1
A similar reluctance to find that an alleged misrepresentation in an expert
opinion is actionable under lOb-5 was shown in Volge v. Magnavox Co.272 In
Volge the court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in a class
action brought under section 10(b) and section 14(a) for alleged misrepresen-
tations in connection with a freeze-out merger. The court, after discussing
Santa Fe in great detail, concluded that the only difference between this case
and Santa Fe was that the complaint in Volge alleged misrepresentations and
omissions.273 Plaintiffs claimed misrepresentation in defendant's statements
that the merger was authorized by Delaware corporation law and that share-
holders had no choice but to surrender their shares for nine dollars per share
or seek appraisal. The issue was whether the asserted validity and effect of the
merger, even if untrue in point of law, was a misrepresentation actionable
under lOb-5. The court said "[flor plaintiff to characterize the statements in
the Proxy Statement as 'misrepresentations' and 'concealments' does not make
them so."' 2 7 4 Since the validity of the merger was based on an opinion of
counsel, which was disclosed, and since plaintiffs did not allege that counsel
was incompetent, had failed to follow Delaware decisions at variance with its
opinion, or was disqualified to give the opinion because of interest, "[t]he only
reason that plaintiff alleges the statements are untrue is because plaintiff enter-
tains a [different] view of the law," 275 and this was not actionable under lob-5.
d Prediction and Speculation
Failure to disclose speculative information or what amounts to a predic-
tion is not usually deemed a violation of rule lOb-5. Illustrative is Goldberger
v. Baker276 in which plaintiffs, shareholders of Health-Chem, alleged that de-
fendants caused three subsidiaries of Health-Chem to enter into sale lease-
back transactions and failed to disclose that these transactions would substan-
270. Id. at 725.
271. Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The court also
granted defendant's motion to change the venue to the Middle District of Florida. Id. at 55.
272. 439 F. Supp. 935 (D. Del. 1977).
273. Id. at 941.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 941-42. See also Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
276. 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See text accompanying notes 207-12 supra.
1981]
NORTH CAROLINA L,4WREVIEW
tially damage the parent. The Southern District of New York held that as
long as plaintiffs did not allege that they were deceived about the terms or
facts of these transactions, failure to predict their unfavorable result did not
violate lOb-5.
2 77
Similarly, in Rodman v. Grant Foundation,278 a proxy misrepresentation
action, the plaintiff alleged unlawful failure to disclose that corporate borrow-
ing to finance stock purchases would be necessary unless corporate expansion
and dividend policies were discontinued. The court noted that the plaintiff
had failed to prove that the borrowing took place and had only offered the
opinion of one director that it might. "Full factual disclosure need not be
embellished with speculative financial predictions. '279 As illustrated by these
cases, rule lob-5 has long required only the disclosure of a material fact.
Therefore, to the extent that speculation or prediction is not fact, disclosure
should not be required under lOb-5.
e. Alternative Courses of Action
Under some circumstances a corporation has been found to have no obli-
gation to disclose possible alternative courses of action. For example, in Um-
briac v. Kaiser280 the District Court for Nevada granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment, no doubt influenced by the fact that the liquidation
plan challenged by the plaintiffs doubled the value of their holdings28' and
was approved by 98.8% of the shares present in person or proxy at the meet-
ing.28 2 In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs charged that the liquida-
tion plan selected by the directors sacrificed a "control premium" that could
have been realized without adverse tax consequences by the use of another
device-the liquidating trust. The specific omissions alleged by plaintiffs were
that: (1) a control premium might have been realized had the corporation sold
its portfolio rather than distribute it; (2) even though all of the corporation's
assets might not have been disposed of within twelve months, the nonrecogni-
tion treatment provided by section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code could
have been secured by transfer of all unsold assets to a liquidating trust; (3) the
plan selected well served the special interests of the corporation's principal
stockholders not only by solving the divestiture problems created by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 but also by perpetuating control of their corporate empire;
and (4) the endorsement given the plan by First Boston Corporation was not
277. 442 F. Supp. at 665.
278. 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 252-59 supra.
279. Id. at 72. The court cited as support for this conclusion Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
586 F.2d 951, and Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. at 665. See, e.g., Dower v. Mosser Indus.,
Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,509 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (failure to disc-
lose financial projections not material to average minority stockholder in a merger of a company
into a newly created subsidiary).
280. 467 F. Supp. 548 (D. Nev. 1979).
281. Id. at 550.
282. Id. at 551. 73.2% of the total number of shares were present in person or proxy at the
meeting. Id.
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the product of independent, rigorous review.283 The court set some general
guidelines for analyzing whether these omissions were material. Management
is not required (1) to disclose to the shareholders information only suggestive
of mere possibility;284 (2) to go beyond revelation of facts and debate issues of
law;285 or (3) "to discuss the panoply of possible alternatives to the course of
action it is proposing, absent perhaps some suggestion that the route not cho-
sen was so well recognized and legally sound that the failure to pursue it de-
mands consideration. '286 The justifications for these guidelines were that "too
much information can be as misleading as too little,"'287 and state corporation
law gives "shareholders a right of veto or approval over organic corporate
changes but entrusts management with the task of devising the means by
which the end will be reached."288 Measured against these standards the court
found that failure to disclose that the corporation might have obtained a con-
trol premium or might have accomplished the liquidation in a tax-free fashion
was immaterial as a matter of law. These facts, in the court's view, were both
practically and legally speculative2 89 since there was no evidence, other than a
theoretical argument in a professor's deposition, that a premium was avail-
able.290 Second, the possibility that section 337 could be used to avoid tax was
legally remote and would require management to discuss a "novel and un-
charted" area of law and, therefore, was not required to be disclosed. 291 Fi-
nally, even though the allegations regarding First Boston and the Kaiser
Foundation were found to raise the "spectre of materiality, '292 the court none-
theless granted defendants' motion to dismiss because plaintiffs could not es-
tablish actual damages.
293
4. Measuring the Adequacy of Disclosure: Essential Facts
If certain basic facts are disclosed, courts seem more tolerant of other
alleged omissions. For example, in Cole v. Schenley Industries Inc. ,294 the Sec-
ond Circuit upheld the dismissal of a complaint challenging the merger of
Schenley, a subsidiary of Glen Alden, with another wholly owned Glen Alden
subsidiary because the shareholders were told the basic fact--the value of their
shares. 295 In 1968 Glen Alden had acquired eighty-six percent of Schenley's
common stock through a tender offer for Schenley stock at $58.66 2/3 per
283. Id. at 551-52.





289. Id. at 554.
290. Id. at 554 n.5.
291. Id. at 554.
292. Id. at 555.
293. Id. at 556.
294. 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977).
295. Id. at 43. The case was remanded for further consideration under state law in light of a
recent state court decision. Id. at 45.
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share. Three years later Glen Alden announced a proposed merger in which
the minority shareholders would receive $29 per share for common stock and
$26.10 per share for preferred stock. The action, filed against Schenley, its
board of directors, and Glen Alden, alleged violations of section 14(a) and
rules 14a-9 and lOb-5. The court found that none of the alleged omissions was
misleading and, therefore, there was no actionable deception under federal
securities laws.
296
First, plaintiffs had alleged that the proxy statement did not adequately
reveal as part of the corporation's cash and marketable securities the money
the corporation had received from the sale of Guild Wine Company and six
percent Glen Alden debentures. The court said that the proxy statement spe-
cifically stated that the financials excluded the proceeds of the Guild Wine
sale. The court further noted that appellants did not contest appellees' claim
that the debentures were not readily marketable, and then found that "the
proxy statement adequately set forth Schenley's cash position as of December
31, 1970."297 Second, plaintiff-appellants argued that the proxy statement did
not specifically state that Schenley would transfer $81.6 million to Glen Alden
immediately and another $36 million by the end of 1973. Upon a careful ex-
amination of the proxy statement, the court found, in bold print, a statement
in the second paragraph that "Schenley will transfer to Glen Alden substantial
funds of Schenley, including a substantial part of the proceeds received by
Schenley from the recent sale of its subsidiary. '298 That statement, and the
proxy statement, which apparently made clear that at least $47 million would
be transferred, was found to constitute sufficient disclosure. The court found
that the corporation had no obligation to clarify the meaning of a 'substantial'
transfer. 299 Third, plaintiff-appellants claimed that the proxy statement failed
to state that Schenley had approximately $140 million of surplus cash, liquid
assets not needed for the operation of Schenley's business. Plaintiffs alleged
that, if this fact had been disclosed, they would have sought appraisal. Per-
haps influenced by the fact that 250 Schenley shareholders did seek appraisal,
the court, in an interesting analysis, stated:
Page 3 of the proxy statement says that at least $47 million of Schen-
ley's funds would be transferred (provide a source of payment) im-
mediately to Glen Alden. The financial tables at pages 12 and 26 of
the proxy statement indicate that Glen Alden planned to issue about
$102 million of debentures as part of the merger. Section 1.3(b) of
the Plan and Agreement of Reorganization, Exhibit A of the proxy
statement, says that one possibility is for Schenley to purchase for
cash these Glen Alden debentures. A shareholder could have rea-
sonably concluded from this information that as of May 21, 1971
management had decided that Schenley had 'surplus cash' of be-
296. Id. at 37-38.
297. Id. at 41.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 42.
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tween $47 million and $102 million.3 ° °
The court obviously was willing to permit some omissions and require the
shareholders to read the proxy statement carefully, possibly because the share-
holders were told the most important fact---the value of the shares:
While the proxy statement did not allow the shareholder to make a
precise estimate of the value of a share of Schenley stock, it did give
the shareholder enough information to decide whether to accept the
Glen Alden offer, to seek appraisal, or to try to enjoin the merger.
Page 15 of the proxy statement shows that the book value of Schen-
ley's common stock (assuming full conversion of the preference stock
and adjusting for the sale of Buckingham) was $40.44. . . the fair
market value of the Glen Alden offer was $29 per share of common
stock and $26.10 per share of preferred stock.
3 01
This information was sufficient to permit the shareholder to make his only real
decision-whether to accept the offer, seek appraisal, or enjoin the merger.
30 2
5. Measuring the Adequacy of Disclosure: Action and
Sophistication of Shareholders
Courts also may be less willing to find actionable deception under lob-5 if
a significant number of disinterested shareholders approve the transaction.
For example, in Golub v. PPD Corp.303 the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment to the defendants and denial of plaintiffs' leave to amend on the
ground that there was no actionable deception for purposes of either lob-5 or
the proxy rules. In that case Old PPD was to be sold and continued as New
PPD, with the top management of Old PPD, who owned directly or indirectly
about eighty-two percent of Old PPD stock, to be paid substantial bonuses if
they remained in the employ of New PPD and if the operations of New PPD
exceeded certain profitability targets. A proxy statement, which described the
terms of the sale, including the bonus arrangement, was submitted to the
shareholders for a vote, and the sale was approved by 99.4% of the voting
stock. The complaint alleged that the proxy statement failed to state the
"'true purpose and nature of the sale transaction'" and that it failed to state
"'that the bonuses were a reward or premium for the sale of the business.' ,304
Applying Santa Fe to the proxy rules, the Eighth Circuit found that failure to
characterize a transaction was not deception under lob-5 and that absent de-
ception, a mere breach of fiduciary duty was not actionable under lOb-5, sec-
tion 14a, or rule 14a-9.305 The large shareholder vote approving the
300. Id.
301. Id. at 43.
302. Not only did 250 Schenley shareholders obtain appraisal, id. at 40 n.7, but minority
shareholders brought three separate suits to enjoin the merger, id. at 40 n.8. See also Nash v.
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978), in
which several minority shareholders, despite claimed omissions, gleaned enough from the disclo-
sure document to decide to dissent under Ohio law.
303. 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978).
304. Id. at 763.
305. Id. at 764.
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transaction was no doubt a significant, but unmentioned, factor in the court's
decision. If, however, there had been a misrepresentation or omission of
greater significance to the shareholders, their vote in support of a transaction
would be of less relevance.
A court may also be reluctant to find deception if the investors are sophis-
ticated and have profited from the investment. In Bridgen v. Scott,306 for ex-
ample, participants in a partnership formed to obtain "dramatic" tax savings
for its participants by investing in speculative real estate sued the promoter
under lOb-5 for "premature" termination of the partnership. The court,
largely influenced by the sophistication of the investors in the private offering,
concluded that there was no material deception and that, citing Santa Fe, "it is
not the function of the 1933 or 1934 Securities Acts to remedy or provide a
cause of action for managerial mis-management. '30 7
6. The Crux of Deception: Materiality
Inextricably linked with the concept of lOb-5 deception is materiality, be-
cause no misstatement or omission is actionable under lob-5 unless it is
proved to be material. Materiality has been described as "one of the most
unpredictable and elusive concepts of the federal securities laws."'30 8 The test
for materiality used in most lOb-5 cases is that set forth in TSC Industries, Inc.
v. North way, Inc.:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote. This standard is fully consistent with Mills' general descrip-
tion of materiality as a requirement that "the defect have a signifi-
cantpropensity to affect the voting process." It does not require proof
of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would
have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the
standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have as-
sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of
information made available.
30 9
Applying the Northway test of materiality to a fiduciary duty cause of action
under lOb-5, the Second Circuit in Goldberg v. Meridor310 adopted a director-
focused standard: a fact is material if it would have assumed actual signifi-
cance in the deliberations of reasonable and disinterested directors and if
those directors would have considered the fact to have "significantly altered"
306. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
307. Id. at 1057.
308. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977).
309. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 438, 449 (1976).
310. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 59
]ob-5 FID UCIAR Y DUTY CLAIMS
the "total mix" of information available.3 11 On the other hand, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Kidwell v. Meikle,312 adopted a shareholder-focused test of materiality
in a similar fiduciary duty case. The Kidwell test of materiality was whether a
"reasonable minority shareholder probably would have considered this infor-
mation important in any decision whether or not to sue to block the sale."
'3 13
The court did not hesitate to state its disagreement with the Second Circuit's
director-focused test:
In cases such as this, where the deception is found in nondisclosure
affecting shareholders' decisions whether or not to sue to block a cor-
porate transaction, we believe that the proper inquiry on the materi-
ality question is what a reasonable shareholder would have
considered significant. To the extent that it differs (by focusing on
the expectations of a reasonable director), the Second Circuit's analy-
sis in Goldberg v. Meridor. .. is disapproved.
3 14
In Kidwell the only undisclosed fact held material under the shareholder-fo-
cused test was the directors' share ownership in a sister corporation that would
profit from the transaction. The shareholder-focused Kidwell test is more sen-
sible when the court is deciding whether disclosure to the shareholders is ade-
quate, as was the case in both Goldberg and Kidwell. However, the Goldberg
test is more proper if the question is the adequacy of disclosure to directors.
Materiality usually depends upon the circumstances of each case. For
example, whether a particular fact is material, according to the Kidwell court,
must depend upon the theories under which the transaction in question could
have been enjoined under state law. If, for example, state causes of action
other than the directors' conflicts of interest were available to enjoin the sale,
such as ultra vires or the defacto merger theory, completely different facts may
be material.3 15 Also, materiality may vary in relation to the sophistication and
knowledge of the investors. In BrIgden v. Scott,31 6 for example, the court em-
phasized that the "highly sophisticated and knowledgeable" investors could
have determined the crucial facts from the confidential memorandum distrib-
uted to each participant.
3 17
A detailed application of the Northway materiality standard was made in
Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc..318 First, the court, using a shareholder-focused test,
stated that summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of materiality is
appropriate only "if the established omissions are so obviously important to an
311. Id. at 219.
312. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979), dscussedin teXt accompanying notes 100-04 supra, 346-53,
364-65 infra.
313. Id. at 1293.
314. Id. at 1293 n.10. The court observed, however, that the result in Goldberg could have
been the same under a shareholder-focused materiality analysis.
315. Id. at 1293.
316. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
317. Id. at 1064-65. The court added that "a reasonable juror (in this Court's opinion) could
not conclude, that a reasonable investor might have considered additional details important in
making his [investment] decision." Id. at 1065.
318. 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978), dcussed in text accompanying notes 42-44, 239-51
supra, 376-79 infra.
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investor that reasonable minds cannot differ."319 From that perspective the
failure to disclose in tender offer materials the availability of an appraisal rem-
edy in a subsequent merger was material as a matter of law because the tender
offer materials did disclose that the minority would be cashed out for the
tender offer price in the planned merger. The appraisal remedy would be the
only alternative for a shareholder who wanted a higher price for his shares.
The Valente court also found as a matter of law that the failure to disclose
readily available financial information, such as earnings per share, was not
material when the improvements in the corporation's earnings were high-
lighted in its annual and quarterly reports and appeared on the financial pages
of major newspapers from time to time.
320
Materiality was also key to the District Court of Nevada's findings in Urn-
briac v. Kaiser.321 The failure to disclose the possibility that the corporation
could have effected a liquidation to obtain a "control premium" was found to
be immaterial because there was no evidence that the premium was actually
available. The failure to disclose that the liquidation might have been accom-
plished in a tax-free fashion through the use of a liquidating trust was also
immaterial because such a possibility was "legally remote" and would require
discussion of a "novel and uncharted" area of law.322 Omission of alternative
procedures was likewise immaterial because the shareholders had the author-
ity under state corporation law to decide whether the corporation should liqui-
date but not the authority "to pick and choose among the various routes that
could be taken to that end."
323
Therefore, as discussed earlier,324 certain kinds of omissions are not ma-
terial because of their nature and thus are not deception under lob-5. To that
extent the usual factual discussion of materiality can be made a matter of law.
If the omitted fact falls within one of the categories-characterization of a fact,
readily available information, expert opinions, prediction, speculation, or al-
ternative course of action-it is not material as a matter of law, and the lOb-5
claim can be disposed of on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
D. Manioulation
Absent deception, a claim can nonetheless be actionable under lOb-5 if
manipulation is demonstrated. Courts, however, usually have defined manip-
ulation in its technical sense and consequently have concluded that a breach of
fiduciary duty is not manipulation under lOb-5. Perhaps the best, and cer-
319. Id. at 1238 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)).
320. Id. at 1243. For further discussion of the Valente analysis of materiality see text accom-
panying notes 239-51 supra.
321. 467 F. Supp. 548 (D. Nev. 1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 279-92 supra.
322. Id. at 553, 554.
323. Id. at 553. When the question of materiality cannot be determined as a matter of law,
which is most frequently the case, courts review materiality as a question of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard. See, ag., Nash v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
324. See notes 207-90 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 59
lob-5 FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS
tainly most extensive, discussion of whether a breach of fiduciary duty might
be manipulation within lOb-5 is found in Hundahl v. UnitedBen§ft Life Insur-
ance Co.325 Class, derivative, and individual actions were brought against a
parent who had allegedly taken various actions for the purpose of depressing
the price of the stock of the partially owned subsidiary it sought to take over
through a tender offer. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, in violation
of rule lOb-5, engaged in a manipulative scheme that consisted of the follow-
ing acts: (1) improper allocation to the subsidiary of certain expenses that
should have been borne by the parent; (2) improper restriction of dividends to
the subsidiary's shareholders; (3) creation of unnecessarily large reserves for
policy reevaluation and contingencies; (4) use of grossly conservative account-
ing principles in the preparation of the subsidiary's financial reports; and (5)
failure to disclose the true value of the subsidiary's assets in its financial re-
ports.326 The court, concluding that the "heart of plaintiffs' lOb-5 claim is
manipulation," said: "The issue which this court must resolve is whether the
Supreme Court's definition of manipulation in Santa Fe encompasses acts oc-
curring outside the marketplace which, absent an intent to manipulate, would
constitute only a breach of fiduciary duty. We find that it does not."
' 3 2 7
In language that may provide guidance in other cases, the court defined
manipulation and its relationship to a free market:
To state a claim for manipulation under § 10(b), the plaintiff must at
the very least complain of conduct that interferes with the proper
functioning of the free market. A free market is one in which inves-
tors are provided with sufficient information to enable them to assess
accurately the value of a security. But conduct that interferes with
the free market only by depriving it of complete information is not
necessarily manipulative. When a corporation files a false report, or
its director issues a misleading press release or its officer sells stock
based on inside information, the price of the security may have been
changed and the securities laws may have been violated-but the
conduct alone is not manipulative. The Supreme Court in Santa Fe
explained that manipulative conduct consists of "practices ...in-
tended to mislead investors by artifically affecting market activity."
430 U.S. at 476.. . . In determining what the Supreme Court meant
by this definition, this court has viewed the free market concept
against the common law of manipulation, the language and legisla-
tive history of the Securities Exchange Act, and the Supreme Court's
recent emphasis in securities cases on federalism. From this study,
the following definition emerges: practices in the marketplace which
have the effect of either creating the false impression that certain
market activity is occurring when in fact such activity is unrelated to
actual supply and demand or tampering with the price itself are ma-
nipulative.3
28
325. 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979), discussedin text accompanying notes 230-35 supra.
326. Id. at 1354.
327. Id. at 1359.
328. Id. at 1360.
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The court, applying its definition to the facts of Hundahl, concluded that
a market reaction to defendants' actions was not by itself sufficient evidence of
lOb-5 manipulation.
[Pilaintiffs here to [sic] not complain that defendants conducted
transactions in the marketplace which had the effect artifically of
lowering the stock's price. Rather, they complain of acts which re-
sulted in the market forming a judgment about the value of United
stock based on its perception of the wisdom of decisions made by
United's management. Such a judgment considered whatever was
disclosed about the dividend policy, the allocation method[,] the ex-
penses, and the surplus. The mere fact that the market reacted to
them by price changes does not make the acts manipulative. Indeed,
a rise or fall in a stock price as a result of such acts is indicative of a
free market process. Thus the acts of which plaintiff complain are
properly the subject of suits "traditionally relegated to state law," for
if proved they are classic breaches of fiduciary duty. A failure to
disclose them is arguably deception, but it does not constitute manip-
ulation.
329
Apparently somewhat uncomfortable with this result, the court quite
frankly stated that it felt compelled to limit manipulation to its narrow techni-
cal definition because of the mandate of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe.
To draw manipulation more expansively pulls pure breaches of
fiduciary duty such as a restrictive dividend policy into the federal
stream. It does so although that breach is traditionally redressable
under state law. Thus this court's definition is an afortiori result of
Santa Fe. . . . The decision to disallow such a claim is at its root
one of policy grounded in federalism; such a choice ultimately ought
to be made by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court made the
choice in Santa Fe. Any quarrel of this court with that decision is
irrelevant. Nor would it be intellectually honest to attempt to steer in
a direction opposite that in which the Supreme Court has pointed.
330
Finally, the Hundahl court distinguished Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp.331 In Schlick a parent caused its subsidiary's pension fund to buy the
parent's share on the market with the purpose of increasing the price of the
shares. The Hundahl court said the Schlick scheme "falls squarely within this
court's definition of manipulation" because the "actions occurred in the mar-
ketplace and constituted artifical acts of stimulative trading designed to mis-
lead investors into believing that there was a heavy demand for Penn-Dixie
stock."
332
In Nash v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. 333 plaintiffs argued
that defendants' acquisition of ninety-five percent of their company had de-
stroyed the market for the company's stock and was therefore manipulation.
329. Id. at 1362.
330. Id. at 1362, 1363.
331. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
332. 465 F. Supp. at 1363.
333. 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
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Citing the Santa Fe definition of manipulation,3 3 4 the Sixth Circuit found that
even though the acquisition of ninety-five percent of the stock may have de-
stroyed the market for the company's shares, it "hardly amounts to 'manipula-
tion' of prices. '335 In Blackmar v. Lichtenstein,336 the trustee of a profit-
sharing trust, created for the benefit of Liberty Loan Corporation employees,
sued the successor trustees for violating rule 10b-5. The trustees were alleged
to have purchased Liberty Loan stock on behalf of the trust for the primary
purpose of increasing their control of Liberty Loan and maintaining the price
of the Liberty Loan stock for their benefit. The court dismissed the complaint
because the allegations constituted neither deception nor manipulation. There
was no deception because plaintiffs failed to allege any omissions or misstate-
ments of information. 337 Further, there was no manipulation "since the
knowing purchase of high risk securities by a fiduciary to protect its own inter-
ests in the issuer of the securities is not that type of device which artifically
affects market activity."338 It is clear from these cases that manipulation is not
a useful theory to convince a court that a breach of fiduciary duty is actionable
under rule lOb-5. However, the Fifth Circuit, in Alabama Farm Bureau Mu-
tual Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 3 3 9 suggested a
broader definition of manipulation. The directors of the corporation were ac-
cused of violating rule lOb-5 by causing the corporation to repurchase its own
stock for the purpose of maintaining their control. The repurchase was said to
inflate artifically the market price of the corporation's shares, thereby discour-
aging other persons from buying shares or attempting to gain control of the
company. The court suggested that manipulation could be more than "a term
of art."
Conduct designed to deter investment is within the scope of Rule
lOb-5 when it acts as a deceit or works as a fraud on a corporation or
those who have invested in its stock [citations omitted]. Such con-
duct falls within the scope of the literal language of § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 and is consistent with the congressional intent to proscribe in-
tentional or wilful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors.
As the Supreme Court has noted, § 10(b) is "described rightly as a
'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to deal with new manipu-
lative [or cunning] devices'. . .. 340
Then, in a footnote, the court said:
The Senate indicated in its report that § 10(b) was directed "at those
manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated
334. Id. at 562.
335. Id. at 562 n.9.
336. 438 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 578 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1978).
337. Id. at 807.
338. Id. (quoting O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 431 F. Supp. 292, 297 (N.D.
Ill.), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 1175 (1977)).
339. 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979).
340. Id. at 612 (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185, 203, which was quoting Hearings on H.R
7852 and H.. 8720 Before the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 115 (1934) (remarks of Thomas G. Corcoran)).
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to fulfill no useful function." A corporation's purchase of its shares
at artificially inflated prices would not appear to serve a useful pur-
pose.3
4 1
Despite the broader language used by the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff is well ad-
vised to use deception and not manipulation as a vehicle for bringing a fiduci-
ary duty cause of action under lOb-5.
E. The Third Question in a lob-5 Fiduciary Duty Case. Did the Deception
Cause the Harm?
1. Three Tests of Causation
After the court has determined to whom disclosure should be made and
the adequacy of disclosure, the third question is whether the omitted or mis-
represented fact caused the injury to the shareholder. In an omission case,342
if the shareholders would have been powerless to prevent the proposed self-
dealing even if all material facts had been disclosed, the omission would not
have caused the harm, and there would be no causation or reliance for the
purpose of lOb-5. The relationships among the concepts of materiality, reli-
ance, and causation are often indistinct. In the usual lOb-5 case, reliance is
presumed in a case of an omission if there is a showing of materiality.343
Therefore, in situations in which a shareholder vote is required to approve the
transaction, the questions of materiality, reliance, and causation are related
and demonstrable, because the shareholders could have taken direct action by
their vote if the information had been properly disclosed. When a shareholder
vote is not required, these questions are resolved less easily. Most courts have
found that causation is shown if it is demonstrated that the shareholders, if
possessed of all the material facts, could have brought a successful suit in state
court to enjoin the transaction. Thus, the ironic result is that the federal
courts-in order to find a violation of lOb-5-must examine state law as it
would be interpreted by the appropriate state court and determine whether
that law would, or with reasonable probability of success might, have afforded
plaintiffs relief. In all cases that have been discussed in this article, the basis of
an injunction under state law would most likely have been that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty by engaging in the self-dealing transaction. If an
action for breach of fiduciary duty is brought in a state court, the self-dealing
director must bear the burden of proving that the transaction is fair. In most
cases, if he can demonstrate fairness, no breach of fiduciary duty is found.
The plaintiff under these circumstances cannot successfully challenge the
transaction in state court and, as a result, also cannot show the causation nec-
essary to bring a successful lOb-5 action in federal court.
On the other hand, if the self-dealing director cannot meet the burden of
proving that the transaction is fair, the state court will likely conclude that he
341. Id. at 612 n.8 (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
342. The discussion in this section concentrates on the causation issue in an omission case. In
an affirmative misrepresentation case, the question becomes one of actual reliance.
343. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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has breached his fiduciary duty. The plaintiff will then have proven that he
can successfully challenge the transaction in state court and also will have
demonstrated causation under lOb-5. The crux of both the state and federal
actions is whether a state court will determine that the director has proven that
the transaction is fair. Thus, in Wright v. Heizer Corp. ,34 the Second Circuit
determined that the questionable pledge transaction would be unfair and con-
sequently a breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law. The court found,
therefore, that the requisite causation existed to justify a lOb-5 action. Like-
wise, in Goldberg v. Meridor,3 45 the court carefully examined New York law
and concluded that under existing case law and a newly passed statute, "where
an appraisal remedy is not available, the courts of New York have displayed
no hesitancy in granting injunctive relief' and that the omission and misrepre-
sentations in the press release were therefore material even though the share-
holders had no right to vote to approve the transaction.
346
The Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit in Wright and the Second
Circuit in Goldberg, adopted in Kidwell v. Meikle 347 the "actual success" test
for causation. After stating that "the record before us sheds little light on the
question whether, in state court, an action could have been brought to block
the sale of. . . assets," 34 8 the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[u]nder Idaho
law, in these circumstances minority members reasonably could have brought
a well-pleaded derivative suit to block the sale of. . . assets."'349 The court
then examined an Idaho statute and three cases dealing with duties owed by
fiduciaries to the corporation. It concluded that "[g]iven this line of cases, the
Idaho courts almost certainly would have entertained a suit by the sharehold-
ers charging a breach of the fiduciary duties by the. . . directors who voted
for the sale of assets," and that "given the mandate of Idaho Code § 30-142
and the Idaho case law of directors' fiduciary duties, we believe the defendants
are correct in admitting that a suit could have been brought in state court to
enjoin sale on grounds of conflict of interest and unfairness.
'350
The Kidwell court did not find that the state suit would have been success-
ful but rather required the district court to decide the state question on remand
before reaching the causation question under lOb-5. The court simply found
that a suit could have been brought under state law for breach of fiduciary
duty and possibly on other grounds such as ultra vires or defacto merger the-
ory.351 The Ninth Circuit then articulated its test: to prove causation the
344. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), discussedin text accompanying notes 75-105, 171-72, 205-06
supra.
345. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 112-15, 309-10 supra.
346. Id. at 219.
347. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 200-04, 311-14supra,
364-65 infra. The court in Kidwell made a reasonable attempt to distinguish between materiality
and causation in a fiduciary duty setting. An omitted fact would be material if its disclosure
would have caused the shareholder to bring suit in state court, but there would be no causation
unless the shareholder would have been successful in bringing the action. Id. at 1293-94.
348. Id. at 1292.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1292-93.
351. The court cited Pennsylvania and Delaware cases, but no Idaho cases, for its defacto
1981]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
plaintiff must prove that he "would have succeeded in getting permanent in-
junctive relief, or damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in the state law
action. '352 "The question is essentially one of fact, but the federal trial judge
should decide any legal issue that would have arisen in the hypothetical state
suit as a matter of law in the rule lob-5 suit."'353 The Kidwell court cited
Goldberg to justify a federal grant of relief contingent on the availability of
such relief in a state court. "Inadequate disclosures lull into security those
shareholders who might bring a derivative action under State law to enjoin the
securities transactions if all material facts were revealed." 354 Apparently, a
lOb-5 claim is an essential enforcement tool to give substance to the state law
claims.
The "actual success" test was expanded by the Second Circuit in Cole V.
Schenley Industries, Inc. 355 In Cole minority shareholders sought to enjoin a
merger under section 14 because of alleged misrepresentations and omissions
in the proxy statement and under section 10(b) for a breach of fiduciary duty.
The court found that causation was shown regardless of whether minority
shareholders could have successfully enjoined the merger under Delaware law
because the minority shareholders could have either sought appraisal rights
under Delaware law or threatened to seek appraisal rights in an attempt to
force Glen Alden to improve its offer.356
The Fifth Circuit, in Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. Ameri-
can Fidelity Life Insurance Co. ,357 used a "might" test of causation. A share-
holders' derivative action was brought against directors of a company for
causing the company to purchase its own shares, allegedly to maintain their
own control. By artifically inflating the market price, the directors could dis-
courage other persons from purchasing the company's shares or attempting to
take control of the company. Citing Goldberg,358 the court said that lob-5
requires "a showing that state law remedies were available and that the facts
shown make out a prima facie case for relief; it is not necessary to go further
and prove that the state action would have been successful. '359 Likewise, in
an enforcement case, SEC v. Parklane Hosiery,360 the Second Circuit substi-
tuted a "might enjoin" causation test for the "actual success" test. Had all the
information been disclosed to the minority shareholders, reasoned the court,
the shareholders "might well have been able to enjoin the merger under New
merger theory. The ultra vires claim arose because of plaintiffs allegation that the board was
constituted in violation of the corporation's articles and bylaws. Id. at 1293.
352. Id. at 1294.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1292.
355. 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 293-301 supra.
356. Id. at 39-40.
357. 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 221-23, 338-40 supra.
358. 606 F.2d at 614. The court noted that the Second Circuit in Goldberg refused to dismiss a
claim because a state suit would have been possible even though there was no allegation that the
shareholders would have been successful. The Goldberg court did not inquire further into the
shareholders' likelihood of success in the state action. Id.
359. Id.
360. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
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York law as having been undertaken for no valid corporate purpose." 36 1 The
"might" test also was used in a private action by the Delaware District Court
in Jacobs v. Hanson.362 The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss a
complaint in which the trustee in dissolution of the corporation and the minor-
ity shareholders sued certain directors, principal officers, and majority share-
holders on the ground that pursuant to a plan of liquidation they caused the
corporation's assets to be sold on terms unfavorable to the corporation's mi-
nority shareholders, terms which included lucrative consulting and anti-com-
petitive covenants for the defendants. In reaching its decision, the court found
that causation could be established if the trier of fact (1) believed the defend-
ant majority shareholders' allegation that he would not have voted for the sale
if a majority of the minority shareholders had not approved it363 or (2) found
that a minority shareholder might have secured an injunction barring the chal-
lenged transaction.364 Not only did the court fail to examine state law to de-
termine if an injunction might have been obtained, it also found that the
shareholder's previously unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the meeting at which
the transaction was approved did not demonstrate that, even with the benefit
of the undisclosed information, he might have been unable to. enjoin the
sale.365
The Third Circuit, in Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc. 3
66
(CRP), took still a different approach and chose simply to analyze causation as
an aspect of the materiality requirement. In Healey the plaintiff, a twenty
percent owner of Catalyst Regeneration Services, Inc. (CRS), sought an in-
junction and damages under rule lOb-5 for a merger that caused CRS to
merge with CRP, a subsidiary created by CRS that had previously purchased
eighty percent of CRS. Plaintiff lost an appraisal petition in the Texas state
court but won an approximately $200,000 judgment after a lengthy jury trial
on his lob-5 claim in federal court. Defendants appealed to the Third Circuit,
which reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings. First, the Third Circuit found that, after Santa Fe, the
crucial fact in determining whether a fiduciary duty cause of action exists is
"whether there was misrepresentation or omission in the flow of information
between the majority and minority shareholders. '367 In the court's view, the
causation test, which it deemed most logically to be a part of the materiality
analysis, should be framed as follows: If the investor had received the correct
361. Id. at 1088.
362. 464 F. Supp. 777 (D. Del. 1979).
363. Id. at 780.
364. Id. at 781.
365. Id. For a finding of no causation see Lewis v. McGraw, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), in which the court found shareholders who
were suing directors of the target corporation for frustrating the consummation of a tender offer
did not have the benefit of a presumption of reliance when materiality was shown because no
tender offer actually was made. Id. at 96,570.
366. 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 588 F.2d 202, 207 n.21
(6th Cir. 1978), in which the court also preferred a materiality analysis to a reliance or causation
analysis, because in an omission case, reliance is presumed if materiality is established.
367. 616 F.2d at 646.
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information, would he have had a reasonableprobability of securing an injunc-
tion in a state court.368 Focusing the analysis on the decision-making process
of the reasonable investor, the Third Circuit substituted "reasonable
probability" for the Kidwell "actual success" test because (1) absolute cer-
tainty is an impossible goal and an impracticable standard for a jury to imple-
ment, and (2) in most cases, the state remedy will be a preliminary injunction,
which looks to the likelihood of ultimate success. 369 The court was unable to
determine whether the omissions were material absent an explanation of the
bases on which the merger could be enjoined under state law, which might
include fraud, illegality, an ultra vires act, or unfairness. The case was re-
manded to the district court with an instruction that the court consider
whether there was sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on the question of
the plaintiffs' reasonable probability of ultimate success under Texas law. In
the Third Circuit's view, this determination would require a two-step inquiry
by the district court: (1) whether the jury could reasonably believe that any
information was withheld, and (2) whether this information could have been
used to obtain a Texas injunction.
370
There are then three causation tests used by the various circuits: (1) the
"actual success" test, (2) the "might" test, and (3) the "reasonable
probability" test. After a brief discussion of other views of causation, these
tests will be analyzed.
2. Other Views of Causation
Courts wrestling with the question of causation in contexts slightly differ-
ent from the traditional fiduciary duty setting often use different words and
tests but generally have the same focus: could the shareholder have taken
some kind of action if the information had been fully disclosed? For example,
in Bridgen v. Seott,3 7 1 plaintiffs purchased participation interests in a partner-
ship formed to obtain "dramatic" tax savings as well as future speculative
profits for the investors. The complaint alleged the venture was prematurely
terminated in violation of rule lob-5 because, among other things, it was not
disclosed that the promoter acquired fifty-five percent of the participation
when he was able to sell only forty-five percent of the interests. The investors
further alleged that they were unfairly treated because the partnership was
terminated when the promoter, who could not or would not raise enough cash
to continue his fifty-five percent participation, backed out of the deal. Heavily
influenced by the fact that most of the participants were sophisticated inves-
tors, the court found no deception and no causation under the ]iper v Chris
Craft Industries372 test of causation.
368. Id. at 647.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 648.
371. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 265-67, 305-06,
315-16 supra.
372. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Applying this language and reasoning to the case at bar, the ultimate
injury of which the plaintiffs hwere complain is the premature (in
their present view) termination of the partnership's interest in Dr.
Thorn's property. To conclude that the ultimate result would have
been different had Scott's 55% ownership of the participation inter-
ests been more widely distributed requires one to engage in totally
unsupported speculation and conjecture. Thus, there is no proof that
the alleged violation, i.e., the alleged omissions, in any way would
have altered the ultimate result and thus plaintiffs, applying Justice
Blackmun's reasoning, have totally failed to establish that the alleged
omissions in any way caused or contributed to the plaintifis "ulti-
mate injury. '3
73
The plaintiffs' failure to specify the action they could have taken had the infor-
mation been disclosed was fatal to their. claim. For the same reason, the
Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. ,374 dismissed a complaint brought by the executors of the estate of
a former employee, officer, and stockholder of Merrill Lynch whose stock was
purchased at his death pursuant to a charter provision giving Merrill Lynch
the right to purchase upon death of the holder. Plaintiffs alleged that the stock
was purchased in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme devised by the insiders to
increase the public offering price of the company's stock and to maintain and
preserve the insiders' control of company management after public ownership.
In addition, defendants allegedly failed to disclose to the executors at the time
of exercise of the option the future public offering of Merrill Lynch stock. In
dismissing the claim on the ground that causation was not shown because
plaintiffs could have taken no action to stop the purchase even if the informa-
tion had been disclosed, the court stated:
Whether we analyze the causation issue before us in terms of materi-
ality, reliance or both, the result is the same: causation in fact does
not exist as a matter of law under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Any
"loss" which was occasioned by the sale of the Bitting stock to the
corporation was not caused by any material omission, fraudulent or
otherwise, on the part of the defendants. The purported "loss" was
caused by two events unrelated to the alleged fraud: 1) the execution
of the stock restriction, which was enforceable under Delaware law,
and 2) the death of the shareholder Bitting, the specified contingency
which triggered the operation of the stock restriction. Whatever the
Bitting executors knew or did not know about a future public offer-
ing of Merrill Lynch stock was wholly irrelevant to their decisions to
sell the stock.
375
The plaintiffs have not suggested how they might have acted dif-
ferently had they been given prior notice of any company prepara-
tions to go public, aside from the observation that they would have
taken every possible legal action to protect their interests. However,
373. Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. at 1066.
374. 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
375. Id. at 1049.
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plaintiffs could have litigated nothing more at that time than they
have litigated in this case. The point we wish to emphasize is that
plaintiffs could have done nothing to block the sale of the stock.
3 76
The District Court for Delaware, in Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc. , used an
unconventional and expansive test of causation that focused on action that
could have been taken by the defendant even after disclosure rather than on
actions that would have been taken by the plaintiff. In that case PepsiCo, an
88.2% owner of Wilson, made a tender offer for Wilson stock, which was to be
followed by a short-form merger in which minority shareholders would be
cashed out at the tender offer price. In response to the claim of minority
shareholders that certain omissions in the tender offer materials violated rule
lOb-5, defendants argued that a causal connection could not be established
between the alleged violations and the asserted injuries because PepsiCo, with
an 88.2% interest in Wilson, could have effected the merger without con-
ducting the tender offer. The court, citing various cases and commentators to
justify its position, found transaction causation might exist,378 even though the
votes of the minority shareholders were unnecessary to effect the merger, be-
cause disclosure might serve other functions beyond obtaining the informed
consent of a certain percentage of the shareholders. 379 The court gave exam-
ples of these other functions by suggesting that plaintiffs might prove causa-
tion if the trier of fact found (1) full disclosure would have produced an
incentive for PepsiCo to raise the price offered or (2) PepsiCo would have
foregone the tender offer and merger altogether because of the failure of the
tender offer, direct shareholder pressure, or the obligation to disclose.
380
3. Difficulties Presented by the Causation Theory
The element that the causation theories have in common is the require-
ment that some action be possible as a result of the disclosure.381 In the fiduci-
ary duty context, in order to find the required lOb-5 causation, courts
generally must determine that plaintiffs might, or with actual or a reasonable
376. Id. at 1050 n.15. See also Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, 438 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mo. 1977),
rev'don other grounds, 578 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1978), in which a trustee was suing prior trustees
on behalf of the beneficiaries of the trust for what was essentially a self-dealing claim. The court
found that the complaint failed to state a claim because, among other deficiencies, the failure to
disclose material information was not material to any investment decision made by the plaintiffs
because the trustees were given discretionary power to purchase securities, subject only to the
beneficiaries' right to ratify or disapprove the investment decision after it had been made.
377. 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 42-44, 239-51,
317-19 supra.
378. In the case of a tender offer, the concept of causation can be somewhat complex because a
plaintiff must prove not only that a defendant's misstatements or omissions caused shareholders to
accept the tender offer ("transaction causation"), but also that the violations caused the injuries of
which the plaintiff complains ("loss causation"). The court found sufficient loss causation because
the tendering shareholders' acceptance of the tender offer resulted in the loss of their right to
obtain an appraisal at the time of the subsequent merger, which would not have occurred if the
merger had been executed without a prior tender offer. Id. at 1247.
379. Id. at 1248-49.
380. Id. at 1249 n.36.
381. However, this is not true of the unusual and unconventional test adopted by the court in
Valente. See text accompanying notes 376-79 supra.
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probability of success could have, obtained an injunction under state law if the
information had been properly disclosed. Problems with this approach have
only begun to surface. Of course, there are the typical conflict of laws ques-
tions that arise any time a federal court is bound by state court interpretations.
First, the federal court must decide which state's laws to apply when determin-
ing whether an injunction would issue,382 a problem exacerbated by the fact
that causation can be shown if the transaction can be enjoined on any one of
several theories-ultra vires, fraud, or unfairness-each of which may be gov-
erned by a different state's law. More importantly, unlike the usual conflict of
laws case, there often may be little or no applicable precedent. For example,
the Ninth Circuit in Kidwell found no Idaho cases to support its theory that
the merger might be enjoined on a de facto merger theory and had to rely on
cases in other jurisdictions. 383 Even in Delaware there were no cases until
quite recently on whether a court should defer to the business judgment of
disinterested directors if they decide not to bring an action on behalf of the
corporation.
38 4
Aside from the conflict of laws problems, 38 5 the crucial difficulty with
causation as it has been defined by the federal courts is that there is a great
deal of justifiable confusion regarding the degree of probability of success in
obtaining an injunction under state law that must be proved by the plaintiff.
Must the plaintiff demonstrate that an injunction could actually have been
obtained if the information had been properly disclosed, as required in Me!-
kie, or is it sufficient to prove that there was a reasonable probability that it
could have been obtained, as required in Healey? Or is it enough simply to
show that an injunction could have been sought, without determining the like-
lihood that it would have been granted, as required in Alabama Farm Bu-
reau?38 6 To require "actual success" would make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to establish causation and therefore presumably would discourage
them from bringing actions in federal courts. However, the determination of
"actual success" would require a more intensive exploration of state law, a
function traditionally, and under Santa Fe preferably, left to state courts. In
addition, this test permits afederal cause of action only when afederal court
determines there would also be a state cause of action. The "reasonable
probability" requirement, on the other hand, would result in a lower standard
382. This question is raised by the Southern District of New York in dictum in Kerrigan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 450 F. Supp. 639, 644 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
383. 597 F.2d at 1293.
384. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
385. The Third Circuit in Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., 616 F.2d at 648, was unsure
whether the court or the jury should determine the law of the relevant state. Comparing the
problem to cases involving malpractice or the law of a foreign country, it permitted the district
court to decide whether Texas law should be determined by judicial notice or by the jury. Id. at
648.
386. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1979). The Seventh Circuit in O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
593 F.2d 54, 60 n.9 (7th Cir. 1979), seemed genuinely uncertain. To justify its uncertainty, the
court cited Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474 n.14 and Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule
10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1874, 1893-98 (1979).
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of proof for causation, thereby making it easier to establish a lOb-5 cause of
action in federal courts. At the same time, however, it would not require a
federal court to examine and interpret state law with the same exhaustive de-
gree of thoroughness necessitated by the "actual success" test. Moreover, as
argued by the Healey court, the "reasonable probability" requirement has the
advantage of being more familiar to the federal courts because it is the test
usually applied in determining whether an injunction should issue. Like the
"actual success" test, the "reasonable probability" test grants lOb-5 relief only
when the chances are high that the same relief is available in state court. The
inescapable difficulties that federal courts are willing to tolerate in formulating
and applying a causation test illustrate their reluctance to relegate fiduciary
duty cases to the state courts. The federal courts apparently are willing to use
tortured definitions of causation to retain jurisdiction over fiduciary duty
claims, a prediliction at odds with Santa Fe. The requirement of causation, as
now defined by the circuits, undermines the policies of Santa Fe by condition-
ing federal remedies upon the presence of state remedies and by requiring
time-consuming interpretations of state law by federal courts.
It certainly would be simpler to return to the Affiliated Ute rationale and
decide that once materiality is demonstrated, at least in an omission case, reli-
ance and causation should be presumed. Materiality would be established if a
reasonable investor could have made a more informed decision, such as sell-
ing, buying, seeking appraisal, seeking an injunction, or ousting the directors,
had the information been properly disclosed.387 Although this test will make
proof of causation less burdensome for the plaintiffs, it also will minimize the
exploration of state law by federal courts and possibly will make federal reme-
dies less dependent upon the availability of state remedies. In addition, this
approach will focus the inquiry on action to be taken by investors, rather than
certain litigants, 388 and will return the focus to materiality, as urged in Affili-
ated Ute. In fact, the causation requirement might be effectively eliminated
altogether. If materiality is established, it is not productive to require an addi-
tional showing of causation when that showing entangles the federal courts in
discussions discouraged, with good reason, by Santa Fe and does not improve
the disclosure relevant to informed investor decision-making.
387. The Fifth Circuit, in Alabama Farm Bureau, argued that the "might" test would "predi-
cate relief on a hypothetical basis" while the "actual success" test would in effect "exact the
equivalent of a trial of the state claim. The rule that appears to us to be both desirable and
practicable steers between Scylla and Charybdis: the plaintiff must show that there is at least a
reasonable basis for state relief, but need not prove that the state suit would in fact have been
successful." 606 F.2d at 614.
388. But see the dissenting opinion in Healey:
By deeming the allegations of materiality legally sufficient merely because Healey
alleges availability of injunctive relief, the majority change the emphasis of rule lOb-5
from protection of the reasonable investor to protection of a certain type of litigant. Hea-
ley does not contend that the information would have enabled him to make a more
informed investment decision. Indeed, he had no investment decision to make because
his votes were unnecessary to complete the merger. As in Santa Fe, his options, either to
tender his stock or seek appraisal, were fully disclosed to him. The purpose of the fed-
.eral securities laws, to promote a full and fair disclosure, was fulfilled.
616 F.2d at 654 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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The problems the courts face in applying the present causation test are far
exceeded by the problems confronted by the corporate planner who attempts
to structure a transaction to avoid lOb-5 exposure. He can justify two diamet-
rically opposed courses of actions. On the one hand, he might be inclined to
disclose all information that conceivably might be material to an investor who
is deciding whether to seek an injunctive remedy available under state law.
Theories that have been suggested as affording injunctive relief under state
law include fraud, ultra vires, de facto merger, unfairness, or illegality. Given
this plethora of theories, it would be challenging at best to disclose all the
information that might be deemed material by a trier of fact long after the
transaction. On the other hand, it is arguable that the corporate planner might
advise his client to disclose nothing.38 9 The most likely theory under which
injunctive relief could be sought is breach of fiduciary duty when a state court
will enjoin the transaction only if the directors cannot prove that the transac-
tion is fair. One then could argue that if the transaction is demonstrably fair,
no plaintiff can successfully sue under rule lOb-5 even if no material facts are
disclosed, because he cannot establish causation under the "actual success" or
"reasonable probability" test. Therefore, rather than disclose anything, the
planner might be well-advised to assure that the transaction is demonstrably
fair. But what is fair and in whose eyes? Will the courts defer to a disinter-
ested board's determination that a transaction is fair at the time it is negoti-
ated? Or will the court after the fact determine whether the transaction is fair?
What guidelines will the court use for fairness? The Court of Chancery of
Delaware gave the most extensive list of facts to be considered in determining
whether a merger used to effect a going-private transaction was fair:
390
389. In dictum the court in Goldberger v. Baker hinted that there was an affirmative duty to
disclose:
In their brief, plaintiffs restate their allegations concerning the sale lease-back
transactions to say that defendants failed to disclose any facts of the transactions prior to
the time they occurred. If true, this allegation might raise a substantial issue of whether
in certain self-dealing situations, the parent has a duty under federal law to disclose the
fact that the transaction is to occur, notwithstanding the absence of trading and in addi-
tion to the applicable reporting requirements under the 1934 Act. See Meridor, 567 F.2d
209 at 221 n.10. Cf. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 248. The instant complaint
does not make such an allegation, however, and it would be unwise to explore this issue
on these pleadings in their current form.
442 F. Supp. at 665 n.5. In IT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), modpfed on other
grounds, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980), the court dismissed a complaint because lOb-5 was found
not to extend to foreign corporations under the circumstances of the case. Noting that in Goldberg
it was not faced with "the more difficult issue whether pure nondisclosure surrounding a transac-
tion for which no shareholder approval was necessary could constitute an actionable deception
under Rule lOb-5," the court mused:
Such a holding would effectively impose an independent duty on directors, in addition to
the other reporting provisions of the act, to make disclosures to minority shareholders
about transactions in which the directors have a conflict of interest and no shareholder
approval is otherwise required .... It is interesting to note that such a holding was
advocated by the SEC ten years ago as amicus curiae in the Schoenbaum rehearing en
banc, but has never been explicitly adopted by the Second Circuit.
Id. at 222 n.27.
390. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382, 390-94 (Del. Ch. 1979). See also
See. Exchange Act Release No. 16075 (8-8-79) 44 F.R. 46736 (fairness criteria in going-private
release).
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1. Purpose of the merger: does it have a legitimate and compelling
business purpose?
2. Are there alternatives to a cash-out merger?
3. Are there independent recommendations as to fairness of price?
4. Was adequate notice given to minority shareholders?
5. Was there a possibility of public issue at a high price followed by
a merger at a low price?
6. Were corporate funds used to finance the merger?
7. Were appraisal rights available to minority shareholders?
8. Did the defendants appropriate.the benefits of the merger?
Even these were not taken with equal degrees of seriousness by the Dela-
ware court. The court's consideration of those factors illustrates the difficulty
inherent in a fairness review after the fact. A planner should be reluctant to
rely on the transaction's fairness to avoid lOb-5 disclosure because of the un-
certainty of his being able to prove fairness.
That causation ultimately becomes a test of fairness is a further irony.
The federal securities laws were designed to mandate disclosure, not to deter-
mine merit. As a result of the causation test, the federal courts now are re-
viewing the transaction for merit as well as disclosure.
F The "In Connection With" Requirement
A related but somewhat different element that has arisen in fiduciary duty
cases, but not with the frequency of the deception and causation questions, is
the "in connection with" requirement. To be actionable under lOb-5 the fraud
must be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. In Ketchum v.
Green391 the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a lOb-5
action for failure to state a claim, primarily because the "in connection with"
requirement was not met. Plaintiffs, who owned the controlling bloc (their
holdings plus proxies) at the shareholders' meeting, had voted to give defend-
ants control of the corporation's board of directors, allegedly unaware of de-
fendants' intention to remove plaintiffs as corporate officers. Immediately
after their election to the board, defendants refused to re-elect plaintiffs as
officers of the corporation, fired them as employees, and adopted a resolution
for the corporation to purchase plaintiffs' shares as authorized by the corpora-
tion's stock retirement plan. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants' failure to re-
veal their intentions at the shareholders' meeting violated lOb-5 because
plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to vote for their own demise. It was al-
leged that by deceiving the plaintiffs defendants obtained control of the board,
which resulted in plaintiffs' termination as officers and then as employees of
the corporation. Termination then led to the forced sale of plaintiffs' stock
under the stock retirement plan.
The court, noting that the "connection" factor "of rule lob-5 has received
relatively scant consideration by the Supreme Court and other federal tribu-
391. 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
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nals,"392 found that this factor was not satisfied on the facts of this case. The
court cited Superintendent of Life Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. ,393
which found that the "connection" requirement is met if the party is de-
frauded "as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale .. .of securi-
ties."394 The Ketchum court, however, ignored the "touch" test because it
could be interpreted to cover practically all disputes relating to intracorporate
management395 and held that the relevant inquiry in Banker's Life was
whether the complaint essentially alleged internal corporate mismanage-
ment.39 6 Since the essence of the plaintiffs' claim in Ketchum, in the view of
the court, was their dismissal as officers, the case was actually a dispute arising
from an internal contest for control of a corporation. Thus, reasoned the
court, any alleged deception was in connection with a struggle for control, not
a securities transaction, and essentially involved "internal corporate misman-
agement. '397 Thus, the "connection" requirement was not met. A second ba-
sis for reaching the same conclusion was that there was not sufficient proximity
between the securities transaction and the claimed fraud.398 In distinguishing
Bankers Life the court said:
By contrast, the degree of proximity seems to be more attenuated in
the situation before us. Instead of being merely one step away from
a securities deal, the supposed deception here is somewhat removed
from the ultimate transaction. Indeed, there are a substantial
number of intermediate steps between the fraud and the accomplish-
ment of the forced sale of plaintiffs' shares: the shareholders' vote
subsequent to the misrepresentation; the ensuing meeting of the com-
pany directorate during which the plaintiffs were removed as officers;
and the adoption of the resolution terminating the plaintiffs' status as
company employees. Only the last development triggered the opera-
tion of the stock retirement program, compelling Ketchum and
Bigler to tender their shares to the corporation. 399
The court finally observed that even though "causation" and "connection" ap-
parently were viewed as different requirements by the Supreme Court in Bank-
ers Lfe, they are nonetheless similar because both "speak to the degree of
proximity required between a misrepresentation and a securities transac-
tion."4°° In finding an absence of causation, the court reasoned:
Assuming that the supposed misrepresentations of the defendants did
set into motion a chain of events which culminated in the securities
transaction, we believe that the retirement agreement operates as an
independent and intervening cause of such transaction - a force that
392. Id. at 1025.
393. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
394. 557 F.2d at 1026 (citing Superintendent of Life Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
at 12-13).
395. 557 F.2d at 1027.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1028.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1029.
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serves to disrupt the connection between the challenged conduct on
the part of the defendants and the relinquishment of plaintiffs'
shares.
40'
The District Court for Massachusetts in Wittenberg v. Continental Real
Estate Partners40 2 also dismissed claims because the alleged fraud was not "in
connection with" the plaintiffs' purchases. The plaintiffs had purchased real
estate limited partnership interests pursuant to a prospectus representing that
the issuer would adhere to a fiduciary duty of good faith. However, the al-
leged fraud occurred after plaintiffs' purchase. The court stated that "[a]t best
the complaint makes out a claim of postinvestment fraud or mismanage-
ment."4 03
Similarly, in Filor, Bullard Inc. v. Empress International, Ltd ,'44 the Dis-
trict Court for Delaware, relying heavily on Ketchum, granted summary judg-
ment in a "going private" transaction. Violations of lob-5 and sections 14(a)
and 14(e) were alleged because the defendants had not disclosed in a proxy
statement, which solicited votes for the election of directors, that the directors
intended to cause the company to make a going-private tender offer. Since the
tender offer was made after this challenged election, and the court could not
find the necessary connection between the tender offer and the election of di-
rectors.
In this case, because the only corporate action sought to be author-
ized was the election of five directors and the ratification of the selec-
tion of independent auditors and no authorization was sought from
the shareholders to approve a cash tender offer, there was no viola-
tion of Section 14(a) or the rules thereunder for failure to disclose a
contemplated cash tender offer as a matter of law, since the injury
complained of--'coercive tender offer-was not directly traceable to
the corporate action authorized by the electorate as a result of the
proxy solicitation .... 405
In Jacobs v. Hanson40 6 the court distinguished Ketchum and used a broad
definition of "in connection with". In Jacobs plaintiffs alleged that the major-
ity shareholders had caused the assets of the corporation to be sold, pursuant
to a plan of liquidation, on terms favorable to them and unfavorable to the
minority shareholders. Defendants argued that the "in connection with" re-
quirement was not met because the alleged misrepresentations were in connec-
tion with the forced sale resulting from the dissolution, not from the sale of the
corporation's assets. However, the court did not accept that argument, finding
401. Id.
402. 478 F. Supp. 504 (D. Mass. 1979).
403. Id. at 509. The court further stated that even if the defendants had breached their fiduci-
ary duty, the representations on which plaintiffs allegedly relied were made by other owners. See
also Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 460 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), adon othergrounds, 608
F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the court found there was no connection between purchases of
securities and alleged omissions at a later board of directors meeting.
404. 442 F. Supp. 217 (D. DeL 1977).
405. Id. at 223.
406. 464 F. Supp. 777 (D. Del 1979).
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that the dissolution and sale of assets were part of a single scheme. The disso-
lution was "an essential and central element of [the] scheme" 40 7 because the
dissolution not only produced favorable tax results but was necessary to obtain
the minority shareholders' support of the sale of assets. The Jacobs court said
that in Ketchum "the misrepresentations were in connection with one transac-
tion-the election of a board of directors-and the sale of plaintiffs' securities
was a part of a separate transaction-the subsequent firing of the plaintiff and
the purchase of his stock by the corporation pursuant to a buy-out agreement."
The Jacobs court then found that the "misrepresentations were made to in-
duce action on one step in a plan of dissolution."
408
IV. PLANNING A CONFLICT OF INTEREST TRANSACTION TO MINIMIZE
lOb-5 LIABILITY
A corporate planner who seeks to minimize lOb-5 exposure in a self-deal-
ing transaction may find the following guidelines helpful.
A. To Whom Should Disclosure Be Made?
If shareholder approval is necessary to effect the transaction, disclosure
should be made to the shareholders. If shareholder approval is not necessary
and if a majority of the board are disinterested under the Maldonado test,4° 9
disclosure should be made to the board. If all of the board are interested,
disclosure should be made to the shareholders even though shareholder ap-
proval is otherwise unnecessary. If only a minority of the board members are
disinterested under the Maldonado test, it is at least arguable that disclosure to
the disinterested. members of the board is sufficient, provided shareholder ap-
proval is unnecessary to effect the transaction under state law.4 10 If the minor-
ity directors constitute a quorum under the company's bylaws or the state
corporation statute, or if they can legally act on behalf of the corporation
under the state corporation statute, an even better case is made for disclosure
to the board.
B. When Should Disclosure Be Made?
Disclosure should be made prior to the consummation of the transaction
so that the party to whom disclosure is owed can take effective action a.4 1 In
Kidwell the court held that disclosure at a shareholders' meeting was per se
407. Id. at 781.
408. Id. One year earlier the same court in Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. at 1228,
found that omissions in tender offer materials were "in connection with" forced sales effected by a
subsequent short-form merger several months later because both the tender offer and the merger
were part of a single plan. The court based its finding of a single plan on two facts: (1) the tender
offer and the merger were jointly referred to in the press releases and tender materials; and (2) the
short-form merger was possible only as a result of the successful tender offer, which gave the
tender offeror 90% of the target company's stock. Id. at 1237.
409. See text accompanying notes 173-84 supra.
410. See text accompanying notes 122-70 supra.
411. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 236.
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inadequate when a notice containing only a brief outline of the proposed plan
to be considered was sent to shareholders and there was poor attendance at the
meeting-a startling conclusion when one considers that the defendant was a
nonprofit corporation and that a shareholders' vote was not required by Idaho
law.
412
C. What Kind of Information Should Be Disclosed?
1. All material facts should be disclosed, that is, all information which,
if disclosed, would influence a reasonable investor to seek an injunction in
state court.
413
2. Materiality may depend upon the nature of the injunction that could
be sought. Although courts have alluded to various theories upon which an
injunction might be granted under state law, the only injunction seriously dis-
cussed in the cases is one sought on the basis that the defendants breached
their fiduciary duty. Facts material in determining whether an investor should
seek such an injunction in state court would include all facts relevant to the
fairness of the transaction. 414
3. Specifically, in fiduciary duty cases, which almost always have been
based on self-dealing, courts have sometimes found certain information mate-
rial as a matter of law:
(1) The terms of the transaction;415
(2) Occasionally, the alternatives available to the corporation
in the transaction;
416
(3) Whether a majority vote of the shareholders is necessary to
approve the transaction;4
17
(4) Underlying facts indicating a conflict;418
(5) "Bottom line facts," the disclosure of which is usually evi-
denced by other shareholders' seeking appraisal or injunctive relief,
based on the disclosed facts.4 19
412. See text accompanying notes 200-04 supra.
413. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); text accompanying notes 307-
22 supra (materiality discussion). See Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d at 1293; Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d at 218-19.
414. See text accompanying note 389 supra.
415. See Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 247; Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 459
F. Supp. at 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. at 665; Lavin v. Data Sys.
Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a 'dmem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978).
416. See, e.g., Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 247. But see text accompanying note 410
supra.
417. 560 F.2d at 247. But see Lavin v. Data Sys. Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. at 107.
418. See Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979) (no written disclosure to members
of a non-profit corporation that directors who approved sale of corporation were shareholders of
a for-profit corporation that would benefit from the sale). But see Rodman v. Grant Foundation,
460 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), ar?'d, 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979).
419. See Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). "While 'corporations are
not required to address their stockholders as if they were children in kindergarten,' it is not suffi-
cient that overtones might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts."
Id. (citing Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973) (court perhaps
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4. Courts have been more helpful in clarifying what information need
not be disclosed:
(1) Characterization of the transaction in pejorative terms;420
(2) Stating motives or the true purpose for the transaction;421
(3) Providing information readily available to the plaintiffs
from other sources;422
(4) Predictions and speculation;
423
influenced because 250 shareholders sought appraisal and minority shareholders brought three
separate suits to enjoin merger); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1293, (9th Cir. 1979) (failure to
dislcose that nonprofit corporation would sustain a loss and sister corporation would enjoy a profit
constituted material omission).
420. Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d at 765 (no requirement to explain that bonuses were not
true bonuses but premiums paid for stock ownership or commercial bribes); Biesenbach v.
Guenther, 588 F.2d at 401-02 (representation that transaction in best interests of shareholders not
actionable); Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. at 724-25 (representation that
both the price and exchange ratio in a merger were fair not deemed actionable misrepresentation);
Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. at 665 (need not state that loans were made for less than fair
consideration); Lavin v. Data Sys. Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. at 107 (no need to disclose that
employee bonus plan involved self-dealing and use of corporate funds for personal benefit of
defendants and that plan had no legitimate business purpose; proxy provisions not aimed "at
ensuring an exhaustive, dispassionate, and evenly balanced presentation of conflicting interpreta-
tions of the facts given."). See also Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979);
Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
421. Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d at 765; Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 459 F.
Supp. at 724 (need not disclose that sole purpose of merger was to freeze out minority sharehold-
ers); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery, 558 F.2d 1083, 1086 (2d Cir. 1977) (unclear whether the alleged
deception was the failure to disclose president and principal shareholder's personal debts or that
his motive for the transaction was to use corporate assets to disclose his debts). But see Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979) (imposed requirement that disclosure make clearer the
fact that corporation lost more than $400,000 in tax savings.)
422. Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 460 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 608 F.2d
64, 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) ((1) purpose to maintain control was evident from size of purchase;
(2) because the proxy statements disclosed the prices previously paid by employees for the corpo-
ration's stock and the formula by which the corporation was to calculate the price it would pay to
buy its own share from its director-controlled shareholders, failure to allege that this price was $20
higher than the price paid by employees was not a violation; (3) since the number of authorized
and issued shares were disclosed in financial statements, attached to the proxy statement, failure to
disclose that the company had sufficient authorized but unissued shares to meet its obligations
under an employee stock purchase plan without having to purchase its presently outstanding stock
was not misleading; (4) since the financial statements disclosed the amount of assets and liabilities
and the number of treasury shares, failure to disclose that the prices of the shares to be purchased
exceeded book value, would decrease the company's net worth, and would have an adverse effect
on its profit and loss statement was not misleading because a shareholder could compute book
value from the information disclosed and could infer (since treasury stock was carried on the
books as an asset valued at cost) that the purchase of stock at more than book value would leave
net worth unchanged and increase book value, id. at 1037; (5) failure to disclose that the prices to
be paid under the stock purchase agreement might exceed the market price on the date of closing
was not misleading because "[t]his risk could be inferred easily from the fact that the price was to
be the average of the daily closing market prices during a certain month," which fact was dis-
closed, id. at 1037); Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978) ((1) failure to
disclose the availability of an appraisal remedy in a merger which would probably follow the
tender offer was material as a matter of law because it was not deemed known to shareholders, id.
at 1240; (2) whether control was adequately disclosed in tender offer materials and prior annual
reports was left up to trier of fact, Id. at 1242; (3) there was no obligation to disclose readily
available financial information, such as earnings per share, when it was highlighted in annual and
quarterly reports and it appeared in financial pages of major newspapers, id. at 1243); Goldberger
v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. at 667 (price listed on AMEX).
423. Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d at 72 (failure to disclose that the company would
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(5) Alternative courses of action;4 24
(6) Inconsistency with previous policy;
4 2 5
(7) Expert opinions, even if wrong.
4 26
5. At lease one court has suggested that materiality may also depend
upon the knowledge and sophistication of the investors.
427
It is unclear how much more disclosure is required by lOb-5 than by the
proxy rules. For example, the court in Maldonado v. Fynn428 suggested that
rule 14a-9 simply sets forth minimum standards for disclosure and that "going
beyond the Rule, it has been recognized that shareholders are entitled to truth-
ful presentation of factual information 'impugning the honesty, loyalty, or
competency of directors' in their dealings with the corporation to which they
owe a fiduciary duty."' 429 However, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust 430 seemed to reach a
contrary conclusion when asked to determine whether sufficient facts relating
to a conflict of interest had been disclosed in a proxy statement for the election
of trustees. Although certain information was disclosed, the proxy statement
did not state specifically that, as a result of certain transactions, a majority
shareholder's cash flow distribution would increase by twenty percent with no
corresponding increase in his obligation. The court found that even though
the omissions were material, rule 14a-9 was not violated because the plaintiffs
failed to allege that inclusion of these facts would be necessary to make state-
ments therein not false or misleading.431 More important to the present dis-
have to borrow to finance the stock purchases if it continued its then-existing expansion and divi-
dend policies was not misleading because "[flull factual disclosure need not be embellished with
speculative financial predictions."); Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548 (D. Nev. 1979) (failure
to disclose certain tax treatment was immaterial because practically and legally speculative);
Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. at 665 (no requirement to disclose that transaction would sub-
stantially damage company).
424. Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. at 553 (not required to discuss panoply of possible alter-
natives to proposed course of action absent a suggestion that the route not chosen was so well
recognized and legally sound that failure to pursue it demands consideration.) But see text accom-
panying note 415 supra.
425. Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d at 72 (not required to disclose that company's
management previously had rejected idea of buying outstanding shares for employee stock
purchase plan); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
426. Voege v. Magnavox Co., 439 F. Supp. 935, 941-42 (D. Del. 1977) (opinion of a properly
qualified outside counsel, asserting that corporation had power under Delaware Law to consum-
mate merger, even if wrong is not actionable).
427. Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F.Supp. 1048, 1064 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (context of a private offering).
428. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). The court cites as authority Cohen v.
Ayers, 449 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rafal v.
Geneen, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) q 93,505 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Robinson
v. Penn Cent. Co., 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
429. 597 F.2d at 796 (quoting Cohen v. Ayers, 449 F. Supp. at 298, 317 (N.D. Ill. 1978)).
430. 432 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
431. For a contrary interpretation see Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. at 1240 n.19. "In
light of the spirit of the federal securities laws, the words 'necessary in order to make the state-
ments made ... not misleading' should be read broadly, in order to assure that investors will not
be deprived of essential information." Id. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v.
Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). "Even when all the information specifically required
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cussion, the court said there is no obligation to disclose what is not specifically
required by the proxy rules.
But, if Schedule 14A, promulgated by the SEC, does not require the
revelation of such information, failure to provide it cannot be re-
garded as a violation of the Act. There is no contention that defend-
ants failed to comply with that schedule. If such information is not
required, material as it may seem, it could be that fiduciary standards
and alleged violations thereof are issues more properly litigated in
the state courts. Defendants argue that "Not only were the proxy
rules not designed to establish fiduciary standards, but they were also
not designed to provide a federal forum to litigate difficult state law
questions." 4
32
Maldonado represents the better view, particularly in the lOb-5 context. Re-
gardless whether the proxy or tender offer rules require particular disclosures,
once the decision is made to disclose, all facts material to describing the con-
flict of interest should be disclosed.
D. Should Any Information Be Disclosed?
Is the corporate planner well-advised to disclose nothing? It is arguable
that absent causation, there is no cause of action under 10b-5 even if there is
an affirmative duty to disclose.433 Causation or materiality (depending upon
the approach used by the court) cannot be demonstrated unless the plaintiff
can prove that if the information had been properly disclosed, he could have
obtained an injunction under state law with "actual success" or a "reasonable
probability" of success. The availability of an injunction has usually de-
by SEC rules and regulations is disclosed accurately in a tender offer, a document as a whole may
be misleading in its effect. There is no requirement under lOb-5 that there be a one-to-one corre-
spondence between an alleged omission and a particular affirmative statement in a document."
454 F. Supp. at 1240-41 n.19. See Evmar Oil Corp. v. Getty Oil Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,358, at 93,228 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1978). "Furthermore, a facially accurate
statement may suggest certain conclusions, which suggestion would be misleading without further
disclosures. See, eg., Lyman v. Standard Brands Inc., 364 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Finally,
as the words of rule lob-5 suggest, surrounding circumstances may cause certain disclosures to be
necessary when they might not otherwise be required." 454 F. Supp. at 1240-41 n.19.
432. Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. at 1303.
433. It may be argued that under certain circumstances the corporation has no affirmative
duty to disclose: (I) if the information is not material; (2) if it is not inside information; (3) if it is
not available and ripe; or (4) if there is a corporate purpose served by nondisclosure. See State
Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII)
97,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (where there was no motive to deceive investors, a construction company
was held not to violate rule lOb-5 when it imposed a publicity embargo required in the contract
despite rumors in the marketplace and unusual market activity). Even if none of these elements
would justify silence, there may be no lOb-5 liability for nondisclosure if there is no insider trad-
ing or tipping and no trading by the corporation because then there would be at least some doubt
that the omission was in coanection with a purchase or sale of a security. But see SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), in which there is a
broad definition of "in connection with a purchase or sale" requirement if the SEC brings an
action. The purchase or sale requirement may also be met if the plaintiff is a shareholder who
sells or an investor who buys the corporation's stock when the information has not been disclosed.
In those cases, one still might argue that a complete omission is not actionable under the language
of rule lOb-5. This assumes that the corporation issues no other statements and is absolutely
silent.
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pended upon the fairness of the transaction. Therefore, if the directors can
prove that the transaction is fair, the plaintiff cannot establish causation under
rule lOb-5 because a state court would not grant an injunction for breach of
fiduciary duty. However, there are few if any guidelines for determining fair-
ness. It may be helpful if a disinterested board of directors has, with full dis-
closure, determined that the transaction is fair. The courts then may either
defer to the board of directors' determination of fairness or to its later decision
not to sue because, in its opinion, the transaction was fair.434 Another tech-
nique to demonstrate fairness, particularly helpful where the directors argua-
bly are not disinterested, would be to condition approval of the transaction on
the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority shareholders. In Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc. ,43- the complaint alleged that the majority shareholder breached
the fiduciary duty of fair dealing owed the minority shareholders in a merger
because the price was grossly inadequate to the minority and because the sole
purpose of the merger was to benefit the majority shareholder by eliminating
the minority. Not only did the minority shareholders who voted approve the
plan of merger by a twelve to one margin, their approval, coupled with the
shares voted by the majority shareholder, easily satisfied the condition that the
plan be approved by two-thirds of all outstanding shares. The court found
that while this vote did not make the merger immune from attack, it did shift
the burden of proving unfairness to the complaining minority shareholders.
Although these precautions are helpful, there is never any assurance that
a federal court with the clairvoyance of hindsight will find that a state court
would have found the transaction to be fair. Accordingly, the planner should
use the disclose-nothing approach only in those circumstances where he or she
has the greatest confidence in the demonstrable fairness of the transaction.
V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE LITIGATOR
The attorney for a plaintiff who brings an action for a breach of fiduciary
duty under rule lob-5 may find these guidelines helpful.
1. State each allegation of deception with particularity.436
2. Allege that the violation occurred on an exchange, in interstate com-
merce, or through the mails;
437
434. See text accompanying notes 122-70 supra.
435. 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979). Query what this case would do to the causation question
under lOb-5. The plaintiff, one assumes, would be required to prove unfairness to establish that
an injunction would issue. See text accompanying notes 342-89 supra.
436. See Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. at 664-65. See also Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life
Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. at 726: "To state a claim under Section 10(b), plaintiffmust with sufficient
particularity identify the misrepresenttaions allegedly made, the manner in which they are consid-
ered false, and the facts from which an inference of fraud by a gipen defendant may be drawn
[citations omitted] .... The complaint may not rely on blanket references to acts of all named
defendants, since each is entitled to be apprised of the specific circumstances surrounding the
conduct for which he is charged with fraud." Id. There must be allegations linking controlling
persons with the alleged misrepresentations or omissions. Id. at 727.
437. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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3. Allege that a security was purchased or sold;4 38
4. Allege that the corporation (if a derivative action) or the shareholder
(if a class action) was a purchaser or seller of securities;
439
5. Allege that the defendants acted with scienter-a degree of fault
greater than negligence, that is, recklessly, with knowledge or an intent to de-
fraud.440
6. Allege that material misrepresentations or omissions were made in
conjunction with the breach of fiduciary duty.44 1
7. If a shareholders' vote is required to approve the transaction, allege
that the shareholders were deceived.
44 2
8. If a shareholders' vote is not required to approve the transaction, al-
lege that all or a majority of the directors have a material, pecuniary interest in
the transaction and that disclosure should have been made to the shareholders.
If disclosure was made to the shareholders under these circumstances, allege
that it was inadequate.
443
9. If a majority of the directors are disinterested, allege that the directors
were deceived.444
10. Allege that had the information been correctly disclosed, plaintiff
"might" or "actually" or with "reasonable probability" could have succeeded
in obtaining an injunction under state law. If the grounds for the injunction
would be breach of fiduciary duty, allege that plaintiffs would have been suc-
cessful under state law because defendants could not have met the burden of
proving that the transaction was fair." 5
11. If the corporation has filed a motion to dismiss the derivative action
on the ground that the disinterested directors' decision not to sue should bar
the action, allege that the directors did not act in good faith or were inter-
ested.446
VI. THE IMPACT OF SANTA FE
A. At First Blush
At first blush, the impact of Santa Fe seems to be significant. The primary
goal of the Supreme Court, to reduce the number of fiduciary duty cases found
actionable under rule lOb-5, appears to have been accomplished. The Sec-
ond,447 Third,448 Sixth,449 and Eighth450 Circuits, expressly following the
438. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
439. See text accompanying notes 32-55 supra.
440. See text accompanying notes 56-66 supra.
441. See text accompanying notes 75-340 supra (discussion of allegations of misrepresenta-
tions and omissions).
442. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
443. See text accompanying notes 109, 200-06 supra.
444. See text accompanying note 108 .surpra.
445. See text accompanying notes 342-89 supra.
446. See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
447. See Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d at 72, Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d
19811
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mandate of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe, have dismissed cases. The district
courts have relegated fiduciary duty cases to the state courts with an even
greater display of enthusiasm than the circuit courts.45 ' Santa Fe has also had
35, 44 (2d Cir. 1977) (complaint discussed which alleged breach of fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders in violation of lOb-5 but case remanded for further consideration in ight of recent
state court decision).
448. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1029-30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977), in which the Third Circuit, in affirming dismissal of a lOb-5 claim on the ground that the
"in connection with" requirement was not met, stated:
Dismissal of the complaint for failure to comport with the 'in connection with' clause of
§ 10(b) would appear to be in order for another reason, one that is implicit in the forego-
ing discussion. To rule otherwise, and to reinstate the present lawsuit, might tend to
promote further incursions by federal courts into areas and activities now regulated by
state corporation laws. While the coverage of § 10(b) may well have been intended by
Congress to overlap somewhat with that of certain state provisions, it is questionable
whether the scope of the statute should be extended to all phases of corporate operations
and relationships whenever they entail the incidental involvement of securities. Realisti-
cally, there are a multitude of corporate decisions and endeavors which implicate securi-
ties in some fashion.
It is apparent, in our view, that § 10(b) was not designed to preempt, in effect, a
large number of state corporation provisions. Yet the plaintiffs' expansive reading of the
"in connection with" clause might open the door to such a development. We are, how-
ever, unwilling to accede to the position advanced by Ketchum and Bigler, especially in
the absence of a precedential or legislative mandate to do so.' As noted above, the
Supreme Court intimated in Bankers Lf/e [Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)] that the statute should not be construed so as to foster
the federalization of corporate law. Not only is the legislative history of§ 1O(b) silent in
this regard, but Congress repeatedly has rebuffed various proposals to preempt, in whole
or part, the field of corporate regulation. Carried to its natural terminus, the plaintiffs'
construction of the "connection" proviso would serve to empty it of any substantive con-
tent.
Conceivably, the plaintiff may have some compensable claim against the defendants
under the Pennsylvania corporation laws. Whether they do is a matter that may not be
dealt with by this Court, at least in the present case, since there is no basis for an exercise
of federal diversity or otherjurisdiction. Any reliefthat may be available to the plaintiffs
is a matter to be decided in a state forum.
See also Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978), in which the court dismissed a
fiduciary duty claim dressed up as a violation of lob-5 in a two page opinion because it found
that there was no deception.
449. See Nash v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 1978) (circuit
court affirmed judgment against a minority shareholder); Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 588 F.2d 202,
209 (6th Cir. 1978) ("If we were to hold that enforcement of such options gave rise to liability
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it would have far-reaching consequences beyond the intendment of
the federal securities laws. Whether or not such stock options are 'fair' or wise as a policy matter is
a question of state law which is beyond the power of this court to determine.") But see Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 479 ("Absent a clear indication of Congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden.")
450. Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d at 764 (application of Santa Fe to a proxy case; upheld
district court's dismissal of the original complaint and denial of plaintiffs attempt to file amended
complaint). "Controversies in those areas [here corporate mismanagement or breach of fiduciary
duty] have traditionally been the subject of litigation in the state courts, and federal legislation in
the field of securities regulation was not designed to draw such controversies into the federal
courts in the absence of diversity of citizenship and requisite amount in controversy," Id.
451. In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litigation, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,217 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stockholders' claims dismissed that alleged directors vio-
lated their fiduciary duties and section 14(e) by resisting a tender offer solely for their own selfish
interests); Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D. Nev. 1979) (defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment granted on the ground that omissions in the proxy statement were not actionable;
noted concern that federal securities laws should not be interpreted to federalize state corporation
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an effect on other kinds of actions brought under lOb-5. For example, the
Court's concern in Santa Fe that state law should govern the internal affairs of
corporations echoed the often-cited language of Cort v. Ash:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs
law or override state policies of corporate regulation); Wittenberg v. Continental Real Estate Part-
ners, 478 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D. Mass. 1979) (10b-5 cause of action dismissed because it was not
alleged that fraud was in connection with plaintiffs purchase); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454
F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (summary judgment granted to defendant directors who alleg-
edly violation § 14 and breached fiduciary duty by seeking to enjoin a tender offer); Bridgen v.
Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (summary judgment granted to defendant, largely
because allegedly omitted facts were found to have been sufficiently disclosed to knowledgeable
and sophisticated investors); Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 462 F. Supp. 190, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (10b-5 claim alleging that controlling interest was eliminated by a stock exchange dismissed
in part because it was the kind of fiduciary duty claim repudiated in Santa Fe); Helfant v. Louisi-
ana & S. Life Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. at 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (claim dismissed that alleged misrep-
resentations and omissions in a proxy statement for a merger designed to freeze out minority
shareholders because "plaintiff's remedies lie in the state courts;" amended complaint upheld in
82 F.R.D. 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)); Altman v. Inight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (deriva-
tive action dismissed that alleged violation of § 14 by the purchase of a subsidiary made solely to
preserve directors' and officers' positions rather than for a valid purpose; the court found this was
"precisely the kind of claim the Supreme Court in Santa Fe felt should be decided under state
corporate law"); Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, 438 F. Supp. 803, 807 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'don other
grounds, 578 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1978) (claims that lob-5 was violated when trustees purchased
stock of a corporation for the trust to increase their control of the corporation and to enhance the
value of their stock in the corporation was dismissed because they "amount to no more than an
alleged breach of fiduciary duties."); Halle & Stieglitz, Filor, Bullard Inc. v. Empress Int'l, 442 F.
Supp. 217 (D. Del. 1977) (defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in a "going-
private" transaction because the action was based on substantive unfairness and impropriety of
the transaction, which were deemed no longer a proper basis for a lOb-5 claim after Santa Fe and
because there was no showing of causation. Id. at 222. The court concluded, "if the plaintiffs
have a cause of action, it is one for breach of fiduciary duties cognizable under state law." Id. at
225-26.); Lavin v. Data Sys. Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (defendants' motion
to dismiss granted in a derivative action against officers and directors (who allegedly were also
majority shareholders) for enacting an employee bonus plan that would give 40% of the pre-tax
income to key personnel; failure to disclose that the program involved self-dealing, conflict of
interest, and utilization of corporate funds for strictly personal benefit was found not to constitute
deception within lob-5 because all of the terms were disclosed); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,
441 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no material misrepresentations or omissions alleged); Perelman
v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. at 1304 (plaintiff's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment denied; court cited Santa Fe for position that "Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to
regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement."); Swift
v. AFW Fabric Corp., 441 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no material misrepresentations or omis-
sions alleged); Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (directors'
interest in maintaining their own control over corporation was held not to create a conflict of
interest so that disclosure to the directors was tantamount to disclosure to the corporation and the
corporation was therefore not deceived for purposes of lOb-5. This conclusion was justified by
Santa Fe:
The Supreme Court in Part IV of the Green opinion indicated its disapproval of the
federal courts assuming jurisdiction in securities cases based on breaches of fiduciary
duties when there were ample state law remedies available. In cases where the directors,
allegedly in violation of their fiduciary duties, have authorized securities transactions it
can always be claimed that the directors did so to maintain their control over the corpo-
ration and failed to disclose the same thereby making a material nondisclosure of infor-
mation. If such allegation stated a securities claim it would permit the federal courts to
resolve those fiduciary duty cases which the Supreme Court has instructed should be left




of the corporation. 452
This policy of Santa Fe has been partially responsible for the reluctance of
courts to imply private rights of acions under the securities laws.
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Another example of the impact of Santa Fe is the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in O'Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust,454 in which a
complaint was found not to state a claim under rule lOb-5, largely because of
the policy considerations enunciated in Santa Fe. Trustees of a pension plan
had sued a bank and trust company, which had discretionary power to invest
on behalf of the pension plan, for (1) purchasing securities of companies of
which it was a substantial creditor without disclosing the conflict of interest
arising from its role as creditor, (2) failing to disclose adverse inside informa-
tion about the investment quality of the securities purchased; and (3) in some
instances, delaying the sale of a company's stock to protect itself as a creditor
of the company. Plaintiffs urged that had this information been disclosed,
they would have exercised their right to terminate the trust.455 The court
stated that plaintiffs had no claim under lOb-5 because of the court's reluc-
tance "to superimpose federal fiduciary standards that 'would overlap and
quite possibly interfere with state corporate laws.' "456 Emphasizing that the
Santa Fe decision militates against the extension of lOb-5, 457 the court stated:
It is worth noting that our holding is not out of step with the other
recent decisions of the Supreme Court in this field of the law in addi-
tion to the Santa Fe and Blue Chip cases. Beginning in 1975 the
Supreme Court had exercised its certiorari jurisdiction in eight pri-
vate federal securities laws cases, and each time it has limited the
federal remedy or its exercise. A commentator noting this develop-
ment in 1977 said, "There can be little doubt about the intensity of
the Court's concern over the expansion of securities liability and its
determination to curb."
458
The policy considerations of Santa Fe were also central to the grant of
summary judgment by the Southern District of New York in Reliance Insur-
ance Company v. Barron's.459 Barron's was charged with libel and a violation
of lob-5 for a report it published about certain securities being offered for sale
by Reliance Insurance Company. The report stated, among other things, that
the sale of the securities in the imminent public offering would serve the inter-
ests of the majority shareholders, not the company, and also implied that the
majority shareholders were using "creative accounting" concepts and were en-
452. 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
453. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979) (no implied
right of action under § 10 of Exchange Act for defeated tender offeror, case is not within ambit of
express civil remedy under § 9).
454. 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979).
455. Id. at 57.
456. Id. at 59 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479).
457. Id. at 61.
458. Id. at 62 (citing 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW, FRAUD SEC RULE 10B-5 § 384.2
(1977)).
459. 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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gaging in improprieties, using bad judgment, and breaching their fiduciary
duties. In entering summary judgment for defendants because the requisite
scienter had not been shown, the court stated:
In addition, the Court concludes that the allegation of a violation of
Rule lOb-5 is being pleaded here as a method of circumventing the
higher evidentiary threshold developed by the Supreme Court to
limit state actions for libel. This is a misuse of the securities laws.
Plaintiff's case, if it has one, is a libel action pure and simple. The
securities laws, and particularly Rule 1Ob-5, were not developed with
the intention of overlapping or reinforcing the law of libel, nor to
inhibit the exercise of freedom of the press.
As we have seen recently, the heyday of the unfettered extension
of the federal securities laws to recompense all those damaged has
ended.4
60
Using a theme reminiscent of Santa Fe the Eighth Circuit, in Abbey v.
Control Data Corp. ,461 affirmed the district court's dismissal of a derivative
action on the basis that the court should defer to the determination by a spe-
cial litigation committee not to pursue the litigation. The court, in deciding
whether application of the business judgment rule would interfere with the
policies of the federal securities laws embodied in section 13, insisted that not
all instances of corporate fraud or mismanagement should fall within the pro-
tection of the federal securities laws:
We have carefully considered Abbey's § 13(a) claim and agree with
the district court that it is at best weak. Illegal foreign payments
cases clearly involve state law questions of breach of fiduciary duties.
They should not be dealt with under the general disclosure provi-
sions of the federal securities laws where it is apparent, as here, that
the nondisclosure of such payments had little, if any, impact on the
plaintiff's dealings with the corpration's stock.
462
These cases suggest that Santa Fe has had an impact not only in traditional
fiduciary duty cases, but also in other related areas of lOb-5 litigation.
B. A Closer Look
A more careful look, however, suggests that in some cases Santa Fe has
been followed in name but not in substance. The first court to evade the Santa
Fe directive--that traditional fiduciary duty claims be left to the states-was
the Second Circuit in Goldberg v. Meridor.463 The complaint as initially filed
alleged that a contract between a parent and subsidiary was grossly unfair to
the subsidiary and violated both federal and state law.464 The district court
ruled that since the complaint contained alleged violations of state law, the
460. Id. at 1353 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 462; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
185; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 723).
461. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 100 S.Ct. 670 (1980).
462. Id. at 731.
463. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
464. Id. at 211.
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shareholder must post a bond for expenses. The shareholder then amended
the complaint to remove all references to state law claims and based his action
strictly on violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The essence of the
amended complaint was that the deal was unfair because the consideration
received by the subsidiary for its stock was inadequate. This allegation was
not sufficient to state a claim after Santa Fe because it did not allege decep-
tion. The district court, in denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint a
third time to include examples of alleged deception, sounded much like the
Supreme Court in Santa Fe:
There have already been two complaints. . . . Both are prime ex-
amples of an attempt to fit the square peg of a state law claim into
the round hole of a lOb-5 allegation. When the original complaint
was dismissed for failure to post security or obtain the requisite sup-
port from other minority shareholders, Goldberg was made exqui-
sitely aware of the need to limit this amended pleading to a federal
claim, unless he could post security under state law, which he could
not. Although he now contends that he could allege that [he] was
deceived by the defendants with regard to the terms of the transac-
tion with Maritimecor, he chose to frame the amended complaint in
such a way as to exclude this element altogether. There is a limit to
the time and energy that a federal court should accord to marginal
federal causes of action which are fully capable of being vindicated
in state court. Presumably, if the element of deceit formed any sig-
nificant aspect of Goldberg's claim, or was responsible for the alleged
injury to UGO, Goldberg could have been expected to have plead
such facts before the third go-round.
465
The Second Circuit viewed the complaint as a second attempt to amend
rather than a "third go-round," because at the time of the second amended
complaint, the plaintiff did not realize that there was anything wrong with his
federal claim and was filing the amendment simply to drop references to state
law to avoid posting a bond. The court then found that the examples of decep-
tion that would have been included had the complaint been amended were
sufficient to give rise to an action under lOb-5 as defined in Santa Fe. The
press release (the only disclosure made to the minority shareholder in this
transaction since shareholder approval was not required) was alleged to have
omitted two material facts: (1) that the parent had current liabilities of 42.5
million dollars in addition to 7 million dollars owed to the subsidiary, which
was apparently being forgiven in the transaction, compared to an equity of
40.4 million, which included 2.8 million shares of the subsidiary and (2) the
conflict of interest of the principals. The Second Circuit, without discussing
these omissions specifically, held that the press release was misleading under
lOb-5 because it "held out an inviting picture. . . when allegedly the truth
was that the subsidiary had entered into a transaction that would ensure its
doom. '466 The court concluded that its decision in Schoenbaurm was applica-
465. Id. at 213.
466. Id. at 214. One of the affidavits submitted suggested that prior to the transaction the
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ble and, surprisingly, that Schoenbaum had not been overruled by Santa Fe
Industries v. Green.467 In defending its holding, the court first argued, relying
on numerous authorities, that the corporation is deceived even if the majority
or all of the directors have knowledge of all the facts of the transaction. Sec-
ond, the court took the position that Santa Fe eliminated only those claims for
breach of fiduciary duty in which no deceptions, misrepresentations, or non-
disclosures are alleged or proven.4 6s The court stated that "[t]he nub of the
matter is that the conduct attacked in Green did not violate the ' "fundamental
purpose of the Act as implementing a philosophy of full disclosure" '. .. the
conduct here attacked does."' 469 Third, the court distinguished Santa Fe on the
ground that in Goldberg the omissions were material because, had there been
disclosure, the minority shareholders, unlike those in Santa Fe, could have
challenged the transaction through seeking injunctive relief in a state court.
After a painstaking examination of New York law, the court found that under
existing case law and a newly passed statute "New York [would] have dis-
played no hesitancy in granting injunctive relief' based on the facts alleged in
the complaint.
470
Finally, the Second Circuit was not persuaded by the policy arguments
made in Santa Fe, particularly the Court's concern that actions traditionally
relegated to state law should be left in state court and not given a federal
forum:
We readily agree that if all that was here alleged was that UGO had
been injured by "internal corporate mismanagement," no federal
claim would have been stated. But a parent's looting of a subsidiary
with securities outstanding in the hands of the public in a securities
transaction is a different matter; in such cases disclosure or at least
the absence of misleading disclosure is required. It would be incon-
gruous if Rule lob-5 created liability for a casual "tip" in the bar of a
country club, as we held in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39
(2d Cir. 1976), but would not cover a parent's undisclosed or mis-
leadingly disclosed sale of its overvalued assets for a stock of a con-
trolled subsidiary with securities in the hands of the public.4 7 1
subsidiary had current assets of 41 million dollars and current liabilities of 2 million dollars.
However, after the transfer of the parent's liabilities to the subsidiary as a result of the transaction,
the subsidiary had a deficit of 3.6 million dollars in current liabilities, which caused it to default in
its obligations and resulted in its ships, which were its primary assets, being seized by creditors.
Id. at 212.
467. Id. at 217-18.
468. Id. at 218.
469. Id. (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478).
470. Id. at 219. The court also found that the directors would have acted differently has the
information been disclosed. Citing TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the
court claimed that the correct inquiry was whether the facts not disclosed or misleadingly dis-
closed would have assumed actual significance in the deliberation of reasonable and disinterested
directors or created a substantial likelihood that such directors would have considered the total
mix of information available to have been significantly altered. Under this test a reasonable
director of the subsidiary in this case, having knowledge of the facts alleged by the plaintiff rather
than the "bare bones" of the press release, would not have voted for the transaction. 567 F.2d at
218-19.
471. 567 F.2d at 221.
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In applying the law to the facts of the case, the court found (1) that the
corporate persona was the shareholders since all of the directors were inter-
ested and (2) that the shareholders were deceived because the press release,
the only disclosure made to the shareholders, was unduly optimistic and con-
tained at least two misrepresentations. The court did not examine the misrep-
resentations to see if they were misleading but instead focused upon whether
they were material.472 Goldberg illustrates not only a court's ability to find
the necessary "deception" in what is essentially a breach of fiduciary duty case
but also its extraordinary patience in permitting amended complaints.
Goldberg ignored the mandate of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe and led
some commentators to suggest that it had resurrected fiduciary duty claims
under rule lOb-5.
4 7 3
The Second Circuit was not the only court to find it difficult to follow
Santa Fe. The Seventh Circuit in Wright v. Heizer Corp.4 7 4 held that a fiduci-
ary duty claim was actionable under lOb-5 and awarded the relief that would
have been available in a state court. One year after Wright the Fifth Circuit,
in SEC v. Blatt,475 found that a lawyer's failure to disclose his beneficial inter-
est in a shareholder of the corporation that dissented to its proposed merger
was a material omission. The lawyer, in the court's view, had a duty to dis-
close his interest to the corporation because the corporation had a duty to
disclose that interest to its minority shareholders. The court distinguished
Santa Fe on the ground that in Blatt useful information was withheld from
the investors.476 In 1979, relying on the (oldberg and Wright cases, the Ninth
Circuit, in Kidwell v. Meikle,477 permitted a fiduciary claim on behalf of mem-
bers of a nonprofit corporation. The court found that the lob-5 claim was
actionable because of, rather than in spite of, the presence of a remedy at state
law. The court concluded that to prove the causation necessary for a lOb-5
claim, the plaintiff must show that he would have succeeded in getting perma-
nent injunctive relief, or damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in a state
law action. In deciding whether the plaintiff had met that obligation, the fed-
eral trial judge was admonished to "decide any legal issues that would have
arisen in the hypothetical state suit as a matter of law in the Rule lob-5
suit."4 78 The court said:
472. Only in a footnote does the court consider whether the alleged "conflict of interest" was
lOb-5 deception. Id. at 218 n.8. The court noted that both press releases did state that Mari-
timecor was UGO's "parent" and that the first release said that on consummation of the transac-
tion Maritimecor's ownership of UGO common stock would increase from 78% to 90% and that
approximately 800,000 additional shares would continue to be held by a subsidiary of Pan-mari-
time Ltd. S.A., a Panama corporation, which controlled Maritime Fruit, and the public, respec-
tively. The court made no comment on these facts and did not decide whether the conflict of
interest was adequately disclosed. Id. at 212 n.2.
473. See, e.g., Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit'r Resurrection of Rule 10b-5
Liabilityfor Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Dulles to Minority Shareolders, 64 VA. L. REv. 765
(1978).
474. 560 F.2d at 236. See text accompanying notes 75-105 supra.
475. 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
476. Id. at 1331.
477. 597 F.2d at 1273. See text accompanying notes 200-04, 311-14, 346-53 & 364 supra.
478. 597 F.2d at 1294.
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While clearly limiting the applicability of Rule lOb-5, Santa Fe In-
dustries has not meant that every breach of fiduciary duty is neces-
sarily immune from invocation of the rule. Indeed, two courts of
appeals have held that even where shareholder approval is not re-
quired for a corporate act under state law, failure by directors and
others to disclose conflicts of interest or unfairness to shareholders
regarding the transaction constitutes a violation of the rule ...
Thus, contrary to the arguments of the defendants in this case, there
is room for lOb-5 liability after Santa Fe Industries even when the
only deceived parties are shareholders who are not entitled to vote on
the transaction in question, and even though there may be a breach
of fiduciary duty under state law. Indeed, under the Goldberg ration-
ale, it is precisely because there are state-law remedies for the share-
holders that a deception can be found. Inadequate disclosures lull
into security those shareholders who might bring derivation actions
under state law to enjoin the securities transactions if all material
facts were revealed.479
Most recently, the Third Circuit in Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Penn-
sylvania, Inc. ,480 reversed and remanded for further proceedings the district
court's entry of judgment on a jury verdict awarding damages for a lOb-5
violation. The court emphasized that the plaintiff's right to recover under lOb-
5 depended upon his having a reasonable probability of obtaining an injunc-
tion in state court if the information had been correctly disclosed. The court
denied it was inconsistent with Santa Fe to premise 10b-5 recovery upon avail-
ability of relief in a state court:
Nor do we perceive an inconsistency between this result and Part IV
of Santa Fe. Part IV should not be read out of context. What was
objectionable in Santa Fe was use of rule lOb-5 by the federal courts
to override traditional areas of state law "[aibsent a clear indication
of congressional intent." 430 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 1304. Thus the
problem in Santa Fe was not merely federal judicial intrusion into
areas of state law, but rather federal judicial invasion of areas of state
law without explicit federal statutory authority.
Here, by contrast, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants en-
gaged in conduct expressly forbidden by the statute and the rule: an
omission of certain information claimed to be material. That the
harm to the plaintiff from the omission was deprivation of a state
remedy in no sense diminishes the federal interest in preventing the
479. Id. at 1291-92. In a related case, Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979),
the Ninth Circuit found a 1Ob-5 cause of action when there was no state cause of action. In Zweig
a financial columnist published a column "puffing" the stock of ASI but did not disclose to his
readers that he bought ASI stock at a discount and intended to sell some of it at the increased
price that would result from his puffing. Plaintiffs alleged that they were damaged when they
merged their company with ASI in exchange for a quantity of the temporarily inflated ASI stock.
The court found that lOb-5 required a financial columnist, in recommending a security that he or
she owns, to provide the public with all material information he or she has on that security, in-
cluding his or her ownership, and any intent he or she may have (a) to score a quick profit on the
recommendation, or (b) to allow or encourage the recommendation to be published as an adver-
tisement in his or her own periodical. Id. at 1271.
480. 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 365-69 supra.
19811
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
omission and thereby ensuring full disclosure of all material infor-
mation in securities transactions. Indeed, deprivation of state rights
and remedies often forms the basis for federal claims. See, e.g., Hart
& Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 500-06 (2d
Ed. 1973).
Moreover, the federal courts have a duty under the supremacy
clause of the Constitution to ensure that federal interests are vindi-
cated. The Supreme Court has permitted use of the securities laws in
the merger context where there has been misinformation that violates
a specific federal provision. . . . Thus we do not feel that Santa Fe
can be read to force us to stay our hand from remedying the harm
that flows from the very type of conduct to which specific federal
statutory and regulatory provisions are addressed.
48'
The circuit courts not only are finding that fiduciary claims can be
brought under lOb-5, they are doing it precisely because there is a remedy at
state law. This analysis disregards the policy considerations taken into ac-
count by the Supreme Court in reaching its decision in Santa Fe.48 2 First, the
Court said that the purpose of the federal securities laws is to require full
disclosure, and that the fairness of the transaction is at best a subsidiary pur-
pose. Yet the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits483 require a federal
court, in determining causation of materiality in a fiduciary duty case, to focus
on the fairness of the transaction and decide whether a transaction would be
found to be fair by a state court. Second, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe was
concerned about the danger of vexatious litigation caused by permitting
fiduciary claims in federal courts. Not only are the circuit courts, in their in-
terpretations of Santa Fe, continuing to overburden the federal courts with
state claims, they are prolonging the litigation by making state questions of
fairness part of the federal inquiry. Finally, the Santa Fe Court emphasized
that since corporations are creatures of state law, state law-presumably as
interpreted by state courts-should govern the internal affairs of the corpora-
481. Id. at 646-47.
The district courts have been less willing than the circuit courts to distinguish Santa Fe. S'e
text accompanying note 450 supra. But see Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1253-54
(D. Del. 1978) (upheld lOb-5 claim despite argument that plaintiffs were attempting to bootstrap a
claim of unfairness by framing it as a claim of nondisclosure in tender offer materials of terms of
the transaction when the tender was followed by short-form merger cashing out minority share-
holders); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1330, 1336 n.4 (D.D.C. 1977) (Santa Fe
distinguished because of allegations of widespread deceptive practices); Jacobs v. Hanson, 464 F.
Supp. 777, 779-80 (D. Del. 1979) (The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss complaint in
which a trustee, in the dissolution of a corporation, and minority shareholders sued principal
officers, directors, and majority shareholders on the ground that they caused the corporation's
assets to be sold, pursuant to plan of liquidation, on terms unfavorable to the corporation's minor-
ity shareholders but which included lucrative consulting and noncompetition covenants for the
defendants. The court, without discussing the allegations of the complaint, found that the tran-
script of the shareholders' meeting and plaintiffs' affidavits provided a basis for an inference suffi-
cient to give rise to a material dispute of fact as to whether the defendants had made
misrepresentations).
482. See text accompanying notes 6-22 supra.
483. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell v. Meikle,
597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978). See text accompanying notes 343-369 supra.
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tion absent express federal preemption. However, as a result of the holdings of
the Santa Fe progeny, federal courts have jurisdiction over a fiduciary claim
under lOb-5 only if a similar claim can successfully be brought in state court.
If the state court will not provide redress, neither can the federal court. For
example, in Wright v. Heizer Corp., the Second Circuit gave the plaintiffs relief
only because it decided that the transaction was unfair and therefore would be
found to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law. The
Wright court, in granting the same kind of relief that would have been avail-
able in a state court, stated:
As is apparent from our approval of the unraveling of the fourth and
fifth transactions, we do not view Green as requiring the federal court
merely to declare the breach of the duty to disclose and send the
plaintiff to the state court to remedy the unfairness. The preventive
prospective relief should not be narrower in scope than the relief that
could be obtained in a new federal action to remedy the future
wrong.
484
Dictum in other related opinions suggests the curiosity, if not the folly, of
having federal relief dependent upon the availability of a state remedy. In IIT
v. Cornfeld485 liquidators of a foreign corporation had sued the foreign direc-
tors for violating lOb-5 by investing the corporation's monies in securities of
certain United States corporations for their own profit (kickbacks, increase in
their management fees, and various tax avoidance schemes). Concerned that
the Goldberg definition of materiality would require a determination that
plaintiffs would have been able to enjoin the transaction under Luxembourg
law, the court observed:
This places the plaintiffs in a curious position in that by establishing
their right to an injunction under Luxembourg law, they could prove
lOb-5 materiality; simultaneously, however, they would be offering a
good reason not to apply lOb-5 to the transactions, since the availa-
bility of relief under foreign law would then be at least partially evi-
dent.
486
Equal reluctance to interpret state law was expressed by the District
Court of Delaware in Voege v. Magnavox Co .487 The proxy statement in issue
asserted that under Delaware law a corporation had the power to consummate
a merger. Because the statement was based upon the opinion of properly
qualified outside counsel, the court held it was not materially misleading
under rule lOb-5 even if the opinion was wrong. The court explained its reluc-
tance to consider the validity of the opinion letter:
The parties dispute whether the assertions in the Proxy Statement are
in fact true or false. That issue cannot be resolved without this Court
determining questions of Delaware law involving the legality of cor-
porate transactions and affairs that have long been regulated by state
484. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 255.
485. 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), mod#fledon othergrounds, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
486. Id. at 224.
487. 439 F. Supp. 935 (D. Del. 1977).
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corporation law and dealt with by the state courts. This Court can-
not undertake to decide them in connection with a Rule 1 Ob-5 claim
without disregarding the restrictive philosophy expressed in Part IV
of the Santa Fe decision.
4 88
C The Impossibility of Avoiding State Law
1. A Federal Forum Through Pendent and Diversity Jurisdiction
Even courts that dismiss complaints because they do not state a cause of
action under lob-5 often must hear the case because of diversity jurisdic-
tion.489 If there is no diversity and the plaintiffs federal claims under lob-5
are dismissed, some courts have held that state claims for breach of fiduciary
duty should also be dismissed.4 90 However, federal courts do have jurisdiction
to hear state law claims under pendent jurisdiction, even if the federal claim is
dismissed before trial, provided that the federal claim is not insubstantial.
491
For example, the Southern District of New York decided to exercise pendent
jurisdiction in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Freedman.492 The
lOb-5 claim was dismissed because plaintiff did not meet the Birnbaum re-
quirement and did not demonstrate the requisite deception. Defendants had
allegedly transferred money from a wholly-owned subsidiary to the parent
company and had attempted to cover the transfer by representing that the sub-
sidiary was purchasing stock in the parent. In fact, the purchase did not occur
and apparently was not intended to occur. After dismissing the lOb-5 claim on
the authority of Santa Fe and stating that lOb-5 "should not be applied auto-
matically to every allegedly fraudulent transaction arguably involving securi-
488. Id. at 942.
489. If the plaintiff is a resident of a different state and has a claim of $10,000 or more, the
federal courts will hear the case on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See, e.g, Consolidated
Amusement Co. v. Rugoff, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,584 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
490. Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548, 556 (D. Nev. 1979) (court particularly reluctant to
exercise pendent jurisdiction since the claim was based upon "uncharted and unprecedented
problems and issues under the Nevada corporation laws."); Wittenberg, v. Continental Real Es-
tate Partners, 478 F. Supp. 504 (D. Mass. 1979); Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Lavin v. Data
Sys. Analysts, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a f'dmerz, 578 F.2d 1374 (1978).
491. See, eg., O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 593 F.2d 54, 63 (7th Cir. 1979).
Since pendent jurisdiction "is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right," UMW v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966), courts should decide whether to hear a claim under pendent jurisdiction only
after taking into account considerations ofjudicial economy, convenience, and fairness. See Va-
lente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. at 1255. In addition, there should be an underlying federal
claim that is substantial enough to support subject matter jurisdiction, and the state and federal
claims should derive from a "common nucleus of operative facts" Id. (citing UMW v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. at 725). If state issues substantially predominate, Id. (citing UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-
27), or if the case involves a novel and uncharted area of state law, the court may choose not to
exercise pendent jurisdiction. Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 454 F. Supp. at 1255-56. If the federal
claims are dismissed early in the suit on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, the court
should exercise pendent jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances, Wittenberg v. Continental
Real Estate Partners, 478 F. Supp. 504 (D. Mass. 1979), because "[b]y exercising pendent jurisdic-
tion over just such a state claim we would be permitting plaintiffs to do indirectly what they would
otherwise have no standing to do directly." Id. at 511.
492. 443 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aftdmem, 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1978).
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ties," 493 the court exercised pendent jurisdiction to hear the same case under
state law. After finding the defendant liable as a co-conspirator who breached
his fiduciary duty under New York law, the court, to justify its exercise of
pendent jurisdiction, said:
After trial, however, with the litigation over, the Court sees no reason
why in the interests of judicial economy it should not proceed to de-
cide the pendent claims arising out of the same transaction chal-
lenged under federal law, particularly where the federal claims are
neither spurious nor insubstantial.
4 94
Ironically, the court then concluded by arguing the necessity for dismissal of
the federal claim due to the Santa Fe mandate requiring deference to state
courts:
This case displays quite well the limitations of federal securities regu-
lation as a tool for redress of essentially state law violations. Re-
cently, the Supreme Court has begun to exhibit a healthy skepticism
of assertions that corporate mismanagement and waste should auto-
matically come within federal proscriptions of securities fraud . ..
In trying to conform the contours ofjudicially implied liability under
Rule lOb-5 to the purpose of the federal legislation, the Court has
concluded that, in some situations, petitioners complaining of
breaches of fiduciary duties should be relegated to state law reme-
dies. This case demonstrates that such a directive is not necessarily
ineffective.
Of course, this recognition that federal law is not totally inclu-
sive does not weaken the specific proscriptions of the securities acts
which mandate full and fair disclosure to securities investors. It is,
however, a realization that present federal law cannot be interpreted
in a principled way to usurp all of state corporation law. [citation
omitted] A tortured construction of federal statutes is not a proper
way to federalize the law of corporate management. Moreover, as is
apparent from this case, state remedies are not necessarily inade-
quate to redress complaints falling outside of the scope of federal
law.
495
Despite the Southern District's recognition of the Santa Fe directive, it none-
theless interpreted state law and used it as the basis of relief through its exer-
cise of pendent jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit also heard a fiduciary claim under pendent jurisdic-
tion after dismissing it under lOb-5 in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.496 The complaint was filed by executors
of the estate of a former employee, officer, and shareholder of Merrill Lynch
whose stock had been purchased pursuant to a charter provision giving Merrill
Lynch the right to purchase the stock upon the death of the holder. Plaintiffs
alleged that the stock was purchased in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme
493. Id. at 636.
494. Id. at 637.
495. Id. at 639.
496. 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
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designed by the inside group to enhance the price at which the company's
stock was to be offered to the public and to maintain and preserve their control
after public ownership. The court, citing Santa Fe, dismissed the lOb-5 claim
because the requisite causation was not shown. Noting that Delaware law did
not require that the corporation have a valid or justifiable corporate purpose
for a stock purchase such as this, the court refused to superimpose the require-
ment through section 10.497 However, amid several citations that the federal
courts should avoid actions traditionally relegated to state law, the court,
rather than referring the plaintiffs to a state court, exercised pendent jurisdic-
tion and found that there was no common law fraud under Missouri law and
no breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law.498
The Sixth Circuit also has considered the merits of the state law claim
under pendent jurisdiction after dismissing the case under lOb-5. In Toledo
Trust Co. v. Ne 4 9 9 the court reversed a judgment entered against a corporate
defendant for exercising a purchase option without disclosing that another
purchaser might pay a price roughly thirty times higher than the option price.
After finding that a lOb-5 cause of action was not stated because materiality
was not shown, the court exercised pendent jurisdiction to dismiss plaintill's
state law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.50
Another technique used to preserve federal jurisdiction after dismissal of
a lOb-5 claim is the grant of plaintiffs' motion to amend. For example, even
though the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in Gold-
berger v. Baker50' because it was "an attempt to transform what might be
valid claims under state law into federal securities law claims. . .[a practice]
which has recently met firm disapproval by the Supreme Court,"50 2 it left the
federal court door open by granting the plaintiff leave to amend.
2. The Difficulty of Drawing Exclusionary Guidelines Due
to the Breadth of Section 10(b)
The good faith attempts of the federal courts to follow the Santa Fe man-
date illustrate the impossibility of applying Santa Fe with any degree of cer-
tainty or predictability. First, it is difficult for any court to draw clear
exclusionary guidelines for causes of action under rule lOb-5 because the con-
497. Id. at 1052-53.
498. Id. at 1054-55.
499. 588 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
500. The court said plaintiff is in
the completely untenable position of arguing that the defendants are liable for either
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty when they merely acted pursuant to a presumptively
valid contractual commitment under the relevant state law. Plaintiff has cited no author-
ity, and our research discloses none, which would support a common law claim for relief
on the facts of this case.
Id. at 209. The court also observed that plaintiff ignored the confict of laws question for both the
fraud and fiduciary duty claims. Id. at 209 n.26.
501. 442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D.
53 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held amended complaint stated cause of action under section 10(b).)
See text accompanying notes 207-11 & 275-76supra.
502. 442 F. Supp. at 667-68.
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cept of fraud under section 10(b) is broad and ambiguous. Second, the con-
cepts of "fiduciary duty and fairness" are equally confusing and uncertain.
Despite conscientious effort, it is challenging for even the most sophisticated
court to apply consistently an inherently ambiguous concept such as fiduciary
duty to a general, inclusionary rule such as lOb-5. For example, the Sixth
Circuit, in Nash v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. ,503 affirmed judg-
ment against minority shareholders of a subsidiary who brought a class action
against a parent to challenge a merger that would require the subsidiary's
shareholders to either accept shares of the parent or seek appraisal. The share-
holders sought relief under rule lOb-5 alleging that the exchange terms of the
merger were unfair and that a proxy statement issued in connection with the
merger was materially misleading. The court reviewed the record and found
substantial evidence in support of the district court's finding that the exchange
terms were equitable but then cited Santa Fe for the proposition that "an alle-
gation of unfairness in merger terms, standing alone, does not state a claim for
relief under Rule l0b-5. ' '5°4 If Santa Fe makes fairness irrelevant to a lOb-5
cause of action, it is not immediately evident that fairness should have been
central to the Sixth Circuit's opinion.505 An explanation might be that the
Sixth Circuit correctly believed that fairness should be the essential element of
the case despite Santa Fe.
Another illustration of the confusion that inevitably arises in this area is
the opinion of the Western District of Michigan in Berman v. Gerber Products
Co .506 In this strange decision, the court dismissed the action, basing its deci-
sion to some extent on Santa Fe. Shareholders of Gerber Products Co.
(Gerber) brought an action against Gerber and its directors challenging their
efforts to halt a tender offer made by Anderson, Clayton, including a suit to
enjoin the offer on the ground that Anderson, Clayton violated section 14(e)
by not disclosing the identities and locations of certain "sensitive payments" it
had made.507 Plaintiffs claimed that the tactics used by the defendants to stop
the tender offer violated section 14 and common law principles of fiduciary
duty. The court found that two of plaintiffs' counts alleged nothing more than
breaches of fiduciary duty and were therefore no longer actionable in federal
court after Santa Fe. After rejecting these claims on the authority of Santa Fe,
the court nevertheless went to great lengths to find that the board did not vio-
late its fiduciary duty in suing to enjoin the tender offer.508 The court even
503. 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
504. Id. at 562 n.8.
505. Unlike the Healey and Kidwell panels, the court did not discuss fairness in relation to
causation. Id. at 562.
506. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
507. Id. at 1314-15.
508. These claims were that Gerber's litigation against Anderson, Clayton was not motivated
by valid business reasons but rather by the self-serving interests of the individual board members
and that the existing board was re-elected at the last annual board meeting as a result of an
allegedly misleading proxy statement and therefore was able to continue its opposition to the
tender offer. Id. at 1317. The court was heavily influenced by the fact that Anderson, Clayton
violated § 14(e) by omitting material facts---the identities of the payees and locations of the sensi-
tive payments. Id. at 1323.
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argued that the Gerber directors had a fiduciary obligation to challenge the
tender offer. "Far from violating the fiduciary duty imposed upon them,
Gerber's directors were seeking protection of a statutorily established right. It
has been noted, moreover, that corporate management has an affirmative duty
not to refrain from bringing actions under circumstances like those present
here, but to oppose offers which in its best judgment, are detrimental to the
company or its stockholders. '50 9 The court should not have inquired whether
the Gerber directors violated their fiduciary duties since, as the court itself
said, that is not the proper inquiry after Santa Fe (except in relation to causa-
tion). After its detour into the merits of the fiduciary duty claim, the court
returned to the conventional track dictated by Santa Fe and examined the
allegations of misrepresentation and omissions. Finding that none of the mis-
representations or omissions were material, the court entered summary judg-
ment. This decision represents the good instincts of a court which obviously
believes that the sensible focus of the decision should be fiduciary duty but
which is distracted from the proper inquiry by the holding of Santa Fe.
Even courts that seem determined to follow Santa Fe and concentrate
their decisions strictly on deception find doing so frustrating and difficult.
Separating allegations that genuinely involve deception from those that are
fiduciary duty claims faintly disguised by allegations of deception is an ago-
nizing process. In one of the most candid, thoughtful, and revealing opinions
on the subject, Judge Higginbotham, in Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Insur-
ance Co. ,lO granted summary judgment on all but one claim in an action
alleging that, through various devices, the parent company and several officers
and directors had artifically depressed the price of the subsidiary's stock,
which the parent corporation then sought to acquire through a tender offer.
The court found that the conduct described was not manipulation in the lob-5
sense and, after a careful examination, found only one proper allegation of
deception. However, the court was concerned that "there may be a point
where the facts disclosed by corporate management, though true, are so devoid
of explication or other supporting data that the overall disclosure becomes
deceptive, and a claim is stated under the federal securities law."51 1 The court
continued with a very provocative summary:
The line between nondisclosures that amount only, at most, to mis-
management and nondisclosures so significant that they constitute
deception actionable under Rule lOb-5 cannot be drawn with preci-
sion. To be sure, there is a measure of arbitrariness in drawing it, for
the factors that must be considered in making the determination are
not quantitatively measurable. What is clear is that the sweep of fed-
eral law has been drawn tighter by the decisions in Santa Fe and
other recent cases. Just how tight the string has been drawn is uncer-
509. Id. at 1323 (quoting Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712
(N.D. IlM. 1969).
510. 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 230-35, 324-29
supra.
511. Id. at 1365.
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tain, and, at least until the Supreme Court again addresses the ques-
tion, the lower courts must attempt to fashion a useful way to
approach such questions.
Whatever the boundary of the federal court's role in this area is
ultimately drawn, however, this case is likely to fall either near it or
directly on it. Certainly the complaint here, while it is composed es-
sentially of acts of mismanagement, paints an overall picture that is
at least very close to the type of deception contemplated by Rule lOb-
5. But in these circumstances, where the language of recent Supreme
Court decisions provides little specific guidance, this court is con-
strained to follow the tone of those decisions. From Santa Fe must
come the notion that where as here the central thrust of a claim or
series of claims arises from acts of corporate mismanagement, the
claims are not cognizable under federal law. To hold otherwise
would be to eviscerate the obvious purpose of the Santa Fe decision
• . . by artful legal draftsmanship. The plaintiffs here have, with un-
deniable skill, woven a complex series of acts of mismanagement into
a fabric that appears to reflect a scheme of corporate deception. Yet
the fabric is nonetheless woven from the thread of corporate mis-
management. For that reason, this court is constrained to follow the
flow of recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of securities regu-
lation and to resolve this difficult legal question in favor of the de-
fendants.5 12
3. The Reluctance of Federal Judges to Relegate
Plaintiffs to State Courts
At the heart of the reluctance of the circuit courts to leave these issues to
the state courts may be a skepticism about the adequacy of state law remedies
to protect investors. This skepticism was apparent in Great Western United
Corp. v. Kidwell.513 In Great Western the Fifth Circuit, in finding that the
Williams Act pre-empted an Idaho takeover statute, commented on Idaho's
legislative scheme for protecting investors:
Even if we accept appellant's interpretation of the legislature's pur-
pose, it is . . . true that Idaho chose to protect investors differently
from the way Congress protected investors. Instead of relying upon
investors' decisions after full disclosure, Idaho relies upon the busi-
ness judgment of corporate directors with a fiduciary duty to their
shareholders. Idaho's 'fiduciary approach' to investor protection may
be one way to protect shareholders, but it is an approach Congress
rejected. 514
The court went on to point out the difficulties faced by plaintiffs seeking to
recover under a scheme such as Idaho's.
In general, a state legislature may be entitled to assume that the
512. Id. at 1365-66.
513. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, sub. nom Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (venue improper).
514. Id. at 1279.
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directors and officials of a target company will honor their fiduciary
obligations. It would not be surprising, however, if another legisla-
tive body declined to make the same assumption. To establish a
claim under state law, a shareholder usually must overcome a pre-
sumption that directors act properly and prove that they acted in self-
interest. Fe plaintj9s have successfully met this burden*515
VII. THE SANTA FE MANDATE SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED: THE NEED
FOR A FEDERAL STATUTORY FIDUCIARY STANDARD
The confusing and conflicting nuances of the fiduciary duty cases demon-
strate the need for express federal fiduciary standards. Specific arguments
based on the law of these cases may be made to support the creation of a
fiduciary duty under federal law. First, the federal courts are already deciding
fiduciary duty questions. To determine lOb-5 causation, the federal courts
must review the fairness of the transaction. Not only is this review actually a
discussion of whether the fiduciary duty has been breached, it also focuses a
court's analysis on fairness, 5 16 which according to Santa Fe is at best a subsid-
iary purpose of the present federal securities laws. The federal laws should be
amended to allow the courts to do directly what they are now doing indirectly.
Second, the Santa Fe progeny, in defining causation, have made the availabil-
ity of a federal remedy dependent upon the availability of injunctive relief
under state law. This gives two avenues for relief to those plaintiffs who can
prove that they would have been successful under state law and no remedy to
those plaintiffs who cannot. Third, there can be no consistency under present
law among the circuits or even within any one circuit because the circuit court,
in determining causation, must look to a particular state (after solving the con-
flict of laws problems) to see if an injunction would be granted by that state. If
State A would grant an injunction, and State B in the same circuit would not,
the circuit would be obliged to reach different results on the same facts. The
plaintiff in State A could proceed in federal court under lob-5 because he
could show causation under lOb-5; the plaintiff in State B could not. Fourth,
the determination of causation requires the federal courts to become deeply
involved in the formulation and interpretation of state law,5 17 a result decried
by Santa Fe. Under a federal standard, issues of state law could be avoided by
the federal courts. Fifth, the law is more confusing when both federal and
state standards are applied to the same theory. The court must apply federal
515. Id. at n.51 (emphasis added by Great Western Court).
516. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 651-61 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldis-
et, J., dissenting).
517. This development of the materiality standard demonstrates the difficulty federal
courts are having, and will continue to have, in expansively construing the federal securi-
ties laws while attempting to avoid confficts with state corporate law. In each case, the
federal court must immerse itself in an extensive inquiry into the existence of state reme-
dies, the elements of the state action, the evidentiary sufficiency as perceived by the state
court, and the plaintiff's perception of his case in state court. When the state law is
unclear, as may often be the case, the court must speculate on each of these issues, hope-
lessly involving itself, and the federal securities laws, in matters of state corporate law.
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d at 660.
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law to determine standing under Birnbaum, scienter, materiality, and decep-
tion. To determine causation, the court must apply inherently ambiguous
state law concepts of "fraud," "fiduciary duty," and "fairness." This confusing
combination of state and federal law creates an inescapable maze for the cor-
porate planner, the litigator, and the judge. Greater clarity would result under
a federal statute, interpreted exclusively by reference to federal precedent.
Sixth, the federal courts' reluctance to defer to state law is based upon a genu-
ine and well-founded skepticism regarding the adequacy of relief under state
law as interpreted by state courts.518 There is often little precedent under state
law, and state judges may be inexperienced in handling certain corporate and
securities questions. Seventh, it is a rare corporate question that does not tran-
scend the boundaries of any one state. Corporations may be incorporated in
one state, have a principal place of business in another, do business in several,
and have shareholders in fifty. Questions regarding the fiduciary relationship
of the corporation's directors to the entity and its shareholders are too impor-
tant to be settled by state law, which may be neither well-developed nor pre-
dictable. Finally and most important, even those cases that follow Santa Fe in
letter and spirit must now spend an inordinate amount of time and verbiage
discussing real or feigned issues of deception that should be irrelevant.519 If
the case involves essentially fiduciary duty claims, the energy of the parties
and courts can be spent more efficiently discussing fiduciary duty issues. As it
now stands, that issue--often the real issue in the case-gets lost in elaborate
and circuitous discussions of misrepresentation, omission, materiality, manip-
ulation, and causation. This result is directly attributed to the Santa Fe man-
date and the lack of an express cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
under federal law.
No cause of action is more central to preserving the rights of a share-
holder than a suit to enforce the fiduciary duty owed to him and the corpora-
tion. It is much too important to be entangled with other issues and to depend
upon the conflict of laws determination of whichever happens to be the rele-
vant state. The progeny of Santa Fe, by their confusion, circuity, and evasion,
demonstrate the necessity for an express federal statute. Legislation should be
passed by Congress to give federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over the
518. State fiduciary duty laws have not effectively redressed this imbalance. These laws
impose a low standard of fiduciary duty, which has been further weakened by years of
near desuetude and a tradition of case law interpretation favorable to corporate manage-
ment. Moreover, the shareholder's ability to institute derivative suits based on such
fiduciary duty laws has been limited, in several key jurisdictions, by procedural barriers,
notably a requirement to post security for costs. Although corporate controllers thus
have little to fear from these state laws, self-dealing transactions are still usually con-
cealed from shareholders. It is such failure to disclose that allows these transactions to
be reached by rule lOb-5, at least in cases where the breach of fiduciary duty involves a
transaction in securities.
Id. at 661 (citing Note, Suitsfor Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule JOb-S After Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1874, 1876-77 (1978)).
519. Federal courts are especially cautious in granting motions for dismissal, judgments on
the pleadings and summary judgments in federal securities law cases because "discovery is often
necessary for the shareholder to obtain the specific facts from insiders in the corporation required
to fully develop its claim." Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. at 295.
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fiduciary duty of directors to the corporation and its shareholders and over
derivative actions alleging breach of that duty. Then the federal courts could
focus on fairness-as they should-without the artificial constraint of relating
fairness to causation under lOb-5 and without the hurdle of interpreting non-
existent, inexact state law.
If Congress were to pass a federal statute creating an express federal cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty, a central issue to address is whether the
courts should be required to defer to the business judgment of disinterested
directors who decide not to bring an action on behalf of the corporation for
breach of the duty. The trend, at least in federal courts, seems to be to defer to
the directors' decision not to sue, provided that they are disinterested and they
act in good faith.520 This deference is sensible and desirable because it
(1) avoids costly litigation; (2) leaves the question of fairness to persons
elected by the shareholders; and (3) results in more knowledgeable decision-
making because the directors presumably have an intricate knowledge of the
company far superior to that of a judge.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress should pass a statute creating a fiduciary duty of directors and
of majority shareholders to the corporation and to minority shareholders and
giving the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over breach of that duty.
The statute should require the federal courts to defer to the business judgment
of the company's disinterested directors who decide in good faith that the cor-
poration should not sue. If deferral to business judgment is required, the only
questions left for any court would be whether the directors were disinterested
and acted in good faith.
This legislation would not only remove litigation from state courts, which
are often ill-equipped to handle these issues, but also would limit fiduciary
duty litigation in the federal courts, since the threshold questions in a deriva-
tive action would be whether the directors who decided not to sue were disin-
terested and whether they acted in good faith. If no significant number of the
directors are deemed to be disinterested or if the directors are deemed not to
act in good faith, the court, absent a vote by a majority of the minority share-
holders not to bring the action, would hear the case on its merits and examine
the fairness of the transaction in order to decide whether the fiduciary duty
was breached. Regardless of the merits of the fiduciary duty claim, if material
misrepresentations or omissions were made either to the disinterested directors
or to the shareholders, an action could be still brought under lOb-5for decep-
tion. Express legislation would permit fiduciary duty and deception actions to
be heard by federal courts without the misdirected efforts of forcing the square
peg of fiduciary duty into the round hole of disclosure under lOb-5.
52
520. See text accompanying notes 125-61 supra.
521. A more detailed description of the author's proposal for the federal legislation is beyond
the scope of this article. She believes, however, that this article provides direction and guidance
and plans to develop her proposal more fully in a future article.
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